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Thesis abstract
This thesis studies the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance in the context of U.S. institutions. The aim o f the thesis is to contribute 
to its field of research from a mainly Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) perspective. 
Hence, this thesis is not a direct contribution to Agency Theory (AT) which has been 
the dominant paradigm in the field of corporate governance and firm performance up 
to this day. However, given that most of the relevant research in this area o f study has 
been, for the last thirty years, conducted using AT, this thesis starts with a critical 
appraisal of this literature and a statement of the reasons why AT is not employed.
The thesis's critical review of AT identifies important problems. A key issue is that 
the field is divided in two camps, both of which rely on AT, which nevertheless reach 
diametrically opposed conclusions: while one group of researchers finds a significant 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, an opposing faction 
argues that no such relationship exists. This thesis criticizes this literature by (a) 
arguing that the conflicting results are the consequence of: not applying the different 
AT theories to the class of phenomena they were designed to explain (b) by showing 
that part of the extant research is in a pre-theoretical stage, and (c) by mustering the 
arguments of AT theorists who have stated that some of their own work is flawed.
It is because of these pitfalls in AT that this thesis is designed to contribute to the 
field of corporate governance and firm performance from a mainly TCE perspective. 
Starting with the TCE approach to corporate governance, this thesis uses insights 
taken from a lifecycle theory of the firm to fill in gaps in TCE concerning the issue of 
bilateral dependency between a firm and its shareholders. Thus, a key contribution of 
the thesis is a new model which explains how corporate governance changes as the 
firm matures and the effects of such changes on firm performance.
The model is then tested for empirical validity at which stage additional important 
contributions are made, especially, a new measurement of firm financial autonomy, 
the “A-index”, is developed. Moreover, an entrenchment index currently available in 
the literature is employed, and investment performance and firm valuation are 
measured employing marginal q and Tobin’s q respectively. The empirical results 
provide statistically significant evidence in favour of the predictions o f the model. The 
thesis concludes that the new combined theory is an important contribution to positive 
economics and finance: the theory states clear, testable, predictions which are 
supported by the data.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1. Introduction and motivation of the thesis
The field of corporate governance and firm performance has flourished during the 
last thirty years. Thanks to the effort and resources invested in this area of research 
our knowledge o f the topic has increased exponentially and many original theoretical 
and empirical contributions have been made. However, the field o f study is still 
relatively young and there is still important controversy that needs to be clarified and 
theories that need to be refined.
Since the very beginnings of the field the key controversy has been, without a 
doubt, whether or not there actually exists a relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. The problem is that Agency Theory (AT), which 
has been the dominant theoretical paradigm, is malleable enough, so that starting from 
its premises opposed conclusions as to the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance can be reached. Thus, as it will be discussed in the literature 
review, two opposing camps have emerged: one group that maintains that there exists 
a strong relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, and 
another which denies this relationship.
One may expect that such controversies could be resolved by carrying out 
empirical tests of the theories in question. However, a cursory review o f the empirical 
literature reveals that opposing camps have found that the empirical evidence supports 
their respective theoretical positions. Thus, after many years o f investigation the result 
of empirical work in the field of corporate governance and firm performance remains 
inconclusive. Indeed, it has even occurred that results obtained using data from 
substantially the same set of firms during the same temporal period has been used by 
researchers of the two opposing groups to support their contrasting theoretical 
predictions. 1
On the other hand, this apparent inability of AT arguments to unambiguously 
predict the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance seems to 
have stimulated an implicit movement in the field characterized by an intention to 
shun theory and instead to rely solely on empirical methods. The old motto “don’t 
think, find out” seems to embody this trend. Setting aside obvious problems of
1 Compare the samples and the results o f Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and those o f Morck et al. (1988).
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interpretation (it is always possible to explain the meaning o f empirical findings in 
more than one way) an important difficulty with this approach is that it can be shown 
that no scientific empirical work can be undertaken without the researcher having 
some guiding ideas as to what data is relevant to the investigation. The relevant facts 
of nature that researchers need to collect in order to carry out their empirical work just 
do not, of their own accord, separate themselves from the infinite set o f facts that exist 
in nature, nor do they come with their noteworthy characteristics duly labelled in 
advance for them (Cohen, 1953, pp. 76-77). Thus, in order to decide what data should 
be collected the investigator needs at least a rudimentary idea as to what is relevant to 
the study in question. That is, it is impossible to undertake empirical work without, at 
a minimum, the building blocks of a theory at hand. In short, it is impossible to rely 
exclusively on empirical methods because even the simplest empirical work requires 
assumptions o f a theoretical nature as to what data must be collected.
But then, being the case that (a) it is impossible to undertake scientific work 
without at least the rudiments of a theory, (b) that it seems that AT arguments cannot 
be relied upon to unambiguously predict the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance, and (c) given that a considerable amount of 
information about empirical relationships has been accumulated thanks to the 
excellent efforts of previous researchers in the field, why not take the next step and 
attempt to build a fully developed theory based on the solid foundation of prior 
theoretical work, different than AT, which is known to have “proved their mettle” in 
other areas of the economics profession? These considerations constitute the main 
motivation for the present doctoral thesis.
In order to provide solid theoretical foundations for the study of corporate 
governance and firm performance the present work will revisit the ideas of Nobel 
laureate Oliver E. Williamson with the intention of extending the application of his 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) framework (Williamson, 1985; 1996) into this 
field of study. The key reason for selecting the TCE paradigm is its demonstrated 
robustness. Over the years, TCE has proved to be a reliable tool to study a wide 
variety of contracting phenomena and in each occasion the results have shown 
unambiguous theoretical predictions which have been amply supported by the data 
(Williamson, 2005). Clear-cut predictions and solid empirical corroboration are 
certainly desirable properties in any scientific work.
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At this point the question may arise that if  TCE is that good why has it not been 
widely applied already to the field presently at hand? One important reason is that 
Williamson’s terminology can be disconcerting for financial economists steeped in 
the AT paradigm. For instance, for AT scholars the term “transaction costs” usually 
refers to the costs of carrying out a trade i.e. commissions and the difference between 
the price obtained and the midpoint of the bid-offer spread. It is essential to emphasize 
that this is definitely not the central meaning attached to the term in TCE. First o f all, 
among TCE scholars a “transaction” refers to a long term relationship between two 
parties where the identity of the parties matters while, on the other hand, a one-off 
trade between an anonymous buyer and a seller is mainly referred to as an 
“exchange”. Secondly, in TCE the term transaction costs refers to the costs of 
policing a transaction in order to prevent opportunism from occurring, this involves 
expenses destined to the establishment o f contractual safeguards designed to protect 
the parties involved. Thus, the proper understanding of the meaning o f TCE requires 
the study of new terminology (such as “bilateral dependence”, “specific assets”, etc.) 
and patient consideration of how all these concepts fit together. Once such 
understanding is attained, however, the researcher is richly rewarded with the 
possession of a powerful theoretical lens with which to study economic organization 
and a useful tool to derive clear-cut testable predictions.
Another reason why nowadays TCE is not broadly employed in the field of 
corporate governance and firm performance is that, as it stands today, the theory 
cannot be directly applied. To be applied in this field of study TCE requires further 
elaboration. Specifically, up to now TCE has only considered transactions in which 
the condition o f  bilateral dependency between the parties is assumed to hold. In such 
cases, the parties in question always need each other to be better off. In contrast, in the 
case o f corporate governance and firm performance while young cash-hungry 
corporations will likely depend on shareholders for their funding, it is palpable that 
mature firms with abundant cash flows may not depend on their shareholders since 
they have an alternative source of funding. Clearly, in the latter case bilateral 
dependency is unlikely to hold. Thus, this thesis contends that in order to make TCE 
applicable to the study o f corporate governance and firm performance it is necessary 
to incorporate insights from a lifecycle theory o f the firm. For this reason, in the 
present doctoral study the firm life-cycle theory of Dennis C. Mueller (Mueller, 1969; 
1972), a time honoured theory in the field of industrial economics, will be adopted
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and adapted to the TCE paradigm. The key idea is that the characteristics of the 
transaction {bilateral dependency, safeguard intensity, opportunistic activities, etc.) 
between the firm shareholders and the “control” of the corporation will change as the 
firm matures, -and that the effects o f such changes on firm performance can be 
unambiguously predicted.
Crucially, the preceding paragraph touches on the fundamental lessons which can 
be leant from  the mainly TCE approach developed in this thesis that we do not learn 
from AT: firstly, that the emphasis of the theory in the field o f corporate governance 
and firm performance should be in determining the degree to which the condition of 
bilateral dependency between the “control” of the corporation and its shareholders 
holds, and secondly that the assumption of opportunistic behaviour in the TCE 
framework implies that a contractual safeguard such as the board o f directors will 
only work properly if it is in the best interests of both parties that a competent 
safeguard is put in place and maintained. This contrasts with the two main AT 
approaches to be discussed in this thesis which place all o f the attention either on 
ownership structure or in the characteristics of the board o f directors (e.g. board 
composition and board size), approaches which have led many an analyst to conclude 
that improved corporate governance can be attained by simply changing the values of 
these two variables.
A good illustration o f the above mentioned differences is the case o f Velcro 
Industries producer o f the “ubiquitous hook-and-loop fastener” (Berrs, 1994). At the 
end of the 1980s Sir Humphrey Cripps, who had “long controlled 67% of Velcro 
Industries”, found that his company was financially independent from shareholders 
for the foreseeable future as the company was reporting record earnings (thanks to the 
Velcro brand name) while there were limited profitable investment and growth 
opportunities since at the time “several companies around the world produced a 
similar product” as they had developed “cheap knockoffs, hurting Velcro abroad” 
(Berrs, 1994). In view o f Velcro’s financially autonomous situation Sir Humphrey 
decided to “attack Velcro’s stock price [by] eliminating the dividend [and] 
aggressively [writing] down assets to slash earnings” with the intention of buying out 
Velcro shareholders cheap (Berrs, 1994).
Now, if we attempt to interpret this case from the point of view of the version of 
AT which emphasizes ownership structure as a means o f mitigating agency conflicts 
we find that the situation hardly fits the theory’s predictions. With 67% of the stock of
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Velcro under the control of the owner-manager one would expect that agency 
conflicts would not be nearly as severe as the case illustrates. Thus from the 
perspective o f this version o f AT such a situation would likely be considered a puzzle. 
In contrast, seen from the perspective o f TCE the situation is very clear, Sir 
Humphrey attacked the shareholders because they were not needed for the well 
functioning of the company. On the contrary, they were superfluous as any additional 
equity funding deemed necessary could easily be generated from the company’s 
earnings. Had the company needed substantial equity funding from its shareholders 
his behaviour towards them would have been completely different.
On the other hand, an analyst examining Velcro’s case from the point of view of 
the version of AT which emphasizes the importance of the board of directors as a 
means to mitigate agency conflicts would probably conclude that corporate 
governance could be improved by changing the composition o f the board o f directors. 
Since this version of AT asserts that outside directors have incentives to develop a 
reputation in mitigating this kind of control problems, our analyst would likely 
recommend that the conflict of interests above could have been alleviated by forcing a 
change in the composition of Velcro’s board of directors, so that it would have a 
majority o f outside directors thereafter. Moreover, the analyst would likely point out 
that this change in board composition could be achieved, for instance, if  a government 
agency makes such board compositions compulsory (similar to what the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission implemented in late 2003). In contrast, if we 
examine this measure from the point of view of TCE there is good reason to believe 
that it would not work. As mentioned above the assumption of opportunistic 
behaviour in the TCE framework implies that a contractual safeguard such as the 
board of directors will only work if  it is in the best interests of both parties that a 
competent safeguard is maintained. Thus, even if  we assume -fo r the sake of 
argument- that it is the case that the vast majority of outside directors do have strong 
incentives to protect shareholder interests, seen from the perspective of TCE it would 
be naive to think that a determined “control” of the corporation would not have the 
ability to find and successfully elect to the board a sufficient number o f biased outside 
directors who would continue to favour its interests.
In the following subsections, the research question and the contribution of this 
doctoral thesis are stated. This is followed by a detailed chapter summary.
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1.2. Research question and basic definitions
As mentioned above, the present doctoral research will examine the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance in the context of U.S. 
institutions. In particular, the research question that this thesis aims to answer is the 
following: concerning the large U.S. publicly held corporation, is it the case that 
corporate governance affects firm performance? Let us examine the key concepts 
involved in the research question more closely, so that it is clearly understood what is 
meant when we speak o f corporate governance and firm performance in the present 
work.
From the perspective of economics and finance, corporate governance refers to the 
set of constraints and controls which protect shareholders interests from potential 
managerial discretion, that is, from the possibility that managers, taking advantage of 
the ample powers bestowed upon them over the corporation’s assets, benefit 
themselves at the expense of their shareholders. As we shall see in this thesis, modem 
financial economic theory informs us that the checks on the discretion of the top 
management of the large publicly held corporation consist o f a variety o f corporate 
governance mechanisms including: incentive alignment arrangements (e.g. managerial 
ownership of stocks), monitoring by the corporation’s board of directors, and the 
threat of takeover (i.e. the “market for corporate control”), among others.
Since in this literature it is often assumed that the managements o f large publicly
held corporations, if  left unconstrained, would likely advance their own interests at
the expense of shareholders, an important field of research within financial economics 
studies whether the performance o f  the firm  is related to the effectiveness o f corporate 
governance constraints. In this field of study, firm  performance is usually measured 
by employing estimates of firm valuation (usually Tobin’s q which is the ratio the 
market value of the firm divided by the replacement value of the firm’s assets), 
accounting performance ratios such as Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets 
(ROA), and measurements of investment performance (e.g. “marginal q” which is the 
ratio of a firm’s return on investment over its cost of capital).
1.3. The contribution of the thesis to the literature
The key contributions that the present thesis aims to provide to the corporate 
governance and firm performance literature are threefold.
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Firstly, this thesis aims to contribute to the field by performing a critical review of 
the AT literature. The objective is not to downplay or in any way diminish the 
importance o f AT, but instead to carry out constructive criticism o f the ideas 
involved: if  the key weaknesses in the literature are clearly indicated future work will 
hopefully correct them.
As mentioned above, a key issue is that the field is divided in two camps, both of 
which rely on AT, which nevertheless reach diametrically opposed conclusions: while 
one group of researchers finds a significant relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance, an opposing faction argues that no such 
relationship exists. Thus, this thesis criticizes this literature by (a) arguing that the 
conflicting results are the consequence of not applying the different AT theories to the 
class of phenomena they were designed to explain2 (b) by showing that part o f the 
extant research is in a pre-theoretical stage, and (c) by mustering the arguments of AT 
theorists who have stated that some of their own work is flawed. It cannot be 
emphasized enough that the criticism of the literature presently provided is given in a 
constructive spirit. It is hoped that researchers who rely on the AT paradigm will 
carefully consider the present criticism of ideas and either prove it false using sound 
scientific arguments or adopt corrective measures in their future work. Only by 
knowing and correcting our mistakes we can make scientific progress.
The second contribution of this thesis to the literature consists in the creation of a 
new theoretical framework which combines insights taken from TCE and the lifecycle 
of the firm. As mentioned previously, the new framework explains how the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance develops through 
the various stages o f the lifecycle of the firm and yields testable predictions which are 
consistent with the empirical evidence.
The reason for the choice of this mainly TCE approach in the present work is that 
no easy solutions for the gaps in the AT paradigm were found. It may be argued, for 
instance, that if  the problem is that researchers have misapplied the existing AT 
theories by applying them to phenomena other than that which they were designed to 
explain, then the solution rests in the implementation o f appropriate tests of each 
theory rather than the creation of a new theoretical framework. However, the problem 
is more complex than that. In addition, to the criticisms mentioned above there are
2 Cf. Friedman (1953).
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additional criticisms of AT that have been pointed out in the TCE literature which 
appear difficult to overcome, e.g. Williamson (2002) argues that AT suffers from an 
exclusive reliance on an ex-ante incentive alignment approach which disregards the 
mechanisms of ex-post governance. Moreover, it could be argued that there is a lack 
of a consolidated AT theoretical framework to study both entrepreneurial and 
managerial firms which can cause problems to researchers as they may apply these 
AT theories to the wrong kind of firm.
Thirdly, the thesis makes a contribution at the empirical level. Specifically, an 
empirical counterpart for the key theoretical concept of bilateral 
dependency/autonomy (a characteristic feature of the long term relationships 
emphasised by the TCE perspective) labelled the “A-index” is developed. As it will 
be discussed later in the thesis, this index was constructed as a proxy for the 
theoretical concept of firm financial autonomy. The concept that the A-index is 
intended to capture is the phenomenon illustrated in Mueller's (1969, 1972) firm 
lifecycle theory viz. that mature firms will usually have cash flows which are larger 
than the amounts needed to fund all positive net present value projects on a continuing 
basis, while on the other hand, young firms will usually have cash flows which are 
usually smaller than the amount needed for the regular funding o f all positive net 
present value projects. Hence, the construction of the A-index involves the 
examination o f the relative size of a firm's cash flows vis-à-vis its investments over 
several years. The key issue is that a young firm which regularly depends on its 
shareholders for equity funding will not deviate from its usual performance in the 
event of receiving a one-off windfall if its management expects that in the successive 
years it will still have to ask its shareholders for more funding on a regular basis.
Overall, the new theory developed in the present doctoral work represents an 
important contribution to the positive economics and finance literature since it states 
clear, testable, predictions which are supported by the data.
1.4. Plan of the thesis
This section presents an outline o f this thesis. The summary below briefly 
considers the motivation and contents of each chapter. It may be useful to return to 
this section at any time in order to quickly review the arrangement o f the thesis.
In view of the fact that AT has historically been the dominant paradigm in 
economics and finance when it comes to the study of corporate governance and firm
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performance for the last three decades, Chapter 2 performs a critical examination of 
the most influential versions of this theory. The objective of this chapter is to identify 
pitfalls in AT so that measures can be taken in later chapters to avoid them. The idea 
is that by building a new theory that avoids the drawbacks in the current literature the 
present doctoral research will be in a better position to answer the research question of 
this thesis and thereby make a contribution to the field.
After examining AT’s entrepreneurial theory of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) and two different versions of AT’s theory of large modem corporations (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; and Jensen’s 1986), Chapter 2 finds two main pitfalls. The first 
drawback o f AT is the fact that it tends to focus in ex-ante incentive alignment and 
that it is inclined to disregard the mechanisms of ex-post governance, i.e. the 
mechanisms governing ongoing contractual relations (Williamson, 2002). The second 
difficulty in AT is that a consolidated theoretical framework is needed in which both 
the existence of entrepreneurial and managerial firms is taken into account.
Chapter 2 then suggests measures to avoid the pitfalls. First, it proposes that an ex­
post theoretical perspective such as TCE can be helpful to address existing theoretical 
weaknesses. Second, it puts forward that a logical approach to integrate 
entrepreneurial and managerial theories is to adopt a lifecycle theory perspective.
Chapter 3 reviews the empirical literature on corporate governance and firm 
performance that is based on AT and finds that it is inconclusive. Specifically, while 
one group of researchers finds that there exists a relationship between firm 
performance and corporate governance, there is an opposite camp that denies this 
relationship. Chapter 3 starts by analysing the empirical literature inspired by the 
entrepreneurial model by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that focuses on ownership 
structure and firm performance. It then moves to study the empirical work centred on 
the relationship between board composition and firm performance inspired by the 
work of Fama and Jensen (1983). Then, the chapter reviews a more recent empirical 
literature, also based on AT, that studies the relationship between indices of anti­
takeover provisions and firm performance. Finally, the chapter examines empirical 
studies that employ comprehensive lists of corporate governance variables.
Chapter 3 concludes that the mixed empirical results are closely related to the gaps 
in the theoretical literature: it is apparent that a more complete theory is needed. The 
chapter then suggests that such a theory can be constructed in three stages. First, it is 
necessary to adopt a theory that concentrates in studying the mechanisms that govern
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ongoing contractual relationships instead of focusing in ex-ante incentive alignment 
(as it is done in AT). It should not be missed that agency problems occur ex-post, 
during contract execution. Hence, Chapter 4 discusses Oliver E. Williamson’s TCE 
(Williamson, 1985, 1996). Second, the theory should be applicable to both 
entrepreneurial and managerial firms; accordingly Chapter 5 examines Dennis C. 
Mueller’s lifecycle theory of the firm (Mueller, 1969, 1972). Finally, using insights 
from both TCE and lifecycle theory, Chapter 6  builds a combined TCE-lifecycle 
theory.
Chapter 4 introduces key elements of Williamson’s Transaction Cost Economics. 
Particularly, the paradigmatic “make-or-buy decision” problem is discussed in which 
all of the powerful analytical apparatus of TCE play a role in the analysis. The chapter 
then goes on to examine the application of TCE to “the choice o f debt vs. equity” 
problem. In contrast to the make-or-buy case, however, the chapter finds that all the 
potent TCE tools previously introduced are not included in the debt vs. equity 
analysis. Particularly, for the equity governance structure the essential issue of 
bilateral dependency in the presence of specific assets is not examined in detail. Since 
for the case o f the equity governance structure it is straightforward to foresee 
circumstances in which bilateral dependency will not prevail, important questions 
regarding the effectiveness of the mechanisms of governance in containing 
opportunism are raised. The chapter concludes that a wide-ranging understanding of 
firm lifecycle is necessary in order to provide satisfactory answers to the issues raised.
Chapter 5 presents the lifecycle theory of the firm first proposed by Mueller and it 
argues that it can be used to address the problems identified in the previous chapters. 
Specifically, the lifecycle theory helps to avoid the pitfalls in AT by providing a 
description o f how firms evolve from entrepreneurial to managerial firms. Crucially, 
the lifecycle theory also helps to fill the gap in the TCE theory o f corporate 
governance. Since the theory suggests that young entrepreneurial firms will be heavily 
dependent on outside shareholders to finance investment projects, while on the other 
hand, mature firms will not, the lifecycle theory helps clarify the nature of the 
bilateral dependency between firms and shareholders (this is a crucial point that 
Chapter 6  exploits to build a combined TCE-firm lifecycle perspective). Finally, this 
chapter examines the weaknesses of the lifecycle theory o f the firm in its present form 
if it were used as a theory o f corporate governance.
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Chapter 6  develops a combined TCE-firm lifecycle theory which is specifically 
constructed to explain and predict how corporate governance affects firm performance 
in the context o f U.S. institutions. This is one of the main contributions of this thesis. 
It represents an original attempt to fill in the gaps and avoid the pitfalls in corporate 
governance and firm performance theory identified in previous chapters. This chapter 
combines the robustness of the TCE framework with some o f the key perspectives 
offered by the lifecycle theory of the firm. The resulting theory yields hypotheses 
concerning the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
which are empirically testable (the empirical tests are carried out in Chapter 8 ).
Chapter 7 discusses important issues regarding the selection and implementation of 
the methods needed to test whether the predictions o f the combined TCE-firm 
lifecycle theory are consistent with the factual evidence. The chapter begins by 
examining the choice o f econometric methods to be used. It then provides a 
discussion on the specification of the particular econometric regression equations to 
be estimated in order to test for the empirical validity of the theory’s predictions.
Chapter 8  performs empirical tests in order to determine if  the predictions derived 
from the combined TCE-firm lifecycle model constructed in Chapter 6  are consistent 
with the evidence. Using a sample of 475 U.S. firms over the period from 1990 to 
2008, and the econometric techniques examined in Chapter 7, the chapter finds that 
there is substantial evidence in favour of the predictions o f the thesis’ model.
Chapter 9 concludes the present work by stating its main results and findings. In 
addition, this chapter discusses the thesis’ theoretical and practical implications. 
Finally, the chapter comments on the limitations of the present work, and on the 
possibilities for future research.
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Chapter 2. Agency theory
2.1. Introduction
Ever since the times of the famous paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976) the 
mainstream of the financial economics profession has relied on Agency Theory (AT) 
to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. In 
view of the prominence of AT in the literature a critical analysis of this theory is 
clearly an indispensable task in this thesis. What is more, since the empirical work in 
the field of corporate governance and firm performance has been overwhelmingly 
conducted employing AT this is a necessary preliminary step for our critical 
discussion of the empirical literature in the next chapter.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the drawbacks in the AT theoretical 
literature. The idea is that once the pitfalls are identified, steps can be taken to avoid 
them, so that the present work is better able to answer its research question: is it the 
case that corporate governance affects firm performance? And thereby make a 
contribution to its field of study viz. corporate governance and firm performance.
After reviewing the theoretical literature, this chapter argues that there are two 
main weaknesses in the AT paradigm. Firstly, this chapter notes that early versions of 
the theory refer to an entrepreneurial firm (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976), while 
later (mutually incompatible) adaptations of the theory attempt to extend the 
applicability of AT to the large modem corporation (i.e., Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen, 1986). Given that no effort is performed on the part o f the theorists to provide 
a consolidated framework of the different versions of AT, or to sufficiently emphasize 
the limitations o f each version, there is a danger that empirical researchers using the 
different AT perspectives will likely misapply them.
A second weakness of AT is manifest in its historical development. In sharp 
contrast to previous AT work, Jensen (1986) argues that one of the main breakdowns 
(if not the main problem) of corporate governance occurs in managerial firms with 
large “free cash flows.” Now, since AT mainly relies in ex-ante analysis of contracts 
(e.g. AT examines incentive alignments between principals and an agents at the 
contract negotiation stage) as opposed to relying in an ex-post perspective that focuses 
on what occurs during contract execution (such as the appearance o f abundant free 
cash flows), AT is clearly a theory not originally intended to explain this type of 
corporate governance problem. Rather, the “agency costs of free cash flows” seem to
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emerge as an incompatible addition to previous AT theorizing when it was found that 
early theories proved unsatisfactory to explain the factual evidence.
This chapter contends that the first of these pitfalls can be best circumvented by 
adopting a firm-lifecycle perspective, while the second pitfall can be avoided by 
employing an ex-post analytical perspective that specialises in examining the 
mechanisms governing ongoing contractual relations, such as Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE).
The remainder o f this chapter is organized as follows. After discussing 
entrepreneurial AT in Section 2.2, we consider managerial AT in Section 2.3. The 
pitfalls of AT are examined in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2. Agency theory type I: an entrepreneurial firm
This section discusses the early theoretical developments o f AT. Although it seems 
that agency theorists at this time were of the opinion that the large modem corporation 
featuring “separation of ownership and control” occupied a preeminent position in the 
corporate sector, their theoretical treatment focuses in an principal-agent 
entrepreneurial model o f the firm in which an owner-manager is an agent of the 
shareholders who are taken to be the principals.
Before entering into the details o f early AT, however, it is important to discuss the 
behavioural assumptions underpinning AT. This will allow us to determine the 
characteristics of the theoretical actors in present in AT, and also to understand what 
agency theorists mean when they talk about ‘agency costs.’
2.2.1. Behavioural assumptions
Jensen and Meckling (1994, p. 5) describe the behavioural assumptions behind AT. 
They label their model o f human behaviour “the Resourceful, Evaluative, Maximizing 
Model (REMM).” The main points o f the model are the following:
1. Every individual is an evaluator: by this Jensen and Meckling mean that (a) each 
individual is interested in possessing almost every type o f ‘good’ e.g. status, peer 
approval, wealth, honour, etc., (b) that the individual is willing to make substitutions 
between the goods, as in the microeconomic concept of marginal rate o f substitution, 
and (c) that individual preferences are transitive as in the familiar notion of 
transitivity in microeconomics.
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2. “Each individual wants are unlimited”: this means that (a) each individual 
prefers more goods to less and (b) the individual cannot be satiated.
3. “Each individual is a maximizer”: this means that the individual will attempt to 
obtain “the highest level o f value possible” according to its preferences and subject to 
constraints. Here as in microeconomics, “the notion of an opportunity set provides the 
limit on the level o f value attainable by an individual” (Jensen and Meckling, 1994, p. 
5). Moreover, Jensen and Meckling (1994, p. 5) point out that “individuals are also 
constrained by the limits o f their own knowledge” and indicate that obtaining 
information in order to take better decisions is costly, if  not impossible. Importantly, 
this affirmation means that complex contracts will be incomplete.
Interestingly, points 1 to 3 are mainly consistent with the behavioural assumptions 
posited by traditional microeconomic theory. There is one important difference 
however: the reference to limits on knowledge indicates that there are boundaries on 
the individual’s rationality. An additional discrepancy between AT behavioural 
assumptions and those of traditional microeconomics resides in the following point:
4. “The individual is resourceful”: By this Jensen and Meckling mean that:
Individuals are creative. They are able to conceive of changes in their environment, 
foresee the consequences thereof, and respond by creating new opportunities... 
Human beings are not only capable of learning about new opportunities, they also 
engage in resourceful, creative activities that expand their opportunities in various 
ways.
(Jensen and Meckling, 1994, p. 5)
Thus, AT man is not the reactive individual of traditional micro-theory, he is 
capable of exercising foresight and transforming his environment in opportunistic 
ways. Putting together these behavioural assumptions with the commonplace 
observation that the economic interests of a given principal and its agent will not 
always be perfectly aligned and the fact that monitoring is costly, AT concludes that 
“there is reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the 
principal” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308).
From this deduction Jensen and Meckling derive the key concept of “agency 
costs.” In AT, agency costs refer to the economic costs generated in situations in 
which an agent acts in such a way that he benefits himself at the expense of a
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principal or principals, moreover, this concept also includes the costs incurred by the 
principals in their effort to prevent such opportunism. For example, if  a manager (an 
agent) in a firm consumes on the job, this will increase the cost o f production and 
reduce the firm’s profits. In this case it is said that agency costs have been incurred to 
the amount o f the value of the manager’s consumption. Moreover, since the principal 
will have had monitoring mechanisms in place designed to prevent the manager from 
consuming on the job, agency costs also include the costs o f undertaking such 
monitoring activities.
In the subsections below we will examine what Jensen and Meckling (1976) call 
the agency costs of equity, the agency costs o f debt and how they combine these into 
a theory o f ownership structure of the firm. It is essential to notice that the main point 
that Jensen and Meckling were trying to put across is that in an agency relationship 
the individuals involved will ultimately bear the costs of engaging in opportunistic 
activities, and that therefore it is in their best interest to try to minimize agency costs.
2.2.2. Agency costs o f  outside equity
Jensen and Meckling (1976, pp. 312-313) analyze the effect of the agency costs of 
outside equity by comparing the behaviour of an owner-manager when he owns 1 0 0 % 
of the shares o f stock o f a firm with the behaviour o f this same individual when he 
sells a fraction o f these shares to outsiders.
When the manager is also the sole owner of the firm AT predicts that -on  account 
of the assumption ofREM M  behaviour- it will act with a view to maximize its utility. 
Hence, the owner-manager is presented with a classic microeconomics problem where 
he is to maximize his happiness or ‘utility’ by choosing between a set goods based on 
his particular preferences and subject to a budget constraint. To simplify, Jensen and 
Meckling group the set o f goods into two categories: pecuniary returns and 
perquisites. The pecuniary returns consist of the after tax purchasing power or wealth 
the owner manager obtains from the company, and the perquisites include the benefits 
from “various non-pecuniary aspects of his entrepreneurial activities such as the 
physical appointments o f the office, the attractiveness of the secretarial staff, the level 
of employee discipline”, working at a intensity level he feels comfortable with (e.g. he 
can choose between pursuing new risky creative ventures vs. relaxing), etc. (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976, p. 312). The optimal solution to this problem is attained when
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the marginal utility derived from an additional monetary unit o f expenditure is equal 
for each o f the goods.
On the other hand, when the owner-manager sells shares of stock (i.e. residual 
claims) to outsiders (which gives them the right to share proportionally with the 
management on any contingent profits that the firm may have and also entitles them 
to enjoy limited liability) agency theory predicts that agency costs will be generated. 
Since the manager now only owns a fraction of the shares, he now only incurs a 
fraction of the costs from any perquisites he extracts from the company, whilst outside 
shareholders will bear the other fraction of the costs o f such perquisites without 
enjoying any benefit. Thus, the owner-manager has the opportunity to increase his 
utility by extracting a larger amount of perquisites at the expense of outside 
shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain that outside shareholders can limit 
(but not eliminate) such activities by spending resources on monitoring activities up to 
the point where the marginal cost of monitoring equals the marginal gains from 
reducing the opportunistic behaviour of the owner-manager.
However, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 318) the owner-manager is 
the individual who bears the agency costs of the relationship. The rationale stems 
from the authors’ additional assumption that the equity markets have rational 
expectations. In simple terms, this assumption implies that the buyers will be aware 
that the owner-manager will increase his perquisite consumption when his ownership 
percentage is reduced, and consequently the (reduced) price that outside shareholders 
will be willing to pay for shares will reflect the agency costs originating from the 
contractual arrangement.
Thus, according to this analysis, it is in the best interest o f  the owner-manager to 
spend resources in the optimal implementation o f  monitoring and bonding activities 
that limit his opportunities to appropriate perquisites. The reason is that any 
reduction in agency costs will increase the price that outsiders will be willing to pay 
for the company’s shares o f stock, thus ( 1 ) increasing the owner-manager’s wealth 
(through the appreciation of his shares of stock), and (2 ) reducing the financing costs 
of the firm.
Moreover, agency theory predicts that the owner-manager will be willing to accept 
to incur these agency costs as long as the benefits he receives from the agency 
relationship are large enough to increase his utility. In such cases, the benefits that the 
owner-manager obtains from the agency relationship may consist of diversification of
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his wealth, increased liquidity o f his assets, and/or the income from profitable projects 
he could not have otherwise funded alone.
It is important to stress that according to Jensen and Meckling’s analysis the costs 
that the owner has to bear in order to obtain additional funding from outside 
shareholders will increase as his fractional ownership falls. That is, agency theory 
predicts that the agency costs of outside equity will increase as the percentage of 
shares of stock held by the owner-manager decreases. The reason is that as the 
proportion of outside equity increases, the owner-manager’s incentives to exploit 
outside investors increase since the percentage of the cost he has to pay in order to 
enjoy additional perquisites declines.
Finally, a key aspect o f this part of the model that must be kept in mind is that the 
control of the management is undertaken by the rational shareholders alone. In this 
model, no other mechanisms that may assist in controlling agency costs are 
emphasized.
2.2.3. Agency costs o f  debt
Proceeding similarly, the effect of the agency costs of debt can be analyzed by 
comparing the behaviour of an owner-manager when he funds his firm by using 
exclusively his own capital with the behaviour of this same individual when he funds 
a fraction of his investment in the firm with his equity and borrows the rest. Since the 
situation when the owner-manager funds the firm exclusively with his personal 
resources has already been discussed in the previous subsection, this subsection 
concentrates solely on the case where the owner-manager issues debt.
When the owner-manager funds a fraction of the firm with his own funds and 
borrows the rest by issuing debt -b y  which he gives lenders the right to receive fixed 
payment(s) at pre-determined date(s) and also a set o f rights specified in the 
‘indenture provisions’-  agency theory predicts that agency costs will be generated. 
Since it is unfeasible to write contracts that protect bondholders from all possible 
unforeseen events, the owner-manager finds that he has opportunities to implement 
decisions that increase his wealth at the expense of bondholders. Specifically, Jensen 
and Meckling mention the following possibility:
The owner-manager will have a strong incentive to engage in activities (investments) 
which promise very high payoffs if successful even if they have a very low
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probability of success. If they turn out well, he captures most of the gains, if they turn 
out badly, the creditors bear most of the costs.
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 334).
The point is that in this and similar situations agency costs are created because the 
owner manager can potentially increase his utility at the expense of that of 
bondholders.
Moreover, if  the bondholders were to embark on the process of writing incredibly 
detailed provisions covering most operating aspects of the enterprise substantial 
agency costs would also be generated. There would be “the costs o f writing such 
provisions, the costs of enforcing them” and costs deriving from “the reduced 
profitability o f the firm induced because the covenants would occasionally limit 
management’s ability to take optimal actions in certain issues” (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976, p. 338).
As in the case of outside equity, Jensen and Meckling (1976) assume that rational 
bondholders recognize the incentives faced by shareholders and consequently pay less 
for the bonds due to the agency costs. Naturally, this means that the owner-manager is 
the individual who ultimately pays fo r  the agency costs o f  debt and as a result it is in 
his best interest to make an effort to reduce them. Moreover, the owner will be willing 
to accept to incur such costs as long as the benefits he or she receives from the agency 
relationships are large enough to increase his welfare.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the theory predicts that the costs that the 
owner incurs in order to obtain additional funding from bondholders will rise as his 
fractional ownership falls. The reason is that as the amount of debt increases the 
owner-manager has stronger incentives to increase the company’s exposure to risk 
because this will cause an increase in the value o f his equity. An increase in the level 
of risk in the projects taken up by the firm will solely benefit the residual claimer as 
he can pocket potentially higher profits. On the other hand, debt-holders will suffer a 
reduction in the value of their bonds since they will (at most) receive the previously 
agreed fixed payments while having to share the risk of potentially higher losses.
2.2.4. A T ’s theory o f  ownership structure
Jensen and Meckling (1976, pp. 343-346) integrate the concepts discussed in the 
previous two subsections into a theory of corporate “ownership structure.” The
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authors explain that they employ the latter term “rather than ‘capital structure’ to 
highlight the fact that the crucial variables [in their analysis] are not just the relative 
amounts of debt and equity but also the fraction of the equity held by the manager” 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 343).
Crucially, Jensen and Meckling (1976, pp. 343-346) argue that since it is the 
owner-manager who ultimately has to pay for the agency costs, he will be careful to 
procure the outside funds, both through debt and equity, in such a way as to minimize 
the total amount of agency costs.
Thus, an owner-manager faced with the problem of securing outside resources in 
order to fund profitable investments will chose to issue debt when “the marginal 
wealth increments from the new investments projects are greater than the marginal 
agency costs o f debt, and these agency costs are in turn less than those caused by the 
sale of additional equity” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 343). Conversely, the 
owner-manager will prefer to issue outside equity when the marginal benefits from 
the new investments are greater than the marginal agency costs of outside equity, and 
these agency costs are in turn less than those produced by the sale o f additional debt.
In sum, AT’s theory o f corporate ‘ownership structure’ -as  in Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)- predicts that the owner-manager will attempt to combine debt, outside equity 
and his personal equity in such a way as to minimize total agency costs fo r  the reason 
that he bears such costs.
Therefore, what Jensen and Meckling (1976) show is that, in accordance with 
microeconomic theory, firms maximise “profits, or more accurately, present value” 
(p. 307), because individuals have strong incentives to minimize agency costs.
2.3. Agency theory type II: a managerial firm
That the AT theory o f the firm as described in the previous section is incomplete in 
the sense that the emphasis of the analysis was not on the large modem corporation, is 
readily acknowledged by Jensen and Meckling when they write:
While we believe the structure outlined in the preceding pages is applicable to a wide 
range of corporations is still in an incomplete state. One of the most serious limitation 
of the analysis is that as it stands we have not worked out in this paper its application 
to the very large modem corporation whose managers own little or no equity. We 
believe our approach can be applied to this case but space limitations precludes
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discussion of these issues here. They remain to be worked out in detail and will be 
included in a future paper.”
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 356)
While the last quotation is ambiguous in the sense that it suggests that 
entrepreneurial AT may be applicable to the large modem corporation, other 
influential theorists have been categorical in their dismissal o f such a possibility. For 
instance according to Fama:
The striking insight of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
is in viewing the firm as a set of contracts among factors of production... This 
insight, however, is not carried far enough. In the classical theory, the agent who 
personifies the firm is the entrepreneur who is taken to be both manager and residual 
risk bearer. Although his title sometimes changes -for example, Alchian and Demsetz 
call him "the employer"- the entrepreneur continues to play a central role in the firm 
of the property-rights literature. As a consequence, this literature fails to explain the 
large modem corporation in which control of the firm is in the hands of managers 
who are more or less separate from the firm's security holders.
(Fama, 1980, p. 289)
In order to cover this gap in AT, a subsequent paper by Fama and Jensen (1983) 
expanded AT by building a special model for the case of firms in which ownership is 
separate from control. The fact that Jensen did not seek to expand the applicability of 
AT in this direction using the original entrepreneurial model is revealing.
23.1. The separation o f  ownership from control and the role o f  the board o f  directors
The starting point of Fama and Jensen’s (1983) approach is a “natural selection” 
view based in the so-called “economic Darwinism” perspective, which is noticeably 
influenced by the work of Alchian (1950). According to this approach, if  a form of 
organization such as the large managerial corporation survives and prospers in a 
highly competitive environment, then it must be the case that (a) it possesses 
significant advantages over other types of organizations such as e.g. partnerships, and 
that (b) it possesses special mechanisms that allows it to minimize agency costs. Thus, 
the task of the theorist is to identify where these advantages reside.
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2.3.1.1. Advantages o f  the managerial corporation over other organizational forms
According to Fama and Jensen, the advantages of the managerial corporation have
two main sources. The first is that the corporation is directed by professional 
management. In this regard it is argued that professional management likely has 
superior decision skills when compared to those of the entrepreneur since “decision 
skills are not a necessary consequence of wealth or willingness to bear risk” (Fama 
and Jensen 1983, p. 312). Therefore, according to this view, in virtue o f its possession 
of a superior administrative hierarchy the managerial corporation is comparatively 
better equipped to adapt to “complex organizational changes in the economic 
environment” (Fama and Jensen 1983, p. 312).
Secondly, since shareholders can buy and sell the common stock of managerial 
corporations with complete freedom, diversification allows shareholders to share and 
greatly reduce their risks. Therefore, through this mechanism, corporations have the 
additional advantage of being able to raise large amounts of capital at relatively low 
cost.
2.3.1.2. The board o f  directors as a mechanism to minimize agency costs
One o f the most important points in Fama and Jensen (1983) refers to their 
identification of the board of directors as a mechanism which helps to minimize 
agency costs. That is, the authors hypothesize that in organizations in which 
ownership is separated from control, agency costs are minimized through the 
institution of a board of directors. According to this view, shareholders delegate 
control of the firm to a board of directors and, in turn, the board hires a management 
in order to administer the corporation. The function of the board is to monitor the 
management on behalf o f the shareholders.
Moreover, inside directors (i.e. the corporation’s executives such as the CEO) are 
distinguished from outside directors who, it is argued, play a key role in guaranteeing 
the integrity of the board so that it does not conspire with managers to take advantage 
of shareholders. Thus, according to this perspective, outside directors constitute the 
backbone o f the corporate monitoring system.
According to Fama and Jensen (1983, p. 315) outside directors often hold a 
majority o f seats and “have incentives to carry out their tasks and do not collude with 
managers to expropriate residual claimants.” The authors explain their point of view 
as follows:
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Our hypothesis is that outside directors have incentives to develop reputations as 
experts in decision control. Most outside directors of open corporations are either 
managers of other corporations or important decision agents in other complex 
organizations. The value of their human capital depends primarily on their 
performance as internal decision managers in other organizations. They use their 
directorships to signal to internal and external markets for decision agents that (1) 
they are decision experts, (2) they understand the importance of diffuse and separate 
decision control, and (3) they can work with such decision control systems. The 
signals are credible when the direct payments to outside directors are small, but there 
is substantial devaluation of human capital when internal decision control breaks 
down...
(Fama and Jensen, 1983, p. 315)
2.3.1.3. The market fo r  corporate control as court o f  last resort
In addition to stressing the role o f the board of directors in minimizing agency 
costs Fama and Jensen also point out the role of stock prices as “visible signals” that 
can be used to monitor the performance o f corporate management. According to this 
view, since stock price swings convey the market’s evaluation of managerial 
decisions, corporate managements will likely feel pressure to perform in such a way 
that the price o f the stock remains high.
More important, however, is the role of the so-called “market for corporate 
control” that Fama and Jensen (1983) incorporate to their model o f managerial AT 
from the earlier work of Manne (1965). According to Fama and Jensen (1983, pp. 
313-315), the takeover market provides a court of last resort that is activated when the 
internal control system i.e. the board of directors breaks down and fails to control 
agency costs. Since this mechanism is deemed by the authors to be very costly, is 
supposed to work only in extreme cases in order to protect the shareholders from 
severe exploitation.
2.3.2. The Breakdown o f  internal control systems, the crisis o f  AT, and the agency 
costs offree cash flows
It is interesting that Fama and Jensen (1983) had hypothesised that the takeover 
market was a court o f last resort, for what followed was a tremendous increase in the 
number of hostile takeovers that lasted for the rest of the 1980s. Given that according
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to Fama and Jensen’s work the takeover solution was very costly, this increase of 
hostile takeovers could only mean that an enormous breakdown of the internal control 
systems (i.e. the board o f directors) of corporations in the U.S. had occurred and that 
correction was taking place.
Moreover, it was difficult for agency theorists to rationalize in terms o f “perquisite 
consumption” the massive takeover premiums that were being paid for the target 
firms by its acquirers. According to Jensen (1989, p. 64) “takeover LBO premiums 
average[d] 50% above market price.” As we will now see, the consequence of these 
developments was a dramatic shift from previous AT theorizing.
2.3.2.1A major shift in the emphasis o f  A T  theoretical assumptions
In view of the fact that many events taking place during hostile takeover wave of 
the 1980s were difficult to rationalize in terms of the work in AT that had been carried 
out up to that moment, many agency theorists revised the assumptions in their models.
The most important o f all the work in AT undertaken in this period is probably that 
o f Jensen (1986). In this piece o f work Jensen adopted the radical assumption (for a 
neoclassical economist) that:
Managers have incentives to cause their firms to grow beyond their optimal size. 
Growth increases manager’s power by increasing the resources under their control. It 
is also associated with increases in managers compensation, because changes in 
compensation are positively related to the growth in sales (see Kevin Murphy, 
1985).The tendency of firms to reward middle managers through promotion rather 
than year-to-year bonuses also creates a strong organizational bias toward growth to 
supply the new positions that promotion-based reward system require (see George 
Baker, 1986).
(Jensen, 1986, p. 323)
This is no small change in the emphasis of the assumptions used in AT. This 
behavioural assumption had been proposed in the so called “managerial” literature of 
the 1950s and 1960s, especially by Marris (1964). However, despite the existence of 
some evidence in favour o f the “managerial” theories o f the firm, this literature was 
largely ignored possibly because it tended to replace the assumption o f profit 
maximization with an assumption of growth maximization, and hence, some
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economists might have interpreted it as an attack on orthodoxy (for a review see 
Mueller, 1992). Now an influential neoclassical economist such as Jensen (1986) was 
adopting “managerial” assumptions. This can only be described as a major shift in the 
emphasis o f assumptions of AT.
2.3.2.2. The agency costs offree cash flows
From these ‘new’ assumptions Jensen (1986) develops a theory which has proven 
very influential and that he calls the “agency costs of free cash flows.” Jensen 
explains the theory as follows:
Free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have 
positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital. Conflicts 
of interest between shareholders and managers over payout policies are especially 
severe when the organization generates substantial free cash flow. The problem is 
how to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than investing it at below the 
cost of capital or wasting it on organization inefficiencies.
Jensen (1986, p. 323)
Thus, a second major change in Jensen’s AT models was that now managers could 
not only expropriate shareholders through perquisite consumption but also by refusing 
to pay out dividends in an efficient way. Interestingly, the view that “[t]he payout of 
cash to shareholders creates major conflicts” (Jensen 1986, p. 323) had been worked 
out previously by Marris (1964). Why had dividend policy received so little attention 
in AT so far? One likely answer can be sketched as follows.
Those familiar with the distinction between moral hazard opportunism and holdup 
opportunism will easily recognize from the arguments in Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
that the builders of entrepreneurial AT were only concerned with the former and 
disregarded the latter. According to Alchian and Woodward (1988) moral hazard 
opportunism occurs in situations in which it is difficult for a principal to monitor what 
an agent did, is doing or will do with its property, which is clearly the point that 
Jensen and Meckling put across with respect to perquisite consumption. In contrast, 
Alchian and Woodward (1988) explicate that holdup opportunism refers to 
circumstances in which one party attempts to expropriate the other by refusal to pay 
or serve and, moreover, the assets involved would lose much o f their productive value
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if  redeployed. Thus, an example of holdup opportunism would be refusal by 
management to pay out free cash flows.
Now, Jensen and Meckling (1976) disregard the possibility that holdup 
opportunism could play a role in their theory of the firm because their paper is, in 
many ways, an extension o f previous theoretical work carried out by Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972). In that paper Alchian and Demsetz reject the notion that holdup 
opportunism has any role to play in their contractual conception of the firm. Twelve 
years later, however, Alchian (1984) admitted that disregarding holdup opportunism 
had been a mistake, so that, by the time of Alchian and Woodward (1988), Alchian 
argues that both types of opportunism should be taken into consideration in a theory 
of the firm. Therefore, the fact that holdup opportunism is neglected constitutes a 
weakness in the early development of AT, and researchers who employ it seem to be 
unaware of it as Jensen does not point out this shortcoming o f early AT in his 1986 
paper.
2.3.2.3. Debt and the agency costs free cash flows
Another interesting point in the quotation above is that Jensen (1986) seems to 
suggest that something should be done to motivate the managers to disgorge the cash. 
Jensen (1983, p. 320) had suggested that AT was a positive theory i.e. a theory that 
provides “knowledge on how the world behaves,” however the quotation above has 
normative overtones. Rather than describing how the world works, it indicates that 
something should be done to achieve what seems to be a socially desirable outcome.
In this connection, Jensen points to the “benefits of debt in motivating managers 
and their organizations to be efficient” (Jensen 1986, p. 324). The argument is the 
following:
Debt creation, without retention of the proceeds of the issue, enables managers to 
effectively bond their promise to pay out future cash flows. Thus, debt can be an 
effective substitute for dividends.... By issuing debt in exchange for stock, managers 
are bonding their promise to pay out future cash flows in a way that cannot be 
accomplished by simple dividend increases. In doing so, they give shareholder 
recipients of the debt the right to take the firm into bankruptcy court if they do not 
maintain their promise to make the interest and principle payments. Thus debt
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reduces the agency costs of free cash flow by reducing the cash flow available for 
spending at the discretion of managers.
Jensen (1986, p. 324)
However, it is not clear how the “resourceful, evaluative, maximizing” 
managements of AT would be persuaded to take up large amounts o f debt, for this 
would evidently go against their interests since it reduces the benefits they can obtain 
from growth and increases the risk of bankruptcy in which case they would lose their 
job. Jensen (1986) points out that many managers used debt as a mechanism to protect 
themselves from the threat of imminent takeover, but this was only a short term 
solution. Evidence from later studies suggests that the long term solution implemented 
by numerous managements to prevent a hostile takeover consisted in the deployment 
of large number o f anti-takeover provisions (see Danielson and Karpoff, 1998).
As things developed, it is difficult to see how entrenched managements can be 
forced to take on extremely high levels of leverage so that the agency costs of free 
cash flows are minimized in practice. From reading Jensen (1989), it seems that the 
debt ratios1 necessary to satisfactorily control agency costs of free cash flows are 
similar to the average debt ratios for leveraged buyouts, which in that time were of 
about 85% (Jensen, 1989, p. 69). Compare this with the average debt ratio for public 
companies prior to a buyout, i.e. about 20% (Jensen, 1989, p. 69). It is hard to see 
how the self-interested managements assumed by AT would adopt and maintain over 
the long run such high levels of leverage o f their own accord. On the other hand, these 
levels of leverage are not uncommon for leverage buyout (LBO) firms such as 
Kohlberg Kravis and Roberts (KKR) which Jensen (1989) suggests will eclipse the 
publicly held corporation.
As we have seen, the spirit and the intent of AT is to demonstrate how agency 
costs are minimized by individuals because they bear such costs. It is possible that by 
pointing out to the benefits of debt in controlling agency costs of free cash flows 
Jensen attempts to show that agency costs will be minimized after all. However, it is 
doubtful that there exists any efficient mechanism which would encourage the 
managements o f firms with substantial free cash flows to adopt a high level of 
leverage over the long run, especially since managements have learned to insulate
1 By debt ratio Jensen (1989, p. 69) refers to “long term debt as a percentage o f debt plus equity.”
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themselves from the takeover threat through the deployment of anti-takeover 
provisions.
23.2.4 The breakdown o f  internal control systems
As discussed previously Fama and Jensen (1983) had argued that the board of 
directors was an effective mechanism that minimizes agency costs in the large modem 
corporation. Can the board of directors help contain the agency costs o f free cash 
flows? In view o f the events taking place during the takeover wave of the 1980s, 
Jensen (1989) argues that the Fama and Jensen (1983) hypothesis regarding outside 
directors was flawed:
The idea that outside directors with little or no equity stake in the company could 
effectively monitor and discipline the managers who selected them has proven hollow 
at best... In practice only the capital markets have played much of a control function.
Jensen (1989, p. 64)
Thus, according to Jensen’s latter view the board of directors of the large modem 
corporation cannot control the agency costs of free cash flows. The author suggests 
that only the capital markets can effectively discipline the management, which is a 
view that had been previously suggested by Marris (1964).
2.4. The pitfalls of AT
Based on the review o f the literature above this section argues that there are two 
main drawbacks in AT. This section discusses these pitfalls and proposes possible 
ways to avoid them.
2.4.1. The lack o f  a consolidatedframework
The first weakness of AT is that a consolidated framework is lacking. On the one 
hand we have an entrepreneurial firm modelled by Jensen and Meckling (1976). In 
this type of firm the entrepreneur cares about outsider’s valuation of his firm, because 
(among other reasons) the firm depends on outside investors for funding and the need 
for such funds provides the mechanism through which investors can control the 
owner-manager. According to this theory, the higher the percentage o f equity the 
entrepreneur owns, the better the mechanism works in minimizing agency costs.
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On the other hand we have two incompatible theories for the managerial firm in 
which ownership is dispersed among a myriad of shareholders. According to one of 
the theories, the board of directors is an efficient mechanism which minimizes agency 
costs. According to the other theory, managerial firms may or may not have “free cash 
flows.” If  free cash flows are present however, much o f these will be squandered in 
negative net present value projects due to the growth-maximizing tendencies of 
management, the inefficacy o f the board as a monitoring instrument, and the 
observation that the takeover market only works in extreme cases as a last resort.
It is essential that empirical researchers take into account that there exist different 
versions of AT, and that not all are compatible with each other. What would be an 
appropriate model for entrepreneurial firms is not suitable for managerial firms. 
Otherwise, agency theorists would not have bothered to create two separate types of 
theory. Thus, this is potentially a major pitfall for empirical research.
Clearly, a logical approach to integrate entrepreneurial and managerial theories is 
to adopt a firm-lifecycle perspective. Examples of firms that were originally created 
by an entrepreneur or entrepreneurs and later had their ownership dispersed and 
developed a bureaucracy with professional management are not uncommon: Boeing, 
Exxon, Caterpillar Inc., IBM... The lifecycle approach will be the one undertaken in 
this thesis. In this vein, Chapter 5 will discuss the lifecycle theory o f the firm first 
proposed by Mueller (1969, 1972).
2.4.2. Ex-ante vs. ex-post theorizing
The second weakness of AT is the fact that it tends to focus in ex-ante incentive 
alignment and that it tends to disregard the mechanisms o f ex-post governance, i.e. the 
mechanisms governing ongoing contractual relations (Williamson, 2002, pp. 172- 
173). Thus, for example Jensen and Meckling (1976) examine how the incentives of 
entrepreneurs and outside shareholders are aligned at the time when they sign their 
contract, but do not examine the mechanisms that would govern their relationship 
thereafter.
Given that according to our review o f AT it seems that the major breakdowns of 
corporate governance are likely to take place during contract execution i.e. the 
“agency costs of free cash flows,” in a mature managerial firm as opposed to a 
younger entrepreneurial firm, it seems essential that we adopt an ex-post perspective.
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In this regard, Oliver E. Williamson’s Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) appears to 
be relevant and convenient for the task. Thus, Chapter 4 will examine this theory.
2.5. Conclusion
AT originally started from the perspective that agency costs are merely a 
production cost like any other, that these are therefore minimized by an entrepreneur 
owner-manager because he has strong incentives to do so, and that consequently, 
firms would tend to maximize profits (or more precisely the present value of the 
firm). However, as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), and later firmly 
emphasized by Fama (1980), the original entrepreneurial AT formulation did not 
apply to the large modem corporation characterized by diffused ownership and 
professional management. To mitigate this gap, additional work was undertaken by 
Fama and Jensen (1983) to further show, how agency costs would be minimized in 
managerial firms. The key mechanism in the new model was the board of directors, 
which was assumed to be capable of minimizing agency costs in the context of the 
large managerial corporation. According to this model the firm would also maximize 
profits (present value).
However, events occurring during the 1980s ultimately induced Jensen (1986) to 
adopt the “managerial” assumption that managers tend to maximize growth, and that 
cash flows may play a role in the theory of the firm (note that cash flows do not 
usually play a role in neoclassical theories of the firm). Nevertheless, Jensen (1986) 
also pointed out that extremely high leverage (e.g. 1 0 -to-l debt to equity ratios, p. 
325) can help reduce conflicts of interest between shareholders and the management, 
thus reserving the view that firms may ultimately maximize profits after all.
The fact that there are two types of AT theory, one entrepreneurial and another 
managerial, calls for the creation of a consolidated framework. To try to employ only 
one of the theories to study the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance can be an Achilles' heel of AT in the sense that the researcher, in 
aggregating both entrepreneurial and managerial firms in a single database, would 
then apply a theory appropriate to only one kind of firm to both types o f companies.
The common observation that many firms start with a founder entrepreneur and 
end up at a later stage with dispersed ownership a professional management clearly 
points to the possibility of a unified theoretical framework through the expedient of a
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firm lifecycle perspective. With this point in mind. Chapter 5 will discuss the lifecycle 
theory of the firm originally developed by Mueller (1969, 1972).
Finally, since AT theory indicates that the conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and management may be more severe at a later stage o f the lifecycle of 
the firm when ownership is dispersed, a professional management has taken over, and 
the firm may have free cash flows, a theoretical framework with an ex-post 
perspective of the problem may be more appropriate than the ex-ante viewpoint which 
characterizes AT. In this respect, Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) clearly stands 
out since it is a theory which was devised with the purpose of studying the 
governance o f ongoing contractual relations. Thus, Chapter 4 will examine TCE and 
its possible application to this problem.
In sum, after reviewing the theoretical literature, this chapter concludes that the 
formulation o f a combined TCE-firm lifecycle theoretical framework seems to be the 
most appropriate approach to answer this thesis’ research question, that is, to 
investigate the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. But 
before this framework is constructed, it is important to first review the empirical 
literature in financial economics which, as it is mentioned in the introduction to this 
chapter, has relied heavily on AT.
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Chapter 3. Critical review of the empirical literature on corporate governance 
and firm performance
3.1. Introduction
This chapter performs a critical review (i.e. summary and evaluation) of that part 
of the empirical literature in financial economics which studies the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance. As it will be seen the main 
debates in this literature have been, for the last three decades, largely motivated by the 
AT theoretical approaches studied in Chapter 2. Specifically, while on the one hand a 
group of researchers have concentrated their work around the issue of whether 
ownership structure is related to firm performance in a way that is clearly inspired by 
the entrepreneurial model of the firm in Jensen and Meckling (1976), a separate group 
of researchers have focused their efforts in investigating whether certain 
characteristics o f the board of directors are associated to firm performance in a way 
that is visibly motivated by the managerial model in Fama and Jensen (1983).
Empirical work based on the AT perspectives has not been conclusive. There is 
considerable controversy surrounding each of the approaches, with one set of 
researchers arguing that corporate governance affects firm performance, and an 
opposite camp denying this relationship. Thus, while some researchers argue, and find 
empirically, that ownership structure is related to firm performance (Morck et al., 
1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991), others disagree 
and contend that controlling for an alleged endogenous relationship between the two 
variables there is no such effect, and also find empirical support for their position 
(Demsetz an Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). 
On the other hand, while some researchers find that the composition of the board of 
directors is related to firm performance (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Rosenstein and 
Wyatt, 1990; Yermack, 1996), others do not find such relationships (Fosberg, 1989; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Bhagat and Black, 2002). Moreover, in this last 
literature there is an important debate concerning the direction o f causality. 
Particularly, it has been argued that firms react to their realised performance by 
changing the compositions of their boards, and that for this reason it is not the case 
that the causal relationship goes from board composition to specific levels of firm 
performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Bhagat and Black, 2002). The present 
chapter criticizes these two debates by arguing that the conflicting results are the
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consequence of not applying the different AT theories to the class o f phenomena they 
were designed to explain. Clearly, logic dictates that entrepreneurial AT should be 
evaluated based on evidence drawn from a sample of entrepreneurial firms and that, 
on the other hand, managerial AT should be tested using a sample o f entrepreneurial 
firms. This chapter contends that this has not been the case and that this has caused 
the mixed results in the literature.
In addition, this chapter reviews a more recent third approach, also related to AT, 
which pays special attention to managerial entrenchment and it is characterized by the 
creation of indices of anti-takeover provisions (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 
2004). The main implication o f this approach is that entrenched managers can act in 
their best interests without having to worry too much about possible retaliation from 
the market for corporate control. This chapter argues that one key problem in this 
literature is that researchers find that available theory does not provide them with a 
unambiguous prediction of how the key variables employed may be related to each 
other and thus they resort to “asking empirical questions” (see Gompers et al. 2003). 
Moreover, it is argued that an additional problem with this recent approach is that it 
may be the case that entrenchment is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
certain kinds of managerial discretion to occur. For example, for recurring 
overinvestment to take place, the firm must also have a reliable source of free cash 
flows with which to over-invest.
Finally, this chapter examines a fourth approach which is characterized by the use 
of comprehensive lists of corporate governance variables. This strand of research 
examines empirically how inclusive sets of governance variables relate to firm 
performance. This chapter criticizes this part of the literature by arguing that it is in a 
pre-theoretical stage since no unambiguous explanation of the relationship between 
the variables deemed to be relevant is offered.
In view o f the lack o f conclusiveness of the debates in the literature, this chapter 
contends that the mixed results may ultimately be due to the pitfalls o f AT pointed out 
in Chapter 2. Consequently, this chapter argues that a new combined TCE-firm 
lifecycle theory of the firm that includes aspects o f both, entrepreneurial and 
managerial firms, in a logically consistent framework can prove helpful in 
circumventing the current stalemate in the empirical literature on corporate 
governance and firm performance.
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To show that the debate has been inconclusive and to shed light on the pitfalls in 
the literature, this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the debate on 
whether ownership structure affects firm performance. Section 3.3 addresses the 
debate on the relationship between the composition of the board of directors and firm 
performance. Section 3.4 reviews the recent literature on managerial entrenchment 
through the deployment o f anti-takeover provisions and its effects on firm 
performance. Section 3.5 discusses empirical work that uses comprehensive lists of 
governance variables. Section 3.6 concludes by summarizing the weaknesses in the 
empirical literature and by suggesting how the pitfalls may be avoided.
3.2. Ownership structure and firm performance
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has been the 
theme of a major debate in the corporate governance literature. The purpose of this 
section is to review this debate. After examining the prominent articles by Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) and Morck et al. (1988), the contributions o f latter researchers that 
have examined this issue are reviewed. Despite much work on the subject the debate 
remains inconclusive.
3.2.1. Demsetz and Lehn (1985)
Based on previous theoretical work by Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
take issue with the first part of Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) theory that the market 
value of the firm falls as the percentage ownership of the entrepreneur decreases. At 
the same time, however, Demsetz and Lehn not only agree with but surpass the 
second and central part o f Jensen and Meckling’s model: that there are offsetting 
mechanisms which act to minimize agency costs, so that ultimately firms maximize 
profits (present value). According to Demsetz:
The structure of ownership ... is an endogenous outcome of competitive selection in 
which various advantages and disadvantages are balanced to arrive at an equilibrium 
organization of the firm.
(Demsetz, 1983, p. 384)
The implication is that, according to this view, the ownership structures that we 
observe in the real world will be a function of the characteristics of, and the situations
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faced by, each particular firm under examination, and that this ownership structure 
will be chosen through competitive selection processes in such a way that only those 
structures that maximize profit (or present value) will exist in practice. Consequently, 
according to Demsetz there is no reason to expect a positive correlation between 
ownership concentration and profit rates.
To investigate the issue empirically Demsetz and Lehn (1985) perform a two stage 
least squares regression in which, in the key equation, a measure of accounting profit 
rates (accounting profit after taxes as a percentage o f the book value of equity) is 
regressed on various measures o f ownership concentration and control variables. 
Demsetz and Lehn find an insignificant negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and accounting profit rate, and conclude that the results support their 
hypothesis.
As we will see below, this result has been challenged on the grounds that Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) utilize an inappropriate econometric specification. However, perhaps 
it is more important to emphasize that the real weakness o f their argument resides in 
that there are important facts missing in their theory which, if  incorporated to the 
model, would change its predictions.
Demsetz and Lehn’s (1985) theory ignores that managements ordinarily have at 
their disposal a remarkable variety o f instruments with which to obstruct market 
mechanisms that may exert pressure towards a particular ownership structure. 
Moreover, their model ignores the problems associated with the agency costs of free 
cash flows. Thus, for example, a hostile takeover attempt might be viewed under 
Demsetz and Lehn’s perspective as an aspect of competitive selection processes that 
bring about a more concentrated ownership structure which is optimal for a firm 
which faces a particular situation, e.g. agency costs of free cash flows. In their view, 
the outcome of the hostile takeover would be to concentrate ownership and thereby 
mitigate agency costs and ensure profit maximization. However, if  the management in 
question induces the board o f directors of the firm to deploy anti-takeover provisions 
such as poison pills, staggered boards, supermajority vote requirements, etc. it is not 
apparent at all that market forces will prevail. In fact the prospective ‘corporate 
raider’ may be dissuaded from attempting the hostile takeover in the first place. 
Therefore, it is by no means certain that the ownership structures that are observed in 
practice solely reflect the outcome of competitive selection processes that act towards 
the minimization of agency costs and the maximization of profits.
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3.2.2. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988)
In sharp contrast to the arguments in the previous subsection, Morck et al. (1988) 
emphasize the first part of Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) model that the market value 
of the firm falls as the percentage ownership of the entrepreneur decreases, and 
moreover tend to depart from the second part o f the theory which states that offsetting 
mechanisms minimize agency costs.
Specifically, in order to “describe patterns in the data” (p. 298) Morck et al. (1988) 
super-impose an entrenchment hypothesis to Jensen and Meckling’s incentive 
alignment hypothesis. The authors suggest that a manager who possesses a high 
ownership stake in his firm is effectively entrenched, and can therefore increase 
perquisite consumption and other agency costs at the expense of shareholders without 
fear of removal “although perhaps to a more limited extent than if  he had effective 
control but no claim on the firm’s cash flows” (Morck et al., 1988, p. 294).
Thus, according to Morck et al. (1988) one can expect a non linear relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance shaped by the two main 
forces affecting the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance: 
(1) Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) “convergence of interests hypothesis” which 
predicts a positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm valuation that 
is expected to work at all levels of ownership concentration and (2 ) their 
“entrenchment hypothesis” which predicts negative relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm valuation that is expected to work “for some range of high 
ownership stakes” (Morck et al., 1988, p. 294).
In their empirical analysis Morck et al. (1988), use a sample o f large publicly held 
corporations and experiment with various piece wise linear regressions. They find a 
positive relation between ownership concentration and Tobin’s q in the 0% to 5% 
ownership range, a negative and less pronounced relation in the 5 % to 25% range, and 
a further positive relation above 25%.
Morck et al. (1988) suggest an interpretation o f these results that is consistent with 
both the convergence-of-interests and entrenchment effects. According to the authors, 
the initial rise in Tobin’s q (from 0% to 5%) might reflect manager’s greater 
incentives to maximize value as their stakes rise. Then in the 5% to 25% interval 
entrenchment might explain the declining valuation of corporate assets as indicated by 
their entrenchment hypothesis. Finally, at around 25% ownership, the researchers 
argue that the both the management and the board may be effectively entrenched and
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thus the increase in Tobin’s q for the interval from 25%-100% range may reflect a 
pure convergence-of-interests effect.
Moreover, in order to compare their results to those in Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 
Morck et al. (1988) also investigate the relationship between board ownership and 
firm performance as measured by the profit rate. When this latter measure of firm 
performance is utilized the “qualitative pattern” of estimated coefficients is found to 
be similar to the Tobin’s q regressions, but the statistical significance o f the estimates 
is much lower, and only the positive slope in the 0% to 5% range is significant at the 
5% level (Morck et al. 1988, p. 306). Thus, Morck et al. (1988) conclude that “the 
failure in Demsetz and Lehn (1985) to find a relationship between ownership 
concentration and profitability is probably due to their use of a linear specification 
that does not capture an important non-monotonicity” (Morck et al. 1988, p. 307).
The weakness of Morck et al.’s work clearly resides in that there are missing parts 
in their theory. A management team that owns little or no equity can be just as 
entrenched as an entrepreneur who owns substantial equity. As it was mentioned in 
the previous section in modem times, corporate managements have learned how to 
have their board o f directors approve anti-takeover provisions such as poison pills, 
staggered boards, supermajority vote requirements, etc. Now, an entrepreneur with 
substantial ownership would have to pay out of its own wealth for a higher fraction of 
agency costs incurred, and on this account he may wish to reduce them. On the other 
hand, a management team that owns little or no equity would not have such an 
incentive to minimize agency costs and, if entrenched using anti-takeover provisions 
it would have an opportunity to incur them without fear of a possible takeover. Hence 
recognition o f these facts would change the predictions o f Morck et al.’s model.
3.2.3. Further contributions to the debate
In addition to the shortcomings of Morck et al.’s (1988) arguments mentioned 
above it should be added the objection that their work mainly attempts to explain an 
observed pattern that they find in their data and therefore may be particular to their 
sample. In this vein, it is possible that their findings may be due to a statistical 
aggregation effect rather than an economic phenomenon.
For example, McConnell and Servaes (1990) using larger samples fail to replicate 
Morck et al.’s (1988) findings. Instead they find a different pattern: using ordinary 
least squares McConnell and Servaes find a significant curvilinear relation between
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Tobin’s q and the fraction of common stock owned by corporate insiders. For samples 
corresponding to the years 1976 and 1986 their estimated curves slope upward until 
insider ownership reaches approximately 40% to 50% and then slope slightly 
downward.
In addition, although using a different measure o f ownership (i.e. holdings by the 
current CEO and former CEOs still present in the board), Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) find yet another pattern: firstly, at levels of ownership lower than 1% Tobin’s 
q increases with ownership. Then, the authors find a decreasing relation at levels of 
ownership between 1% and 5%, and an increasing relation between 5% and 20%. 
Finally, at levels greater than 20%, they find that Tobin’s q decreases with ownership. 
This work is also interesting in that it employs panel data and instrumental variable 
methods in order to check that their results are not driven by a particular type of 
endogeneity of managerial shareholdings. 1
From the findings in these additional papers it seems likely that the patterns that 
will be found in the data will depend on the sample employed. McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) find a curvilinear relationship, while Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) 
divide ownership concentration in four segments in their piecewise linear 
specifications rather than the three segments in Morck et al. (1988). Nevertheless, 
despite the differences found, both papers conclude that their results are consistent 
with the arguments in Morck et al. (1988).
An instructive exchange in this literature occurred between Himmelberg et al. 
(1999) and Zhou (2001). In their paper, Himmelberg et al. adopt the perspective put 
forward by Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and, in addition, argue that 
fixed effect estimators should be employed in order to examine the relation between 
ownership structure and firm performance. Consistent with the Demsetz (1983) view, 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) find no significant correlation between managerial 
ownership and firm performance.
Prompted by the work o f Himmelberg et al. (1999) and in response to that piece of 
research, Zhou (2001) demonstrates that while managerial ownership varies
1 The type o f endogeneity that Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) examine is not the one suggested by 
Demsetz (1983) i.e. ownership being the outcome o f a competitive process. Rather, Hermalin and 
Weisbach suggest that managerial shareholdings may be related to performance “for two reasons: first, 
managers will exercise their stock options after their stock goes up, but not after it goes down; second, 
managers with information about good future prospects are more likely to buy more stock, while 
managers with bad information about their own stock are likely to sell” (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991 
p. 102).
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significantly across firms it varies very little from year to year within firms. Clearly, 
this invalidates the appropriateness of using fixed effect approach: since there is only 
small number of changes over time in the ownership variables, the inclusion of firm 
fixed effects would force estimation of the coefficients from just these few changes. 
Hence, Zhou (2001) concludes that Himmelberg et al.’s findings do not offer strong 
evidence against the view that ownership structure affects firm performance.
Still, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argue that previous work up to that date had 
failed to take into account an important aspect of ownership structure: “that the 
fractions of shares owned by outside shareholders and by management should be 
measured separately” (p. 2 1 1 ) and also that previous work had been flawed in that it 
failed to take into account the endogeneity of ownership structure hypothesised by 
Demsetz (1983). Using two stage least squares and a subsample of the original 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) sample, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) find no 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance (this time measured 
using Tobin’s q).
The weakness in Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), as that in Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985), remains that there is a failure to recognize that managements generally 
possess the means with which to obstruct market selection mechanisms that may bring 
about a particular ownership structure. The obvious example is that managements 
have learned to deploy anti-takeover provisions.
Finally, in an important contribution Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) employ a new 
measure o f firm performance: the ratio of yearly return on investment to cost of 
capital (marginal q). By utilizing the marginal q technique developed by Mueller and 
Reardon (1993) and panel data analysis, the researchers find a significant 
positive/negative/ positive pattern. The results show that the ratio of yearly return on 
investment to cost o f capital (marginal q) is less than one (0 .9 3 5 ) when insider 
ownership is zero. Then the data shows a positive relation between insider ownership 
and marginal q until insider ownership reaches 21.5% and a marginal q = 1.069, a 
negative relation between 21.5 and 63% where marginal q is again less than one 
(0.945), and from then on a positive relation, when insider ownership equals 100% the 
estimated marginal q is 1.417. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that Gugler and 
Yurtoglu’s work is still subject to the same shortcomings of the original Morck et al. 
(1988) paper: there are important parts missing in the theory, and their findings may 
be due to a statistical aggregation effect rather than an economic phenomenon.
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3.2.4. Critical evaluation o f  the ownership structure-firm performance debate
As this section has shown, the debate regarding whether ownership structure 
affects firm performance remains inconclusive. While one group of researchers argues 
that there is a relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, there is 
an opposite group that denies this relationship. Moreover, both camps find 
corroborating evidence in favour of their respective positions. How can this situation 
be accounted for?
Clearly, Fama’s (1980, p. 289) criticism that the firms in the literature following 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) are strictly 
entrepreneurial, and as a result fail to explain the large modem corporation in which 
management owns little or no equity, is highly relevant. By applying models designed 
to explain entrepreneurial firms without first making sure that their datasets contain 
nothing but entrepreneurial firms, researchers in this empirical literature are likely 
misapplying their theories. In this case, an appropriate assessment of these theories 
calls for the construction of a database from a sample of entrepreneurial firms, 
followed by the usual hypothesis testing procedures. Until this analysis is carried out 
properly it is impossible to know which theory is supported by the evidence.
Thus, the main criticism raised in this chapter concerning the ownership-structure 
firm performance debate is that there has been a misapplication o f entrepreneurial AT 
(a theory designed to explain the performance entrepreneurial firms) in the literature 
since the papers summarized above clearly included a substantial number of 
managerial firms in the samples employed. This is evidenced by the fact that that 
firms in which managerial ownership is close to zero percent are included the 
empirical analyses. Moreover, this suggests that the mixed results are the consequence 
of testing entrepreneurial AT using samples containing a class of firms the theory was 
not designed to explain.
Finally, it is important to note that Fama’s (1980) contention that the theories by 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) do not apply to the 
large modem corporation also explains some of the missing parts in the models 
examined above. Clearly, agency costs of free cash flows and a large number of anti­
takeover provisions are not features one would expect to find in a young 
entrepreneurial firm whose owner-manager is seeking to sell securities to outside
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investors. Instead, these are characteristics which one would likely associate with a 
mature managerial firm.
For ease o f reference, the debate on ownership structure and firm performance is 
summarized in the Appendix to Chapter 3, Table A.3.1, at the end of the present 
doctoral thesis. Table A.3.1 complements the critical discussion in this section and 
sums up the main characteristics and conclusions of the reviewed works.
3.3. The composition of the board of directors and firm performance
Parallel to the literature on ownership structure and firm performance in the 
previous section, a related literature has developed in AT in which the central issue in 
the debate is to determine whether the proportion of outside directors in the board is 
associated to firm performance. The key point is to determine if  outside directors in 
the board effectively help minimize agency costs as suggested by the managerial 
model in Fama and Jensen (1983).
3.3.1. The debate concerning board structure and firm  performance
The debate on whether the composition of the board o f directors (i.e. the 
proportion of outside directors on the board) affects firm performance can be 
described as one between two opposing camps, with a group o f researchers who argue 
that there is a causal relationship between the two variables and an opposing group 
denying this association.
One of the earliest papers in this literature is by Baysinger and Butler (1985). 
Clearly motivated by the theoretical discussion in Fama and Jensen (1983) and other 
contemporaneous work on the functions of the board o f directors, they investigate 
whether differences in board independence (measured as the proportion o f outside 
independent directors), and/or changes in board independence, cause financial 
performance differences across corporations. Baysinger and Butler (1985) find that 
boards with a higher proportion of independent directors in 1970 enjoyed relatively 
better records o f financial performance in 1980 as measured by Relative Financial 
Performance (RFP) . 2 However, their empirical analysis suggests that there is no 
significant contemporaneous relationship between board composition and financial
2 Relative Financial Performance (RFP) is calculated by dividing a firm’s return on equity (ROE) by 
the average ROE o f all the firms in its primary industry, including those not in the sample.
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performance. Thus they conclude that board composition has an impact on firm 
performance, but that the effect is lagged.
Baysinger and Butler’s (1985) results have been challenged on several accounts. 
First, the objection has been raised that the lag of 10 years used by the researchers 
seems excessive in order to detect a positive influence o f board composition on firm 
performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003, p. 22, endnote 8 ). Secondly, Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1991, p. 102) argue that Baysinger and Butler’s results are biased 
because their work ignores an alleged “endogeneity o f board structure.” According to 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), since there is strong evidence in favour of the 
hypothesis that “poor performance leads to changes in board composition, ... any 
cross-sectional regression of performance on board composition will be biased 
because of changes in board composition resulting merely from past performance” 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991, p. 102).
Another important paper in the debate, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), attempts a 
more direct approach in order to investigate the relationship between board 
composition and firm performance. Rather than examining inter-correlations or 
employing regression analysis, they rely on standard event time methods in order to 
examine the effect o f the appointment of an outside director by management (as 
opposed to a selection by a large shareholder or as a result o f a proxy contest) on 
stock returns. They find that clearly identifiable announcements of the appointment of 
an outside director selected by management are significantly associated with positive 
abnormal stock returns, thus finding a significant statistical link between board 
composition and firm performance.
Nevertheless this result has also been subject to important criticism. For example, 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003, p. 13) argue that the increase in value that Rosenstein 
and Wyatt observe could simply reflect the fact that, concurrent to the addition of the 
new outside director, the company is changing its board structure with a view to 
improve its efficiency, and thus the increase in shareholder wealth would reflect the 
changes taking place in the company rather than anything having to do with the new 
appointed outside director.
On the other hand, evidence in favour of the hypothesis that board composition 
does not affect firm performance is provided by Fosberg (1989). Using paired sample 
methods Fosberg finds no correlation between board composition and firm
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performance. Hence he concludes that there is no causal relationship between the two 
variables.
Additional evidence against the argument that board composition affects firm 
performance is provided by Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black 
(2002). Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) based on their own previous research, and 
Bhagat and Black (2002) who confirm previous empirical findings, point out that the 
evidence strongly suggests that firms add outside directors following poor firm 
performance. Accordingly, these researchers argue that the composition o f the board 
of directors is endogenously determined, and that in order to take account of this 
endogeneity, it is essential to employ simultaneous equation models and/or 
instrumental variable techniques to study the relevant empirical relationships.
Thus, using these methods they find no correlation between board composition and 
firm performance as measured by Tobin’s q and accounting measures (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991), and no evidence that the strategy o f increasing the number of 
outside ‘independent’ directors improves firm performance for the three years 
following the changes (Bhagat and Black, 2002).
3.3.2. Board size and firm  performance
In addition to the debate regarding board composition and firm performance, some 
empirical research has also been undertaken in this literature to determine the 
relationship between board size and firm performance. The starting point of this 
research is the work by Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992), who argue that 
small boards are better monitors of management than large ones for the reason that 
large boards are likely to suffer from coordination problems. Moreover, it has been 
contended that agency problems inside the board (such as director free-riding 
problems) could be greater for larger boards when compared to those in smaller ones 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). The upshot is that the performance of large boards 
should be less efficient when compared to that of smaller boards.
Yermack (1996) evaluates these theories by investigating the relationship between 
board size and firm performance. The author explicates that his hypothesis is that firm 
value as measured by Tobin’s q is a function o f the quality of monitoring and 
decision-making by the board. Under the assumption that board size is a good 
determinant of board performance, Yermack argues that there should be negative 
relationship between firm performance and board size. Therefore, companies with
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smaller boards of directors should have higher market values. Consistent with his 
hypothesis, Yermack (1996) finds an inverse relation between firm market value (as 
measured by Tobin’s q) and the size of the board of directors. Moreover, he also finds 
that firm profitability, as measured by return on assets and return on sales, also exhibit 
an inverse relationship with board size.
In contrast, however, Bhagat and Black (2002) find no consistent correlation 
between board size and various measures of firm performance including Tobin’s q, 
and accounting measures such as return on assets (ROA). Bhagat and Black (2002) 
suggest that their results may be different from those in Yermack (1996) because 
“board size is known to be endogenously related to many other factors that may 
correlate with performance, including industry, inside share ownership, firm size, and 
board independence” (p. 260). They conclude that their results cast “doubt on the 
robustness of any correlation between board size and firm performance” (Bhagat and 
Black, 2002, p. 260).
3.3.3 Critical evaluation o f  the dehate on hoard characteristics andfirm performance
The main critique that this chapter puts forward concerning the debate on board 
characteristics and firm performance is similar to that in the previous section. 
Specifically, this chapter contends that by applying a model created especially to 
explain firms in which ownership is separate from control (Fama and Jensen, 1983) 
and not checking that their databases consist only o f managerial firms, researchers are 
likely to be misapplying managerial AT. A correct application of the theory requires 
that researchers, using some explicit criteria as to what constitutes separation of 
ownership from control, take steps to insure that their samples contain managerial 
firms only, and only then attempt to test the theory.
In addition, it is worth noting that by concentrating on Fama and Jensen’s (1983) 
theory researchers in this field tend to ignore completely the alternative managerial 
AT theory concerning the agency costs of free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). For 
instance, one of the most interesting points in the discussion concerns Hermalin and 
Weisbach’s (1991) and Bhagat and Black’s (2002) finding that firms add outside 
directors following poor firm performance. In this connection, an interesting issue 
(overlooked in the literature) would be to check if  these firms also suffer from agency 
costs of free cash flows. It could be the case that the existence of abundant free cash 
flows which are expected to continue for an extended period o f time are the cause of
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both a deteriorating board structure (since in order to mal-invest the free cash flows 
the managers would need to weaken board supervision) and a declining Tobin's q (as 
managements should be increasingly able to use the free cash flows to invest in 
negative net present value projects as board quality deteriorates).
The debate on board composition and firm performance is also summarized in the 
Appendix to Chapter 3, Tables A3.2.1 and A3.2.2, at the end o f the present doctoral 
thesis. These tables complement the critical discussion in this section and sum up the 
main characteristics and conclusions of the reviewed works. In considering this debate 
is important to keep in mind that the main disagreement among researchers in this 
area o f the corporate governance literature is not whether the worst or best performing 
firms are those with larger boards, or those with boards that exhibit a higher 
proportion of outside directors. Rather, the dispute centres on whether there is a 
causal link between the larger boards, or the higher proportion of outsiders on the 
board, and better or worse performance.
3.4. Anti-takeover provisions and firm performance
This section reviews recent empirical work in literature on corporate governance 
and firm performance which is characterized by the employment of indices of anti­
takeover provisions. The essential point in the works reviewed in this section 
concerns the possibility that entrenched managers could act opportunistically without 
having to worry about the threat of takeover.
Note that there exists an earlier literature that investigates the relationship between 
individual corporate governance provisions, i.e. each provision in isolation, and firm 
performance. However, since Danielson and Karpoff (1998) have shown that firms 
utilize governance provisions in groups in order to build their anti-takeover defences 
and not in isolation, this section concentrates in articles that utilize indices of anti­
takeover provisions.3
3.4.1. The relationship between anti-takeover provisions and firm  performance
The origins o f the literature in this section can be traced back to the seminal work 
by Gompers et al. (2003). Rather than studying ownership structure or board 
composition Gompers et al. (2003) combine a large set o f corporate governance
3 The older literature on the relationship between individual corporate governance provisions and firm 
performance will not be reviewed but a survey is available in Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
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provisions into an index and then utilize this index to investigate empirically if  there 
exists a significant relationship between corporate governance as measured by the 
index and firm performance. Using information gathered from the Investors 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) on 24 corporate governance provisions, 
Gompers et al. (2003) create their index by adding one point for each provision which 
in their view increases managerial power vis-à-vis their shareholders. Hence, 
Gompers et al. argue that one interpretation of the results in their paper is that the 
balance o f power between shareholders and managers may have an impact on firm 
performance. For this reason, they call their index the “governance index” or “G- 
index”. Table 3.1 below enumerates the 24 provisions in Gompers et al.’s index.
Significantly, Gompers et al. (2003) argue that the theories currently available in 
the literature do not provide them with unambiguous predictions as to how the key 
variables which they employ in their study may be related to each other. Thus, they 
state that their work asks an “empirical question.” One difficulty with this approach is 
promptly revealed in their paper as they find not one, but three possible interpretations 
as to the meaning of the empirical relationships which they find. Moreover, a different 
problem of interpretation with Gompers et al. approach is reflected in the fact that 
latter writers in this literature, specially Cremers and Nair (2005, p. 2864) and Brown 
and Caylor (2004, p. 8; 2006a, p. 3; 2006b, p. 413), have argued that in view of the 
large number o f anti-takeover provisions in the G-index shown in Table 3.1, the index 
is in fact a measure of anti-takeover protection and not a broad measure of 
shareholder rights as originally maintained by Gompers et al. (2003).
Another aspect of the Gompers et al. (2003) paper worth noting concerns their 
regression techniques. In view of the fact that the G-index does not vary much over 
time (Gompers et al., 2003, p. 126) Gompers et al. estimate cross sectional regressions 
for each year in their sample (from 1990 to 1999) and then compute the mean and the 
time-series standard deviation of the yearly estimates of the coefficients. This method 
is known as the Fama-MacBeth procedure (see Fama and MacBeth, 1973; Cochrane, 
2005, pp. 245-251). One obvious alternative would be the use o f panel data with fixed 
effects, but as illustrated by the exchange between Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Zhou 
(2001), since there is only small number of changes over time in the key variable, the 
inclusion of firm fixed effects would force estimation of the main coefficients from 
just a few changes. The upshot is that if the researchers had used fixed effects in their 
analysis the evidence in their work would not have been deemed very “convincing.”
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Table 3.1. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick's (2003) governance index (G-index)
This table shows the list o f the corporate governance provisions included in the governance index (G- 
index) developed by Gompers et al. (2003). The G-index contains 24 provisions in all. The provisions 
may be classified in 22 firm-level provisions and 6 state laws. Since four o f the firm-level provisions are 
equivalent to four o f the state laws, the four firm-level provisions which are analogous to the 
corresponding four state laws (i.e. anti-greenmail, fair price, supermajority approval for mergers, 
directors’ duties) are not reported in the list in order to avoid repetition (see John and Litov, 2008).
Governance provisions included in Gompers et al.'s (2003) G-index
Takeover delay provisions Other provisions
1 Blank check preferred stock 16 Pension parachute
2 Classified board 17 Poison Pill
3 Limits to call special meetings 18 Silver parachutes
4 Limits for written consent
Director protection provisions State laws
5 Compensation plans 19 Recapture o f profits laws (anti-greenmail)
6 Golden parachutes 20 Business combination laws
7 Indemnification 21 Cash out laws
8 Liability 22 Director duties laws (directors’ duties)
9 Severance 23 Fair price laws (fair price)
10 Contracts (director indemnification 24 Control share acquisition law (super­
programs) majority approval for mergers)
Voting provisions
11 Limits to amend bylaws
12 Limits to amend charters
13 Cumulative voting
14 Secret Ballot
15 Unequal voting
As a result o f carrying out their Fama-Macbeth regressions, Gompers et al. (2003) 
find a negative and significant relationship between their G-index and firm valuation 
as measured by industry adjusted Tobin’s q during the period 1990-1999. Moreover, 
Gompers et al. find a negative and significant relationship between the G-index and 
firm performance as measured by industry adjusted net profit margin and sales 
growth. On the other hand, they fail to find a significant relationship between the G- 
index and industry adjusted ‘return on equity’ (ROE) during the same period. On the 
whole, these results suggest that firms with low G-index (interpreted as good 
corporate governance) and good firm performance (measured as indicated above) are 
positively related.
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3.4.2 Subsequent developments
In contrast to the strong debates in previous sections regarding the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance, the results in the work 
undertaken in this literature has been more or less consistent in the sense that although 
some of the results do not match those in Gompers et al. (2003), most papers find a 
significant correlation between governance indices, such as the G-index, and at least 
one measure of firm performance, such as Tobin’s q and the several accounting ratios.
Another difference with the previous debates is that an important part of the 
discussion in this literature has centred on the question concerning whether the 
governance and performance measurements employed by Gompers et al. are the most 
appropriate for the work at hand. For example, Core et al. (2006) suggest that the 
reason why Gompers et al. (2003) failed to find a relationship between G-index and 
industry adjusted return on equity is that ROE is not a very good measure of 
performance because it is affected by discretionary items such as leverage and 
extraordinary items (Core et al., 2006, p. 666). For this reason, Core et al. utilize 
industry adjusted return on assets (ROA) in place of return on assets (ROE) and find 
significant evidence that a high G-index is associated with lower operating 
performance as measured by industry adjusted ROA.
On the other hand, work has also been carried out in order to determine the relative 
importance of the anti-takeover provisions in Gompers et al.’s (2003) G-index. For 
example, Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) investigate the association between staggered 
boards and firm value during the period 1995-2002. They find that, after controlling 
for the other governance provisions in the G-index and various firm characteristics, 
staggered boards are negatively associated with firm value as measured by industry 
adjusted Tobin’s q and that this effect is substantially larger than the average effect of 
the other provisions.
However, the most important effort to refine the G-index to date has been 
undertaken by Bebchuk et al. (2004). Bebchuk et al. question the wisdom of using 
indexes with a large number of provisions due to problems such as the possibility of 
introducing noise by means of adding “innocuous” or even “beneficial” provisions in 
the index. The danger is that if such innocuous or beneficial provisions are introduced 
in the index the provisions that really matter would be underweighted (Bebchuk et al. 
2004, p. 5).
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Therefore, in order to identify the most important governance provisions Bebchuk 
et al. (2004) form a list of provisions based on discussions with lawyers, their own 
personal analysis, and examination of provisions which attract opposition from 
institutional investors. This reasoned method allows the researchers to identify a 
group of six key governance provisions which in their view play a substantial role in 
the correlation between the G-index and shareholder value, namely: staggered boards, 
limits to amend by-laws, poison pills, golden parachutes, supermajority requirements 
for mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter amendments. Finally, with 
these key governance provisions Bebchuk et al. (2004) create an “entrenchment 
index” which they label “E-index” by assigning each company a point for each o f the 
provisions in the index that the firm has.
Using similar econometric techniques to those in Gompers et al. (2003), Bebchuk 
et al. (2004) find that controlling for the rest o f the IRRC provisions, the provisions 
constituting the E-index -both individually and in the aggregate- are significantly and 
negatively correlated with firm value as measured by Tobin’s q. In view of these 
results, the researchers argue that the E-index substantially drives the correlation 
between the G-index and firm valuation.
More recently, however, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) arguing that there may be 
endogeneity in the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance 
and a host o f other variables employ a system of simultaneous equations and find 
results that, they argue, contrast with previous work. While Gompers et al. (2003) and 
Bebchuk et al. (2004) find a significant correlation between their respective indices 
and contemporary Tobin’s q, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find no such correlation 
between both indices (i.e. the G-index and the E-index) and firm performance 
measured as next year’s Tobin’s q. On the other hand, however, Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008) do find a significant correlation between both governance indices and next 
year’s ROA.
3.4.3 Critical review o f  the approach
Since most of the papers in this literature find at least some significant relationship 
between the different governance indices and at least one of the measures of firm 
performance, the weaknesses in the work on anti-takeover indices seem to be mainly 
interpretative (which indicates a lack of theoretical depth in the literature). For 
example, researchers in this literature have not given completely satisfactory answers
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to questions such as the following: do a large number of anti-takeover provisions 
bring about lower firm value or, conversely, do the management o f firms with low 
valuation deploy larger numbers of anti-takeover provisions?
Thus, for instance, both Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2004) are not 
able to establish the direction of causality driving the relationship between anti­
takeover provisions and firm valuation; rather they leave the question open as “a 
challenge for future research” (Gompers, 2003, p. 145). In this connection, Lehn et al. 
(2007) have recently presented results consistent with the hypothesis that the 
managements of firms with historically low valuations have deployed larger numbers 
of anti-takeover provisions (since the mid 1980s) rather than the other way around. 
Unfortunately however, their “test cannot rule out the possibility that a third variable 
affects both valuation multiples and governance indices; thereby creating a spurious 
relation between the two variables” (Lehn et ah, 2007, p. 908).
Given the lack o f a fully developed theory that takes into account aspects of the 
lifecycle of the firm (e.g. the differences between entrepreneurial and managerial 
firms) and historical aspects regarding the evolution of institutions in the relevant 
stock markets (e.g. the tightening of the takeover constraint during the takeover wave 
of the 1980s), it is understandable that such questions are difficult to answer. It is 
apparent that a satisfactory answer to this question requires a fully developed theory 
of corporate governance and firm performance that takes into account both, the ways 
in which firms change as they go through their lifecycles, as well as the effects of 
institutional constraints on managerial opportunism.
Moreover, an additional weakness of this literature is that managerial 
entrenchment, through the deployment of anti-takeover provisions, may be a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for opportunistic behaviour to take place. For 
example, Jensen (1986, p. 323) argues that agency problems between managers and 
shareholders are substantial when a firm produces considerable free cash flow, 
because in these situations managers tend to invest the cash at below the cost of 
capital i.e. they tend to overinvest. It follows that for recurring overinvestment to take 
place the firm must also have a reliable source of free cash flows with which to over 
invest. Therefore, if  an entrenched management does not possess that source o f free 
cash flows, opportunistic overinvestment will not take place.
Similarly to the previous sections, for ease of reference the papers in this part of 
the chapter are summarized in the Appendix to Chapter 3, Table A.3.3. The purpose
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of this table is to complement the critical discussion in this section by summarizing 
the main features and conclusions of the reviewed works.
3.5. A note on empirical work that uses comprehensive lists of corporate 
governance variables
This section reviews work in the field of corporate governance and firm 
performance that employs comprehensive lists o f corporate governance variables. The 
aim of this section is to clarify that work along these lines has not yet addressed the 
problems mentioned earlier in the chapter, specifically those regarding the 
incorrectness of applying the different versions of AT to databases constructed from 
samples containing both entrepreneurial and managerial corporations.
Given that some papers in the governance literature include measurements of 
ownership structure, board composition, and governance provisions in a single 
empirical analysis, it may seem that the problem mentioned earlier in this chapter to 
the effect that managerial models should be applied only to managerial firms, and that 
entrepreneurial models should be applied only to entrepreneurial firms, has already 
been dealt with in the literature. In considering these papers it is possible that 
someone may argue that new theories have already been built in order to deal with 
both types o f firms. This section argues that this is not the case and examines this 
issue with reference to the work of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), who are the 
pioneers in this area of research.
3.5.1. Rationale behind work that uses long lists o f  corporate governance mechanisms
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) start their paper by stating that they base their study 
in two arguments:
First, since alternative control mechanisms exist, greater use of one mechanism need 
not be positively related to firm performance. Where one mechanism is used less, 
others may be used more, resulting in equally good performance.
Second, the extent to which several of the control mechanisms are used is decided 
within the firm... [Hence] we expect these choices will be made to maximize firm 
value. Use of a mechanism will be increased until marginal costs and marginal 
benefits to the firm are just equal.
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p. 379)
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Further, they separate their governance variables into “internal” and “external” 
mechanisms as follows: “[i]nside shareholding, outside representation of the board, 
reliance on debt financing, and reliance on external labor markets are all internal 
decisions. Institutional shareholdings, outside block holdings, and activity in the 
market for corporate control are decisions made by outsiders” (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996, p. 381). Finally, Agrawal and Knoeber state their key hypothesis:
If the four internal mechanisms are selected optimally, a carefully specified cross- 
sectional regression should find no relation between firm performance and the use of 
these mechanisms.
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, pp. 381)
However, after estimating a carefully designed system o f simultaneous equations 
to test their hypothesis, Agrawal and Knoeber find substantial evidence against it: 
they find a negative and statistically significant relationship between outside 
representation in the board of directors and firm performance as measured by using 
Tobin’s q (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, pp. 379, 393). Similarly, subsequent work 
carried out along the lines proposed by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), such as that in 
Beiner et al. (2006) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008), has also found statistically 
significant relationships between some of the internal governance variables in their 
lists and different measures of firm performance.
3.5.2. A theory is more than a list o f  variables
Now, according to Jensen (1983, p. 323) a theory is not necessarily rejected in 
practice for failing to predict accurately as long as there is no better alternative. The 
problem in this case, however, is that a theory is more than a list of variables.
More specifically, the trouble with Agrawal and Knoeber’s (1996) scheme is that 
while the substitution effects in the arguments above imply that there should be a 
negative relationship between the governance mechanisms and no relationship 
between governance mechanisms and firm performance, in fact the authors stop short 
o f  stating specific relationships between their variables:
Since all of the control mechanisms are alternative ways to provide incentives to 
managers, each might plausibly be used instead of another. If so, we would expect
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use of the mechanisms to be negatively related. But this is not the only possibility. 
Positive relations may also exist... [Several examples follow, and then the authors 
conclude:] ... similar ambiguity exists for the relations between many of the other 
control mechanisms. Given this ambiguity we cannot test for particular relations but 
we do explore these relations empirically...
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, pp. 380-381)
According to specialists in theory building (e.g. Dubin, 1978; Whetten, 1989) the 
specification of relationships between the variables is one of the indispensable 
elements that a fully developed theory must have:4
Relationships, not lists are the domain of theory. As Poincaré [1903] so aptly noted, 
“Science is facts, just as houses are made of stone... But a pile of stones is not a 
house, and a collection of facts is not necessarily science.”
(Whetten, 1989, p. 493)
Thus, theories are made o f variables, but a list of variables is not a theory. If the 
relationships between the variables are not stated, then we only have a list of 
variables, not a theory (Whetten, 1989). Other researchers working in this area, such 
as Beiner et al. (2006) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008), have also failed to specify 
theoretical relationships between the variables in their studies. Thus, work in this area 
may be described as an empirical exploration of data which is considered to be 
relevant without a fully developed theory capable of explaining both entrepreneurial 
and managerial firms.
In addition, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) seem not to be aware o f Fama’s (1980) 
criticism that early theory in AT, such as that in Jensen and Meckling (1976), does not 
explain the large modem corporation. Conversely, they seem to overlook that 
subsequent theory in AT, such as that in Fama and Jensen (1983), was built with the 
purpose o f explaining firms where ownership is separated from control. The potential 
problem is that variables which are highly relevant in some o f the early versions of
4 Whetten (1989) argues that there are four key elements that all fully developed scientific theories 
must have, which he summarizes using the following four words: what, how, why and where. The 
‘■'■what” refers to the variables that the theorist regards as relevant to explain the phenomena at hand, the 
“how” refers to the relationships between the variables contained in the theory, the “w hy” refers to the 
reasons why the variables should be related in the way indicated by the theory (in the social sciences 
this involves the adoption o f behavioural assumptions) and the “where ” refers to the specific class o f  
phenomena the theory is designed to explain i.e. in which cases the theory is supposed to hold.
52
AT, but not in the posterior versions of AT, may not be relevant for use in a combined 
model.
3.6. Conclusion: pitfalls in the literature and measures needed to avoid them
This chapter has reviewed the extant empirical literature on corporate governance 
and firm performance and finds that it is inconclusive. Moreover, the chapter argues 
that one important reason for the present situation is that most researchers in the 
literature have not paid attention to the appropriate range o f applicability o f the 
available theoretical models. For example, the empirical literature that focuses on 
ownership structure and firm performance employs entrepreneurial models related to 
that in Jensen and Meckling (1976). Nevertheless, most researchers in the ownership 
structure/firm performance literature apply the entrepreneurial theory to managerial 
firms as well, as it is evidenced by the fact that they examine firms in which 
managerial ownership is close to zero percent. Conversely, the empirical work centred 
on the relationship between board composition and firm performance, which is related 
to the managerial theory in Fama and Jensen (1983), not only does not make sure that 
the firms that are examined are strictly managerial, but it also ignores the alternative 
managerial AT theory concerning the agency costs of free cash flows (Jensen, 1986).
Moreover, this chapter argues that the recent empirical literature that studies the 
relationship between indices of anti-takeover provisions and firm performance lacks 
theoretical depth and it is plagued by problems of interpretation. For instance, there 
are difficulties to determine whether anti-takeover provisions cause poor firm 
performance or if  it is the other way around. In addition, it is important to note that 
this literature also ignores important potential sources of agency costs such as the 
agency costs o f free cash flows.
Finally, this chapter has also discussed empirical work that employs 
comprehensive lists of corporate governance mechanisms. The chapter finds that this 
literature lacks theory, and that the arguments put forward by the researchers are not 
consistent with the empirical evidence.
Thus, the conclusions o f this chapter are consistent with the conclusion of the 
previous chapter viz. that in order to avoid the pitfalls in the current literature the 
construction of a new combined TCE-firm lifecycle theory seems to be the most 
appropriate way forward. The construction of such a theory will put us in a better 
position to answer this thesis’ research question: for the case of the large publicly held
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corporation, is there a relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance?
3.6.1. Why is a combined TCE-firm lifecycle theoretical framework needed?
Now, it may be argued by some that if  the problem is that researchers have 
misapplied the existing theories, then the solution calls for the implementation of 
appropriate tests of each theory rather than the creation o f a new theoretical 
framework. However, as suggested in the previous chapter, the problem is more 
complex than that.
While AT is a “front-end incentive alignment” approach (Williamson, 2002, pp. 
172-173) some o f the most important problems in the field o f corporate governance 
are likely to occur during contract implementation (e.g. the agency costs of free cash 
flows, Jensen, 1986). This observation strongly indicates that what it is needed is a 
theory that has the sufficient theoretical apparatus to examine “the governance of 
ongoing contractual relations” such as TCE (Williamson, 2002, p. 173). In addition, 
although TCE has the necessary tools for the job, guidance is also needed as to how 
the contractual relationship between the relevant parties will likely evolve over time, 
this is why it is important to include, in the combined theoretical framework, insights 
which only a lifecycle theory of the firm such as that in Mueller (1969, 1972) can 
provide.
3.6.2. The steps ahead
As it will be discussed in the next three chapters, the present doctoral thesis 
proposes that the new combined theory can be constructed in three stages:
First, it is necessary to adopt a theoretical perspective that concentrates in studying 
the mechanisms that govern ongoing contractual relationships rather than ex-ante 
incentive alignments (like AT does). While there is no doubt that the examination of 
the incentives of parties to a contract at the time of contract negotiation is a fruitful 
starting point, it should not be missed that agency problems occur afterwards, during 
contract execution. The next chapter will discuss such a theory. Specifically, it will 
discuss some key aspects o f Oliver E. Williamson’s Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE).
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Second, it is essential to understand how the essential TCE variables change as the 
firm matures. In this connection, Chapter 5 will examine some o f the key insights of 
Dennis C. Mueller’s lifecycle theory of the firm.
Finally, with the key elements from both TCE and the lifecycle theory of the firm 
in place, a combined theoretical TCE-lifecycle theoretical framework will be 
constructed in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 4. Transaction cost economics
4.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce some of the key theoretical elements of 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). Specifically, this chapter will make emphasis on 
the features o f TCE that will be employed in Chapter 6 in which a fully developed 
theory o f the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance will be 
constructed.
As mentioned in previous chapters, a key advantage of TCE over AT is that, in 
addition to examining ex-ante incentive alignment, the former possesses potent 
apparatus with which to study the governance of ongoing contractual relations. Since 
it is evident that agency costs will occur during contract execution and not at the 
negotiating table, it is apparent that TCE has important insights to offer to the 
corporate governance-firm performance literature.
On the other hand, in spite of the fact that the TCE approach has many virtues, a 
common criticism o f TCE is that it is “static” (as opposed to “dynamic”) because “it 
works out of an equilibrium contracting setup” (Williamson, 1999, p. 1100). For the 
purposes of the present thesis this means that, similarly to the case o f AT, TCE tends 
to ignore that there are important differences between entrepreneurial and managerial 
firms. As time marches on firms suffer tremendous changes which must be taken into 
account in any theoretical treatment that investigates the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance.
With this limitation of TCE in mind is that Chapter 5 will examine the lifecycle 
theory proposed by Mueller (1969, 1972). As it will be shown in that chapter, 
Mueller’s theory clearly identifies important dimensions in which firms change as 
they mature. The idea is that by combining both TCE and the lifecycle theory the 
resulting framework will benefit from the rigorousness o f the TCE perspective in 
examining the governance of ongoing relationships, while at the same time 
recognizing key differences between entrepreneurial and managerial firms. The 
combined theory will be presented in Chapter 6.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 discusses TCE’s behavioural 
assumptions. Section 4.3 examines the nature o f transaction costs from a TCE 
perspective. Section 4.4 considers the TCE approach to “corporate governance and 
corporate finance” which is, to be precise, a theoiy of the uses of debt and equity.
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Section 4.5 critically appraises several key gaps in the TCE theory o f the uses of debt 
and equity. Section 4.6 considers the literature on TCE. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2. Behavioural assumptions
Oliver E. Williamson usually highlights two main behavioural assumptions about 
TCE actors: bounded rationality and opportunism, and argues that they are the main 
source o f transaction costs in economic activity.
By bounded rationality Williamson means that TCE actors are “intendedly rational, 
but only limitedly so”1 and thus have limited information and limited ability to 
process it. Crucially for TCE theory, bounded rationality is the reason all complex 
contracts are unavoidably incomplete (Williamson, 2002). This concept contrasts with 
that proposed by mainstream economists who tend to assume that economic actors 
have perfect knowledge regarding all factors necessary for taking optimal decisions.
On the other hand, opportunism is defined by Williamson as “self-interest seeking 
with guile” and includes “calculated efforts to mislead, deceive, obfuscate, and 
otherwise confuse” (Williamson, 1996, p. 378). Moreover, TCE points out that 
opportunism is different from the “simple self-interest seeking” often assumed in 
other branches o f economics. Specifically, Williamson indicates that TCE actors 
cannot be expected to dependably follow rules as in e.g. in game theory. In addition, it 
is important to note that that for the purposes of the theory it is not necessary to 
consider that all agents are equally opportunistic, it is sufficient to assume that less 
opportunistic agents are “difficult to ascertain ex-ante” and that “even among the less 
opportunistic most have their price” (Williamson, 1979, p. 234).
Finally, it is worth noting that Williamson points out that “TCE and AT work out of 
substantially identical behavioural assumptions” (Williamson, 1988, p. 570). Both AT 
(as a consequence o f the actor’s limited knowledge) and TCE (due to bounded 
rationality) maintain that complex contracts are incomplete. Moreover, Williamson 
explains that the concept o f an “agency problem is ... [the AT] counterpart o f 
opportunism” and that agency theorists “collapse the two [bounded rationality and 
opportunism] under the heading agency costs” (Williamson, 1983, p. 355).
1 Simon (1957) as cited by Williamson (1996).
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4.3. Transaction costs
Contrary to what economists and finance professionals not familiar with TCE 
would initially expect, the main focus of the TCE paradigm is not with transaction 
costs such as the costs o f searching the markets for suitable business partners, 
employees, acceptable terms to transact, good quality products, commissions paid to 
middlemen such as in the stock markets, etc. These costs are not the central focus of 
the analysis.
Importantly, since in financial economics the term “transaction cost” traditionally 
refers to the cost o f carrying out a trade (i.e. commissions and the difference between 
the price obtained and the midpoint of the bid-offer spread, see e.g. Garman and 
Ohlson, 1981; Stoll and Whaley, 1983), it is essential to emphasize that this, in 
particular, is definitely not the central connotation attached to the term in TCE.
The transaction costs that TCE is mainly concerned with are the costs of 
preventing and keeping opportunism in check (Williamson, 1996, p. 379; Alchian and 
Woodward, 1988). To understand the latter affirmation, one must first understand 
what Williamson calls the ‘fundamental transformation.’
4.3.1. The fundamental transformation
Basically, the fundamental transformation occurs in certain transactions in which 
the parties involved must invest in assets that are specific to that transaction. By 
specific assets or ‘asset specificity’, Williamson refers to assets that once in place 
would be costly to redeploy to other activities if  the contract breaks down because 
there would be a loss of productive value (Williamson, 1985, 1996).
To illustrate our exposition on the fundamental transformation, suppose that a 
manufacturer is persuaded to invest a considerable sum in long-lived specialized 
machinery (i.e. specific assets) in order to continuously supply a special product to a 
particular customer for an agreed price. If  however, posterior to the purchase, the 
customer reneges and no longer requires the services of the manufacturer, the 
producer is left in possession of machinery which is costly to redeploy, and therefore 
would suffer a loss of productive value. Hence, if  there are alternative sources of 
supply, the customer can act in an opportunistic fashion and force the manufacturer to
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supply the product at a lower price than that initially agreed lest he terminates the 
transaction.2
If on the other hand, the customer cannot easily find other suppliers with the 
capacity to deliver the good at a competitive price for the reason that the product is 
highly specific, then what Williamson calls “bilateral dependency” takes place. 
Interestingly, with bilateral dependency, previous to the transaction the customer can 
choose a business partner from “a large number” of potential suppliers. However, at 
contract renewal time, there is only one supplier with the specific investments in place 
who will have an advantage over all other suppliers that do not have specific 
investments. Hence, a fundamental transformation in the number of qualified 
suppliers has taken place.
In such situations, as Williamson (1996, p. 61) comments, “the incentives to work 
things out rather than terminate are ... apparent.” Nevertheless, in an uncertain world 
the occurrence o f unexpected disturbances can generate disagreement between the 
bilaterally dependent parties and expose them to opportunism as each group tries to 
adjust to the disturbance in a self-interested way. In this regard, one o f the key 
insights of TCE is that dependent parties can perform mutually beneficial adjustments 
in the face o f unforeseen disturbances through the judicious choice o f transaction 
specific governance structures which “(1) protect the interests of the respective parties 
and (2) adapt the relationship to changing circumstances” (Williamson, 1979, p. 258).
Moreover, in so far as the governance structure mitigates contractual hazards, TCE 
predicts that the price at which the seller will be willing to supply the special product 
to the buyer will be lower when contractual safeguards are present than otherwise. 
The buyer will be aware of this and in consequence it will also be interested in the 
establishment o f the governance structure.
In the light o f the fundamental transformation phenomenon, Williamson makes an 
important distinction between ex-ante transaction costs and ex-post transaction costs. 
Ex-ante costs are the ones involved in finding a suitable business partner and setting 
up a contract, that is, the costs of “negotiating and writing” (Williamson, 1981, p. 
1544). Ex-post costs are the ones involved in the “governance o f ongoing contractual
2 Note that opportunism need not be forceful as when one party gives the other an ultimatum. The 
opportunistic party may resort instead to “calculated efforts to mislead, deceive, obfuscate, and 
otherwise confuse” in order to expropriate the other party (Williamson, 1996). In such cases safeguards 
such as penalties, information disclosure and verification procedures, etc. can prove very useful to the 
seller.
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relations” (Williamson, 2002, p. 188). The latter costs are incurred in “executing, 
policing, and, when disputes arise remedying the (explicit or implicit) contract” 
(Williamson, 1981, p. 1544).
It is worth emphasizing that transaction cost economics is mainly concerned with 
ex-post costs. Given that complex contracts are incomplete, for reason o f bounded 
rationality, ex-post costs are necessary to protect (i.e. safeguard) the dependent reliant 
resources (specific assets) from opportunism. In fact, Williamson remarks that “but 
for the simultaneous existence of both bounded rationality and opportunism, all 
economic contracting problems are trivial and the study of economic institutions is 
unimportant” (Williamson, 1981, p. 1545).
4.3.2. Markets, hybrids and hierarchies
From considerations similar to those in the previous subsection, TCE puts forward 
an alignment hypothesis which predicts that depending on the characteristics o f the 
transactions (asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency) three organizational modes 
(governance structures which differ in their costs and competences) can occur in 
practice namely: markets, hybrids and hierarchies; where, the result for a given 
transaction, mainly depends on which mode economises the most in transaction costs, 
so that waste is reduced.
Thus, for example, in the transaction just described if  the assets deployed were 
non-specific instead, no bilateral dependency would take place and expenditures on 
contractual safeguards would be superfluous. In this case, the market mode of 
organization would occur because it would be the most economical of the three.
The hybrid mode o f organization corresponds to the case just described where 
inter-firm transactions involve the deployment of specific assets in an uncertain 
environment and governance structures help cement the relationship. However, it is 
possible, notwithstanding the safeguards in place that the hybrid proves unreliable and 
breaks down due to consequential disturbances. In that case, it is possible that one of 
the firms may decide to take the transaction out o f the market and vertically integrate 
i.e., a hierarchical governance structure comes about. Note that according to TCE, 
hierarchies are the organizational form of last resort (i.e. to be used after all other 
forms prove inappropriate) given the non trivial costs associated with the existence of 
a bureaucracy.
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4.3.3. Institutions
TCE holds that in addition to private ordering (i.e. the judicious choice of 
governance structures) the efficacy o f governance in containing opportunism is also 
determined by the quality of the institutional environment in which the transaction 
takes place.
According to TCE, institutions may be regarded as (formal or informal) constraints 
on opportunism which remain in the background of a transaction and that provide 
support for private ordering (Williamson, 1996). Thus, it is possible that in some 
situations and in certain societies, moralistic contempt (an informal constraint) can 
effectively prevent individuals from behaving in an opportunistic manner (e.g. 
stealing, extorting the other party): rather than being the object of social contempt 
individuals may choose to behave ethically. On the other hand, the existence of an 
efficient legal system (a formal institution) can be a powerful deterrent of 
opportunistic behaviour e.g. the mere prospect of being penalized may prevent an 
accountant from generating misleading financial statements. Moreover, in certain 
situations, if  opportunism does occur the courts can provide some relief to the 
aggravated party.
4.4. Williamson’s theory of the uses of debt and equity
Williamson (1988) argues that TCE can be applied to study the uses o f debt and 
equity. Interestingly, this approach examines individual investment projects and 
distinguishes among them in terms of their asset specificity characteristics. In this 
connection, examples of non-specific assets usually refer to redeployable projects, 
such as investment in general purpose, mobile equipment. On the other hand, 
examples of specific assets usually consist o f non-redeployable projects, such as 
market and product development expenses.
According to this approach, debt is akin to the market mode o f organization in that 
it is the cost effective way to finance investments that involve non-specific assets, and 
equity is similar to the hybrid (credible contracting) mode o f organization in that it is 
most economical for investments that involve specific assets. In this application, 
however, the hierarchical mode of organization drops out for the reason that the firm 
cannot own its sources of finance i.e. its investors.
To motivate the argument Williamson assumes initially that projects can only be 
financed with debt, a governance structure that works mainly out o f rules. According
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to the rules, failure to make planned payments results in bankruptcy, in which case, 
debt-holders can recover their funds in proportion to the extent that the assets in 
question are redeployable. Since debt-holders can anticipate that the values that they 
would be able to recover in the event o f liquidation decline as the assets become less 
redeployable, TCE predicts that the terms of debt financing are adjusted accordingly. 
The upshot is that debt financing becomes more costly as the degree of asset 
specificity increases (Williamson, 1988).
According to Williamson’s argument, the solution to the problem of costly 
financing of highly specific assets with debt is to be found in the invention of equity. 
The equity governance structure has three important properties. First, similarly to AT, 
shareholders bear a residual claiming status. Second, the equity contract lasts for the 
duration of the life of the corporation. And third, a safeguard in the form of a board of 
directors is created and awarded to equity-holders. According to this view, the board 
bears a decision-review and monitoring relation to the firm’s management, including 
the review and monitoring o f management’s investment policy.
Williamson (1988) demonstrates this application of TCE with the aid of a heuristic 
model. The author argues that if we define k as an index of asset specificity and D(k) 
and E(k) as the costs of debt and equity capital expressed as a function o f asset 
specificity, there can be a switchover point, k*, as asset specificity increases if  D(0) < 
E(0) but D' > E' > 0 (see Fig. 4.1 below).
According to TCE, when asset specificity is zero debt should be less costly than 
equity (D(0) < E(0)) because debt is a comparatively simple governance structure, 
while equity is cumbersome. Since debt is a rule-governed relation, its setup costs are 
relatively low. On the other hand, equity is a much more complex governance 
relation, it includes interfering involvement in the oversight of the firm’s activities 
and has higher setup costs (Williamson, 1988).
Moreover, TCE predicts that as asset specificity increases the costs of both debt and 
equity will also increase. However, the costs o f debt financing are predicted to rise 
faster. As mentioned above, one important reason is that if  debt is raised to finance 
the purchase of highly specific assets, prospective debt-holders will require large 
premiums because the value of their pre-emptive claims declines as asset specificity 
increases. In addition, Williamson points out that in some situations debt can cause 
the company to compromise value enhancing decisions which could be put into action 
by a more flexible regime, such as equity.
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Fig. 4.1. Choice of debt vs. equity.
Source: Adapted from Williamson (1996, p. 108)
Therefore, as can be seen in Fig. 4.1, TCE predicts that D(0) < E(0) and D' >E' > 0. 
The implication is that the optimal choice will be to finance non-specific assets (to the 
left o f k*) with debt, and highly specific assets (to the right of k*) with equity.
4.5. Critical evaluation of Williamson’s theory of the uses of debt and equity
The gaps in the TCE theory of the uses of debt and equity discussed in Section 4.4 
can be conveniently elucidated by comparing it to the paradigmatic TCE problem 
discussed in Section 4.3, i.e. the make-or-buy decision.
In Section 4.3 all o f the powerful tools that TCE generally uses to study the 
mechanisms that govern ongoing contractual relationships are incorporated into the 
analysis. If  the asset in question is specific, through the fundamental transformation, a 
situation o f bilateral dependency will emerge if  the parties involved decide to sign the 
contract. Since the parties to a contract live in an uncertain world there is scope for 
opportunism to emerge when unforeseen disturbances occur. In order to cement the 
relationship the parties to the contract find that the institution of governance 
structures buttressed by contractual safeguards is mutually beneficial. Moreover,
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there is a clear role for institutions as formal or informal constraints on opportunism 
in the background of the transaction.
In contrast, in the TCE theory of the uses of debt and equity described in Section 
4.4 (i.e. Williamson, 1988) several key governance mechanisms are not examined in 
detail. Significantly, the central issue of bilateral dependency in the presence of 
specific assets is not fully analysed. Important questions are left unanswered: will the 
managers o f the large modem corporation, with its huge internal cash flows, depend 
on shareholders for the financing of non-redeployable projects? Are shareholders, 
who can sell their shares anytime, dependent on the corporation?
If bilateral dependency does not take place at all times, will the governance 
structures in place effectively prevent opportunism from occurring? If opportunism 
occurs, in which form(s) will it be manifested? Moreover, what will be the role of 
institutions in mitigating opportunism?
In sum, for the case o f the equity governance structure an examination of the 
mechanisms o f governance clearly requires a more detailed analysis o f the processes 
involved. That is, if  it is observed that a corporation does not depend on shareholders 
as sources of finance it is important to understand the process leading to such an 
outcome. To shed light on these issues, an examination o f firm lifecycle theory is 
clearly needed. This will be the topic of the next chapter.
4.6. A note on the historical development of TCE’s theoretical and empirical 
literature
Since its introduction in the 1970s TCE has proven to be an extremely versatile 
theory with applications to many types of contracting phenomena. In recounting the 
theory’s achievements Williamson has recently stated that important applications of 
TCE:
...other than vertical integration include non-standard contracting practices (customer 
and territorial restrictions, take-or-pay contracts, exchange agreements, price 
discrimination, and the like), regulation (and deregulation), labor-market 
organization, the uses of debt and equity, agricultural cooperatives, networks,
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multinational economic organization, corporate strategy (many marketing practices 
included), and the list goes on.3
(Williamson, 2005, pp. 12-13)
For the purposes o f this thesis, it is important to note that this TCE literature has 
historically developed in two main directions over the last three decades. On the one 
hand there is the oldest and well-known literature that emphasises the tradeoffs 
between governance modes (i.e. markets, hybrids and hierarchies) and which holds 
that the result for a given transaction mainly depends on which mode economises the 
most in transaction costs, so that waste is reduced. Clearly, this literature is concerned 
with measuring the several dimensions in which governance structures differ and in 
testing whether TCE’s predictions on the choice between alternative governance 
modes are supported by the data.
On the other hand, however, starting in the early 1990s we have a newer literature 
which is concerned exclusively with the economics o f  the hybrid form  and that 
employs the TCE framework {bilateral dependency, opportunism, contractual 
safeguards, etc.) to derive testable predictions on the particulars of this governance 
mode (Menard, 2004). Importantly, this literature takes the results of the older 
literature on the choice between alternative governance structures as given and instead 
places the emphasis solely on the economics o f the hybrid form. Obviously, this 
change in emphasis means that the empirical analysis of the other governance 
structures is not part o f the new literature since it is only concerned with the hybrid.
In this regard, it is essential to clarify that the theory to be constructed in Chapter 6 
below belongs to the new literature, since it is concerned exclusively with the equity 
mode of governance, which is one of the hybrid forms. This means that in this thesis 
the results of the TCE literature on the choice of debt vs. equity are assumed to hold, 
and instead the emphasis is placed exclusively on the equity mode of governance; so 
that we can concentrate on the topic of this thesis which is the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance.
The foregoing helps to explain why the study of corporate governance and its 
relationship to firm performance has not been one of the areas in which TCE has had 
any perceptible application. Thus far all of the TCE theoretical work as well as an
3 For instance, TCE has recently been applied to the field o f Management Control (Speklé, 2001) and 
to examine the staffing decisions o f multinational corporations (Bonache Pérez and Pla-Barber, 2005).
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increasing number o f corroborating empirical studies belong to the older literature on 
the choice of debt vs. equity (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993; 
Kochhar, 1996; Mocnik 2001; Benmelech et al., 2005) and not exclusively with the 
study o f the equity mode of governance as is the goal of the present doctoral thesis.
Hence, given that the choice of debt vs. equity problem constitutes a different topic 
from that which present work intends to study an examination o f the current empirical 
literature on TCE is out of the scope o f the present work and will not be reviewed. 
Please note, however, that surveys of the empirical literature on TCE are available 
from the following references: Boemer and Macher (2002), Shelanski and Klein 
(1995), and Joskow (1988). These surveys suggest that TCE has consistently yielded 
valid predictions. Indeed, according to one of the papers “the empirical literature, on 
the whole, is remarkably consistent with the predictions of TCE -m ore so than is 
typically the case in economics” (Shelanski and Klein, 1995, p. 335).
4.7. Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the key elements of Williamson’s TCE. Section 4.3 
discussed the paradigmatic “make-or-buy decision” problem in which all o f the 
powerful analytical elements of TCE play a role in the analysis. On the other hand, 
Section 4.4 discussed the TCE theory of the choice o f debt vs. equity where it was 
found that all the potent TCE tools previously introduced in Section 4.3 are not 
included in the analysis. Hence, Section 4.5 finds that for the case of TCE’s theory of 
the uses o f debt and equity the essential issue of bilateral dependency in the presence 
of specific assets is not examined in detail. Since for the case o f corporate governance 
and firm performance it is straightforward to foresee circumstances in which bilateral 
dependency will not prevail, important questions regarding the effectiveness of the 
mechanisms of governance in containing opportunism are raised. Furthermore, some 
brief comments on the TCE literature are stated in Section 4.6.
Overall, the chapter concludes that a wide-ranging understanding o f firm lifecycle 
processes is necessary in order to provide satisfactory answer to the issues raised. 
Hence, the next chapter will discuss an important lifecycle theory of the firm first 
proposed by Mueller (1969, 1972). Once the insights from both TCE and the lifecycle 
theory of the firm are in place, Chapter 6 will then build a combined theoretical 
framework.
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Chapter 5. A lifecycle theory of the firm
5.1. Introduction
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, one of the main drawbacks of Agency Theory 
(AT) is that it lacks a unified framework with which to analyze both entrepreneurial 
and managerial firms. Moreover, in those chapters it was argued that since AT lacks 
the analytical apparatus necessary to study ongoing contractual relationships, it is not 
a fitting theory when it comes to the study o f the process through which 
entrepreneurial firms may mature into managerial companies.
On the other hand, Chapter 4 has argued that in order to unpack the crucial TCE 
ex-post analytical tools needed in this thesis to examine how the contractual 
relationship between managers an shareholders evolves over time, it is essential to 
firstly determine in which circumstances the condition of bilateral dependency is 
likely to hold, and in which situations it will possibly not. Accordingly, the main 
purpose of this chapter is to introduce theoretical material necessary to fill the gaps in 
TCE which were identified in the previous chapter.
In particular, this chapter presents some o f the key aspects of Mueller’s (1969, 
1972) lifecycle theory of the firm and suggests ways in which it can help mitigate the 
weaknesses in the TCE approach to corporate governance and corporate finance. As it 
will be discussed below, Mueller’s theory provides key insights on how to fill in the 
gap concerning the crucial TCE concept of bilateral dependency between managers 
and shareholders. Since the lifecycle theory suggests that young entrepreneurial firms 
will be heavily dependent on outside shareholders to finance investment projects, 
while on the other hand, mature firms with large internal cash flows will not, 
Mueller’s theory helps tremendously to clarify the nature of the bilateral dependency 
between firms and shareholders. This is the crucial point that Chapter 6 will exploit to 
build a combined TCE-firm lifecycle perspective.
In addition, the weaknesses of the lifecycle theory of the firm if  it were applied to 
the study of corporate governance and firm performance will also be discussed. For 
example, this chapter points out that a weakness of the lifecycle theory o f the firm, if 
it were taken from its original job of explaining conglomerate mergers and applied to 
the study o f corporate governance, concerns the fact that it does not provide a role for 
the board of directors. Moreover, as another example, more recent accounts of the
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lifecycle theory (e.g. Mueller, 2003, pp. 80-82) have failed to incorporate aspects of 
corporate governance such as the potential role of anti-takeover provisions.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the key behavioural 
assumptions underpinning Mueller’s lifecycle theory o f the firm. Section 5.3 
examines the central aspects of the lifecycle theory of the firm. Section 5.4 discusses 
the fundamental insights offered by the lifecycle perspective which are necessary to 
fill in the gaps in TCE’s theory o f corporate governance. Section 5.5 examines the 
weaknesses of the lifecycle theory o f the firm in its present form if  it were applied to 
phenomena other than that for which it was originally designed to explain and used 
instead as a theory of corporate governance. Section 5.6 considers the relevant 
empirical literature. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2. Behavioural assumptions
In contrast to AT and TCE, which present behavioural assumptions about 
economic actors generally considered, Mueller’s lifecycle theory o f the firm 
emphasizes the importance of managerial motivations. Following Marris (1964, 
chapter 2) Mueller assumes that the two key utility dimensions that dominate 
managerial preferences are (1) firm growth maximization and (2) job security.
The first behavioural assumption states that managements will tend to maximize 
the growth of the firm they control. This assumption is based on the evidence in 
Marris (1964, chapter 2) that the pecuniary compensation (salary, bonus, etc.) and the 
non-pecuniary rewards (prestige, power, and the like) which corporate managers 
receive are closely linked to the rate of growth of the firm they control. Since 
managerial welfare is closely tied to firm growth, Mueller’s lifecycle theory argues 
that it is reasonable to believe that in certain circumstances managements will pursue 
an expansionary policy for the firm which is inconsistent with shareholder wealth 
maximization. On the other hand, the second behavioural assumption states that 
managers wish to feel secure in their jobs at the helm of the firm. Hence, in so far low 
firm market valuations increase the probability o f takeover, this assumption implies 
that managers will be concerned if  the price of their company’s stock falls too low.
The fact that Mueller emphasizes two assumptions about managerial preferences 
should not obscure, however, the important fact that the behavioural assumptions in 
the lifecycle theory are consistent with those postulated by TCE. For instance, the 
hypothesis that managers will maximize firm growth to the detriment o f shareholder
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wealth implies the assumption of opportunistic behaviour on the part of management 
(see Mueller, 1969, pp. 644-648). On the other hand, Mueller’s (1972, pp. 201-204) 
argument that the CEOs o f large diversified firms often suffer from control crises due 
to lack of adequate information, or the similar argument that information losses 
increase as firms grow larger with the result of eventual reductions in profitability, are 
both consistent the assumption of bounded rationality (i.e. the assumption that 
managers have limited information and limited ability to process it).
5.3. Mueller’s lifecycle theory of the firm
Mueller (1969, 1972) develops a lifecycle theory of the firm that combines the 
Schumpeterian view that firms go through lifecycles with Marris’ (1964) assumptions 
that managers maximize the growth of their companies and care about job security 
(Mueller, 2003, p. 80). Figures 5.1 and 5.2 below summarize the key points of 
Mueller’s theory by illustrating how the assumed behaviour on the part o f managers 
may affect investment policy and firm growth at two stages o f the firm’s lifecycle.
The left hand side of Fig. 5.1 exemplifies the investment situation facing a young 
firm. In the figure, CFy represents the cash flow of the young firm (i.e. profit plus 
depreciation). According to the lifecycle theory, the investment opportunities of the 
young firm will generally exceed its internal cash flows. Thus, in the figure, the 
expected marginal rate of return for the young firm (mrry) intersects the firm’s cost of 
capital iy to the right o f CFy. Clearly, in such a case, the shareholder-wealth- 
maximization policy is to raise outside capital until the young firm’s marginal cost of 
capital equals the firm’s marginal return on investment and pay no dividends. 
Therefore, if  the young firm actually maximizes shareholder wealth it would raise (Iy- 
CFy) outside capital and it would undertake Iy investment (Mueller, 1969).
For a young firm, Mueller argues, managerial and stockholder interests regarding 
investment policy will coincide. The reason is that if  managers invest more than Iy 
then future profit would be reduced as negative net present value projects would be 
accepted and the effect would be to increase present growth at the expense of the 
future growth o f the firm. Hence, assuming that “managers have the same time 
preference for growth as shareholders have for income, [Iy will also] be the level of 
investment that will maximize the present value o f the firm’s growth” (Mueller, 1969, 
p. 646).
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Fig. 5.1. Investment choices over the lifecycle of the firm 
Source: Adapted from Mueller (2003, p. 80)
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Fig 5.2. Schematic representation of firm growth over its lifecycle 
Source: Adapted from Mueller and Tilton (1969) and Mueller (1972)
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In other words, according to Mueller's lifecycle theory the investment policy of all 
young firms should be consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. This is also 
represented on the left hand side of Fig. 5.2 where the growth of young firms is 
depicted by the solid line. As can be seen in the figure, in the early years of their 
development the growth o f total output for all firms takes place at a rate which is 
consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. Note also that, following Mueller's 
theory, the figure depicts the rate of growth of firms in their early years as being 
higher when compared to that of firms in their later years.
On the other hand, the right hand side of Fig. 5.1 depicts the case o f mature firms. 
Mueller argues that many new firms will fail; but that those that do well see their cash 
flows increase enormously. Thus, the cash flow for the mature firm is placed on the 
right hand side o f Fig. 5.1 to indicate that mature firms will have much greater cash 
flows than young firms. Moreover, in consideration of the greater probabilities of 
failure, the figure shows the cost of capital for the young company (iy) higher than 
that for the mature firm (im).
According to the lifecycle theory o f the firm, the marginal rate of return schedule 
for a mature firm (mrrm) will also increase and shift to the right, but not as rapidly as 
CFm, “since the firm’s opportunities for internal investment will decline in a mature 
industry” (Mueller, 1969, p. 646). Thus, as the firm matures, its marginal rate of 
return mrrm and its marginal cost of capital im will eventually intersect to the left of 
CFm. It should be noted that, according to the lifecycle theory, by the time the mature 
company reaches this point, its market value and number of shareholders will have 
grown tremendously and therefore its ownership will likely be separated from control 
(Mueller, 2003, p. 81).
Clearly, for the case of a mature firm, a shareholder-wealth-maximizing firm 
would invest until the marginal rate of return of the firm is equal to its marginal cost 
of capital. As it can be seen on the right hand side of Fig. 5.1, such firm would invest 
Isw, pay out CFm-Isw in dividends, or a combination of dividends and stock 
repurchases, and raise no outside capital (Mueller, 1969).
In contrast, according to the lifecycle theory, a growth-maximizing management 
will tend to reduce, but not totally suppress, dividend payouts since these payments 
reduce the quantity o f resources available to the firm for growth. Such management 
“will tend to ignore, or at least heavily discount, investment opportunities outside the 
firm,” and for this reason, one can expect growth-maximizing managements to
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discount investments at a cost of capital below that of the stockholders (Mueller, 
1969, p. 647). Nevertheless, the theory also points out that there are mechanisms 
acting upon managers which keep them from employing a too low cost o f capital. The 
most important o f these mechanisms is the threat o f a takeover. If  shareholder 
dissatisfaction with management is too great the stock price may plunge, and this may 
increase the likelihood of a takeover.
Mueller (2003, pp. 80-81) illustrates the takeover constraint in Fig. 5.1 with the aid 
of curve mcM, which represents the “marginal psychological cost o f investing beyond 
I s w  from the perception of higher probabilities o f takeover.” The author points out 
that if  the managers o f the mature firm maximize shareholder wealth and invest at the 
optimal level, Isw, the threat of takeover due to overinvestment problems is zero, but 
that this threat rises if managers invest beyond that level. As shown in the figure, “the 
mature firm’s managers trade off shareholder wealth for growth” by investing more, 
and paying less dividends, than the management of a shareholder-wealth-maximizing 
firm (Mueller, 2003, p. 81). According to this view, a mature-growth-maximizing 
firm can be expected to undertake “more investment than a mature stockholder- 
wealth-maximizing firm [IM vs. Isw], pay less in dividends [C F m-IM vs. C F m -Isw ], and 
have a lower return on its marginal investment project” (Mueller, 1969, p. 647).
It is important to stress that according to Mueller's lifecycle theory all mature 
companies are growth maximizing firms. Clearly, this follows from the theory's 
behavioural assumptions. This is depicted in Fig. 5.2 where the growth of total output 
for mature firms is represented by the dashed line. As can be seen in the figure, in the 
later years o f their development firm growth takes place at a rate which is inconsistent 
with shareholder wealth maximization. If mature firms were to adopt an investment 
policy consistent with shareholder wealth maximization, this would involve some 
negative growth as it is illustrated by the solid line on the right hand side o f Fig. 5.2. 
Note that despite the fact that mature firms tend to overinvest their rate o f growth is 
much lower than that o f firms in their early years. This is a consequence of the 
reduced opportunities for internal investment in mature industries mentioned above.
Therefore, according to the lifecycle theory it is not the fastest-growing firms that 
tend to over-invest for these are typically young firms with good investment 
opportunities. Instead, over-investment problems are likely to occur in mature firms. 
The reason is that, for the latter firms, “the growth rate that would maximize 
shareholder wealth is likely to be zero or negative” (Mueller, 2003, p. 81). Faced
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with the prospect o f contracting hierarchies, reduced real salaries, lower opportunities 
for promotion, and even unemployment many managers will very likely look for ways 
to make their companies grow. In this connection, Mueller indicates that a mature 
firm in a market with slow growth or in decline can avoid retrenchment only by 
expanding its existing market share or by entering new markets. Since “growth can be 
sustained indefinitely only through diversification,” the lifecycle theory suggests that 
it is likely that the managements of mature firms will eventually pursue growth 
through diversification into unrelated businesses, and that if  this growth is pursued 
with the main goal o f enhancing managerial welfare, the return on these investments 
can be expected to be low (Mueller, 2003, p. 82). Importantly, this is how Mueller's 
lifecycle theory o f  the firm  explicates conglomerate mergers, which is the 
phenomenon it was originally intended to explain (see Mueller, 1969).
Finally, it is worth mentioning that according to Mueller's theory the conflict 
between managers and shareholders concerning investment policy “appears only 
slowly over time.” According to the lifecycle theoiy, the conflict between managers 
and shareholders manifests itself as a lower than optimal expansion of the dividend 
payout ratio during the transition from youth to maturity. Given this gradual shift, it 
may be difficult for shareholders to detect the overinvestment problem in its initial 
stages (Mueller, 1972, 2003, p. 81).
5.4. The lifecycle perspective and the gaps in the theory of corporate governance
The objective of this section is to point out the ways in which the lifecycle theory 
of the firm can help avoid the pitfalls of AT while at the same time help fill in the 
gaps of TCE. In this connection, this section discusses specific problems that can be 
solved with the help of the lifecycle perspective.
First, one of the important difficulties in AT is that it lacks a coherent explanation 
of the reasons why firm ownership structures tend to become diluted over time as is 
documented e.g. in the recent study by Helwege et al. (2007). As it was discussed in 
Chapter 2, Jensen and Meckling (1976) present a theory which suggests that 
ownership structures are the result of an equilibrium mechanism that ultimately 
minimizes agency costs. Moreover, in that paper there is no role for firm cash flows 
and, regarding this point, it is difficult to see the connection of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) with later AT work that incorporates firm cash flows such as Jensen (1986).
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Mueller’s theory adequately addresses this drawback and, in doing so, it provides a 
link between entrepreneurial and managerial firms. The lifecycle solution is 
straightforward. According to the lifecycle perspective, the observed tendency of 
ownership structures to become diluted overtime is related to the fact that young 
entrepreneurial companies usually possess insufficient cash flows with which to fund 
all profitable investment opportunities available and thereby maximize their growth. 
More precisely, the evolution of ownership structure as suggested by insights taken 
from the lifecycle theory may be summarized as follows: young firms are originally 
run by an entrepreneur who starts with substantial ownership. Gradually, the 
entrepreneur dilutes his interests in the firm in order to raise capital since the young 
firm’s cash flows are inadequate to take advantage o f profitable opportunities and 
satisfy the owner’s preference for rapid growth. In this way he entrepreneur slowly 
reduces his ownership stake, so that when the firm matures ownership will be largely 
separate from control.
Secondly, the lifecycle theory provides a coherent unified framework with which 
to analyze both entrepreneurial and managerial firms that is based in the availability 
of internal cash flows relative to investment opportunities. This framework is 
especially important in that it helps tremendously to understand and rationalize when 
the agency costs o f free cash flows problem is likely to occur. Since, according to the 
lifecycle theory, as firms mature their cash flows will regularly exceed the amounts of 
cash necessary to invest optimally, the free cash flow problem will essentially be 
present in all mature firms. Thus, the free cash flow problem should be a fairly 
gradual process and a fairly lasting characteristic o f mature firms. On the other hand, 
the lifecycle theory suggests that the free cash flow problem should not be present in 
young entrepreneurial firms, since these have abundant positive net present value 
investment opportunities and do not have enough internal cash flows to exploit them 
on their own.
Finally and more importantly, the lifecycle theory provides part of the framework 
necessary to fill the gap identified in TCE regarding the question of bilateral 
dependency between managers and shareholders. Although Mueller’s theory works 
out of a composite-capital tradition (as opposed to TCE in which debt and equity are 
alternative organizational modes), it suggests that bilateral dependency is more likely 
to take place between shareholders and the management of young entrepreneurial 
firms. Since young companies usually have plentiful profitable investment
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opportunities and small cash flows to fund these projects, they will likely be 
dependent on shareholders for funding purposes. Conversely, the theory suggests that 
bilateral dependency will not likely hold between shareholders and the management 
of mature companies for the reason that these firms usually have large internal cash 
flows and few positive net present value investment opportunities and, therefore, 
should not regularly depend on outside equity to finance investment projects.
The preceding is a crucial point, it clearly suggests in which circumstances the 
condition of bilateral dependency will likely hold, and in which situations it will not. 
This is an essential insight o f the theoretical framework that will be developed in the 
next chapter, which in turn, will be used to investigate the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance in the thesis’ empirical chapter.
5.5. Weaknesses of the lifecycle theory in its present form if used as a theory of 
corporate governance and firm performance
Even though it helps to avoid the pitfalls in AT and to fill the gaps in TCE, it is 
palpable that Mueller’s theory is not a fully developed theory o f corporate governance 
and firm performance. This is particularly evident, for example, in Section 5.3 where 
an examination of the role of the board of directors is conspicuously missing. In 
effect, a revision of the original papers shows that the theory was originally developed 
in order to study the wave of conglomerate mergers that occurred in the U.S. during 
the 1960s (see Mueller, 1969) and not corporate governance/firm performance 
phenomena. Moreover, more recent accounts of the lifecycle theory (e.g. Mueller, 
2003, pp. 80-82) still continue to ignore such important corporate governance 
mechanisms as the board of directors. Clearly, this is an issue that must be addressed 
if  the theory is to be used to study the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance.
In addition, if  the lifecycle theory is to explain the link between corporate 
governance and firm performance, it clearly needs to incorporate additional 
theoretical treatment regarding the ability of management to entrench itself at the 
helm. Specifically, it is important for the theory to reassess the impact of anti­
takeover provisions on the effectiveness of the takeover constraint in curtailing 
overinvestment. The latter is particularly important given that anti-takeover provisions 
are likely to have a substantial impact on the effectiveness of the takeover constraint 
in Fig. 5.1. As mentioned in Section 5.3, the takeover constraint is depicted in that
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figure with the aid o f curve h ic m , which represents the “marginal psychological cost 
of investing beyond Isw from the perception of higher probabilities of takeover” 
(Mueller, 2003, p. 81). According to Fig. 5.1, the probability o f takeover increases if 
managers invest beyond Isw- However, if  sufficient anti-takeover provisions are 
deployed at the instigation o f management, then, clearly the takeover constraint will 
lose most of its effectiveness. Managers would be free to overinvest heavily and yet 
feel secure to a large extent since the anti-takeover provisions would make their firms 
less vulnerable to takeover.
Finally, the lifecycle theory does not seem to consider the possibility that in 
certain situations the mature firm’s cash flows could become insufficient to fund all 
profitable investments in specific assets once again. For example, changes in 
consumer preferences, successful R&D, innovation, growing demand for certain 
products, etc., could render the mature firm’s cash flows insufficient to fund all 
positive net present value investments. In that case the firm would have to turn to 
outside equity to take advantage of the new opportunities. Conversely, a mature firm 
could also become financially dependent on outside shareholders if, for example, 
competition from younger firms, from abroad, etc., reduces its internal cash flows so 
that they become insufficient to fund all profitable investment projects.
5.6. The empirical literature on the lifecycle theory of the firm
Since the subject matter o f the present doctoral research is that o f corporate 
governance and firm performance, a review o f the empirical literature on the lifecycle 
of the firm which examines conglomerate mergers is out o f the scope o f the present 
work. Please note, however, that a comprehensive survey o f this literature is available 
in Mueller (2003, chapters 8  and 9), where substantial evidence in favour of the 
lifecycle theory o f conglomerate mergers is found. On the other hand, in so far as this 
thesis is concerned with the study of firm performance a few comments are in order 
concerning that part of the literature which studies how rates o f return on investment 
vary over the lifecycle of the firm.
As can be seen in Fig. 5.1, the lifecycle theory of the firm predicts that, for the case 
of mature companies, rates of return on investment will fall below the firm’s cost of 
capital. From this prediction, a branch of research has emerged which studies the 
relationship between firm age (measured in years) and the ratio o f a firm’s return on 
investment over its cost o f capital.
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Perhaps the most interesting article in this literature is that by Mueller and Yun 
(1998). These authors, using a method originally developed by Mueller and Reardon 
(1993) to measure “marginal q” (which is the ratio of a firm’s return on investment 
over its cost o f capital), study how rates of return on investment vary with firm age 
(measured in number o f years since firm incorporation). On the whole, they find that 
over the period from 1950 to 1990 marginal q does decline as firms become older, a 
result which is consistent with the predictions of Mueller's lifecycle theory.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that there are at least two shortcomings with 
this research approach, both o f which are related to the use o f firm age, measured in 
years since incorporation, as a means to distinguish between young and mature firms. 
The first problem is that, as common sense would suggest, some firms mature faster 
than average, while others mature much more slowly. This problem is recognized by 
Mueller and Yun, who comment that:
Although, it is perhaps reasonable to assume that firms pass through a lifecycle, it is 
unreasonable to assume that the lifecycle for all firms is of similar duration. Both 
logic and causal observation suggest that the lifecycle for some consumer products, 
like Coca Cola, will be longer than for some intermediate goods, like transistors.
(Mueller and Yun, 1998, pp. 360-361)
Secondly, since the lifecycle theory does not consider the possibility that in certain 
situations the mature firm’s cash flows could become insufficient to fund all 
profitable investments in specific assets once again, Mueller and Yun (1998) seem to 
disregard some o f the results suggested by their data as implausible rather than taking 
them as an indication that something could be missing in the theory, e.g.:
Equation (8c) implies somewhat implausibly that the average firm’s returns on 
investment relative to its cost of capital begin to rise after 80 years.
(Mueller and Yun, 1998, p. 360)
As it will become apparent in later chapters, one of the original contributions of 
this thesis is to show how these two shortcomings can be overcome in the context of a 
combined TCE-firm lifecycle theoretical framework which is designed to explain how
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corporate governance affects firm performance. Finally, please note that a survey of 
this literature is available from Mueller and Yun’s (1998) paper.
5.7. Conclusion
This chapter has presented the lifecycle theory of the firm first proposed by 
Mueller (1969, 1972) and it has argued that it can be used to avoid the pitfalls in AT 
and fill in the gaps in TCE identified in the previous chapter. For instance, the 
lifecycle theory circumvents several of the drawbacks o f the AT literature. By 
providing a description o f how firms grow and mature, the lifecycle theory provides a 
rationalization o f how ownership structure evolves over time, as well as clarification 
regarding the nature o f “the agency costs of free cash flow” problem.
Crucially, the lifecycle theory helps to fill the critical gap in the TCE treatment of 
corporate governance and corporate finance. Particularly, since the theory puts 
forward that young entrepreneurial firms will be heavily dependent on outside 
shareholders to finance investment projects, while on the other hand, mature firms 
will not, Mueller’s theory goes very far towards resolving the gap in the TCE 
corporate governance literature regarding the crucial TCE concept of bilateral 
dependency. This is the essential perspective that the next chapter will exploit in order 
to construct a combined TCE-firm lifecycle theory, which will then be used to study 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in the empirical 
chapters.
In addition, this chapter has examined the weaknesses of the lifecycle theory of the 
firm in its present form if  used as a theory o f corporate governance. The two principal 
gaps in the theory consist in the omission of such important governance factors as the 
role of the board o f directors, and the effects o f anti-takeover provisions. The 
apparent reason is that the lifecycle theory was not initially intended to be a corporate 
governance theory; instead it was designed with the purpose o f studying conglomerate 
mergers (Mueller, 1969). Finally, this chapter has discussed the empirical literature on 
the rates o f return over the lifecycle of the firm where it has also found some 
weaknesses. The next chapter will show how the gaps in Mueller’s lifecycle theory 
can be filled by developing a complementary TCE-firm lifecycle theoretical 
framework.
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C hapter 6. A combined TCE-firm  lifecycle theory of corporate governance and
firm perform ance
6.1. Introduction
The objective o f this chapter is to construct a combined TCE-firm lifecycle theory 
expressly designed to explain and predict how corporate governance affects firm 
performance in the context of U.S. institutions. This is one o f the main contributions 
of this thesis to positive economics and finance.
This chapter represents an original attempt to fill in the gaps identified in previous 
chapters by combining the robust TCE analytical framework with key insights 
provided by the lifecycle theory of the firm. As discussed in Chapter 4, the main gap 
in TCE’s approach to corporate governance is that the critical issue o f whether the 
condition o f bilateral dependency between a firm (i.e. its executive directors) and its 
shareholder holds is not examined in detail. On the other hand, Chapter 5, in which 
the lifecycle theory o f the firm is discussed, shows that bilateral dependency will 
likely occur in young entrepreneurial firms, but not in mature managerial firms. It is 
by bringing together insights from these two perspectives that this chapter fills the 
gaps in the literature and constructs its combined model.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 presents the combined TCE-firm 
lifecycle theory. Section 6.3 discusses the empirical counterparts of the variables in 
the theory as well as the model’s testable hypotheses. Section 6.4 discusses the choice 
of measurements of firm performance to be used in the theory’s empirical tests. 
Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2. The combined TCE-firm lifecycle model
The starting point o f the combined TCE-firm lifecycle theory in this chapter is 
Williamson’s (1988) treatment of debt and equity as alternative governance 
structures. As discussed in Chapter 4, Williamson has argued that while debt is used 
to finance redeployable assets (i.e. those with low asset specificity), equity, on the 
other hand, is used to finance non-redeployable assets (i.e. those assets with high 
specificity). Chapter 4 notes, however, that throughout his paper Williamson assumes 
that there will always exist a situation bilateral dependency between equity-holders 
and the corporation and, as a result, a question is raised on that chapter on the 
consistency of employing this assumption in all possible cases.
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Accordingly, this section will examine the implications of relaxing the assumption 
of bilateral dependency using, to guide the inquiry, insights provided by Mueller’s 
(1969) lifecycle theory o f the firm. As discussed in Chapter 5, Mueller’s (1969) paper 
clearly suggests that while a condition of bilateral dependency between equity-holders 
and the firm is likely to occur for fast-growing young firms with cash flows that are 
insufficient to finance all profitable investments in specific assets on a continuing 
basis (and are therefore dependent on their shareholders to finance these projects), for 
the case of slow-growth mature firms, on the other hand, the assumption of bilateral 
dependency between equity-holders and the firm is untenable.
The reason is that mature firms usually have cash flows which are sufficient to 
finance all profitable investments on specific assets and simultaneously issue 
dividends and/or repurchase stock on a continuing basis. Hence, mature firms are 
unlikely to depend on their shareholders to finance their investments in specific 
assets, and consequently can be generally regarded as being financially autonomous 
from their shareholders. In contrast, however, the shareholders o f mature firms as a 
group (just as those o f young firms) will remain dependent on their corporations. This 
is because, as Williamson (1985, p. 304) argues, while individual equity-holders can 
terminate their relationship with any given corporation by selling their shares, 
shareholders taken as a group cannot do so: as long as the corporation does not buy 
back its own equity the investing public taken as a group will have to hold it.
6.2.1. Theoretical discussion on how the equity mode o f  organization changes over 
the lifecycle o f  the firm
Based on these insights, this section will argue that in addition to Williamson’s 
(1988) contractual equilibrium, there are three other important equilibria for the 
equity governance structure in the context of U.S. institutions. As it will be discussed, 
the four equilibria represent magnitudes at which the theoretical variables in the 
model can coexist without violating the model’s behavioural assumptions. Moreover, 
they also reflect the changes that the equity governance structure suffers over the 
lifecycle o f the firm. The four equilibria are depicted in Fig. 6.1 in the next page and 
are labelled system states 1 to 4 in order to denote that they take place sequentially as 
firms mature. Note that the purpose of Fig. 6.1 is to provide a quick summary of the 
values that the theoretical variables in the model can take in each o f the system states 
as will be discussed below.
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Fig. 6.1. System states 
Source: author’s considerations
Before we discuss these four equilibria, however, a few remarks concerning the 
concepts (or “mental constructs”) that constitute the theory are in order. Specifically, 
it is important to mention that the theory is constructed using four key theoretical 
variables all o f which are derived from TCE: (a) the level o f bilateral dependency 
between the parties involved (or the lack o f it i.e. firm financial autonomy from 
shareholders), (b) the effectiveness o f firm-level contractual safeguards mainly in the 
form of a board o f directors, (c) the level of opportunism with which the theoretical 
actors conduct themselves, and (d) the level of institutional protection for the parties 
involved.
On the other hand, the behavioural assumptions -which act as theoretical links 
between the variables above- are those used in standard TCE: actors are assumed to 
be limited in their knowledge about future events (bounded rationality, so that all 
complex contracts are incomplete) and to have an inclination to behave 
opportunistically (Williamson 1985; 1996). In addition, the managers in the model are 
assumed to derive utility from firm growth (i.e. they obtain pecuniary and non- 
pecuniary benefits from firm growth), and to value job security (so that if  the market
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valuation of their firms is too low they become concerned due to the increased 
probability of a hostile takeover). In this regard it is important to note that ‘growth 
models’ such as Marris (1964) and Mueller (1969), which are characterized by the 
adoption the last two assumptions, are profit driven. In such models managers never 
pass up opportunities for increasing profits because increases in profits translate into 
increased sustainable growth as well as higher valuation (Marris, 1998). This also 
applies for the model in this section.
Now we are ready to discuss the four system states in Fig. 6.1. Note that for ease 
of exposition, the theoretical variable ‘bilateral dependency’ is represented by its 
opposite ‘firm financial autonomy from shareholders’ in that figure. In addition, note 
that ‘overall corporate governance effectiveness’ refers to both the effectiveness of 
both firm-level (e.g. the board of directors) and institutional corporate governance 
effectiveness (e.g. the threat o f takeover).
System state 1. This state corresponds to the case of Williamson’s ‘equity contractual 
equilibrium’ and to that o f Mueller’s young firms. As can be seen, state 1 is depicted 
at the top left comer of Fig. 6.1, where bilateral dependency is high between the 
firm’s management and its shareholders (i.e. lack of firm financial autonomy), overall 
corporate governance is highly effective (i.e. both good firm-level and institutional 
corporate governance) and opportunism is low.
As mentioned earlier, shareholders are always dependent on the firm and its 
management (Williamson, 1985). On the other hand, young firms (in state 1) depend 
on shareholders to fund investment in specific assets since, according to the lifecycle 
theory o f the firm, managements wish to maximize growth, and firms resort to 
external equity most heavily when they are young given an abundance of good 
investment opportunities and high growth. Hence, we have a condition o f bilateral 
dependency in state 1. In addition, according to TCE equity becomes less costly when 
safeguards are effective and contractual hazards are mitigated. Since good corporate 
governance is mutually beneficial, as it can reduce the cost o f new equity the young 
firm needs for growth and it protects shareholder’s assets, overall corporate 
governance should be highly effective in state 1 (there is an effective board of 
directors in this state). Finally, when overall corporate governance is effective, TCE 
informs us that opportunistic behaviour is constrained, hence in state 1 the level of 
opportunism is low. Since at these magnitudes the interrelated variables are mutually 
compatible, state 1 is said to constitute an equilibrium.
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To further elucidate the implications of the argument in this section Fig. 6.2 in the 
next page presents a sketch of the growth patterns of firms in each state relative to 
those of a hypothetical shareholder welfare maximizing firm. Note that for firms in 
state 1 a low level o f opportunism means that the growth pattern o f these firms will be 
very similar to that o f a comparable shareholder-wealth-maximizing firm.
System state 2. According to Mueller’s (1969) lifecycle theory, as firms mature their 
cash flows become consistently larger than the quantities required to finance all 
profitable investment opportunities. Clearly, since at this point the management can 
finance all investments in specific assets from the company’s internal cash flows, it is 
evident that the date on which the managers start expecting that shareholders will no 
longer be needed as sources of equity capital will mark the end o f the ‘bilateral 
dependency’ condition. On account o f the assumption of managerial opportunism, and 
given that the board o f directors is usually under the influence o f management, it can 
be expected that at this point the management will weaken the effectiveness of the 
board o f directors as a contractual safeguard. For example, the management can alter 
the composition of the board of directors, the composition of its committees, its size, 
etc., thus weakening this control mechanism so that thereafter it favours their interests 
at the expense of those o f shareholders. Since in the case o f equity the contract lasts 
for the entire life o f the public corporation, shareholders as a group have no chance to 
renegotiate terms of their contracts and protect themselves from opportunism.
Nevertheless, in state 2 the managers will continue to be somewhat responsive to 
the interests of the shareholders. This is due to the threat of hostile takeover: if 
shareholders become discontent with management, the firm’s share price may plunge, 
which in turn would increase the likelihood of a hostile takeover taking place. Thus, 
state 2  refers to a stage of the lifecycle of the firm where the firm is financially 
autonomous from shareholders, firm-level corporate governance is weakened by the 
management o f the financially autonomous firm, but opportunism is moderated by 
institutional forces, namely, the takeover constraint works as indicated by Mueller 
(1969, 2003). This state is depicted at the middle-right section o f Fig. 6.1.
Note, moreover, that for firms in state 2 a moderate level o f opportunism means 
that the rate of growth of these firms will be somewhat higher than that of a 
comparable shareholder-wealth-maximizing firm. Fig. 6.2 below illustrates this point 
by depicting the growth pattern of a firm in state 2  using a dashed curve and that of a 
comparable shareholder-wealth-maximizing firm with a solid curve.
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System state 3. In order to overcome the institutional constraints on opportunism so 
that growth can continue at a higher rate, or, perhaps more importantly, to avoid 
retrenchment, 1 one action U.S. managements can take, once firm-level governance 
structures are weakened, is to have the board o f directors approve anti-takeover 
provisions to make their firms less vulnerable to hostile takeover.
Evidently, if the board approves anti-takeover provisions the managements of 
financially autonomous firms will have the required leeway to diverge from 
shareholder wealth maximization policies and instead substantially over-invest in 
expansion of market share or diversification, or both. Hence, system state 3 is 
depicted at the bottom-right section of Fig. 6.1, where corporate governance is at its 
weakest and opportunism is high.
Importantly, this higher level of opportunism at which managements of firms in 
state 3 can conduct themselves without fear of a hostile takeover is reflected in a 
higher rate of firm growth. Fig. 6.2 illustrates this by depicting the pattern of growth 
of a firm in state 3 using another dashed curve. Note that the rate o f growth of firms in 
state 3 is represented in the figure as being higher than that for both, firms in state 2, 
and a hypothetical shareholder-wealth-maximizing firm.
It is worth mentioning that an important institutional constraint that managements 
of U.S. firms in state 3 should not be able to overcome is related to the level of 
institutional shareholder protection enforced in the country, specifically: legal 
shareholder protection and monitoring by the financial press. Unfortunately for 
shareholders, however, although these institutional constraints are likely to be 
effective against stealing on the part of firm managements, they are unlikely to be 
effective against overinvestment decisions. This is because the courts are unlikely to 
second guess manager’s business decisions such as those involved in investment 
choices (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
System state 4. As can be seen in Fig 6.1 the magnitudes o f the theoretical variables 
for firms in state 4 are the following: low firm financial autonomy, moderate overall 
corporate governance effectiveness (due to the deployment o f antitakeover 
provisions) and a moderate level of opportunism. From a contractual perspective
1 It should be noted again at this point that many managers, when faced with the prospect o f contracting 
hierarchies, reduced salaries, lower opportunities for promotion, etc., are likely to seek ways to expand 
their companies even if the investments involved are expected to yield low returns (Mueller, 2003 pp 
81-82).
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firms in state 4 seem unconventional: they are financially dependent yet they have 
entrenched managements. How can a firm reach this state?
Given that previous work, such as that of Field and Karpoff (2002), finds that IPO 
firms deploy significantly less anti-takeover provisions than older firms, one likely 
explanation on how firms reach state 4 is related to the possibility that some mature 
firms may lose their financial autonomy. If so, we could then distinguish between 
‘fortunate’ and ‘unfortunate’ ways in which mature firms may lose their financial 
autonomy. An example of a ‘fortunate’ way is that, due to some events (e.g. changes 
in consumer preferences, successful R&D, innovation, growing demand for certain 
products), a mature firm’s cash flows become insufficient to fund all profitable 
investments in specific assets, and consequently the firm has to turn to outside equity 
to take advantage of the new growth opportunities. This case is depicted with a 
dashed curve in Fig 6.2. As can be seen in the figure such ‘fortunate’ firms in state 4 
would grow at a rate which is consistent with that o f a comparable shareholder- 
wealth-maximizing firm (its size, however, would not be consistent with that of such 
hypothetical shareholder-wealth-maximizing firm). Conversely, an ‘unfortunate’ 
possibility is that a firm’s products become standardized or displaced by new ones 
and competition (e.g. from younger firms, firms abroad, etc.) reduces its cash flows. 
In such a case the rate of growth of such ‘unfortunate’ firms should also be consistent 
with that of a hypothetical shareholder-wealth-maximizing firm, since its management 
would also have to persuade shareholders that the funds are being well invested on a 
continuing basis (though firm size wouldn’t be consistent with wealth maximization).
Note that in both cases if  a firm in state 4 wishes to reduce the cost o f the new 
equity it requires it would have to improve the credibility o f its corporate governance. 
Hence, the combined model in this chapter suggests that, in state 4, overall corporate 
governance should be moderately effective (as shown in Fig. 6.1).
However, despite the return to financial dependency in state 4, it seems unlikely 
that corporate governance effectiveness would return to the high levels of state 1 . 
Consider the case of a ‘fortunate’ firm, if the company had been previously over- 
investing, its stock price would have been low even before the loss of financial 
autonomy (e.g. companies in state 3). Specifically, if prior to the loss of financial 
autonomy, the management of the mature firm had been building an unwieldy 
conglomerate composed o f unrelated businesses, improved efficiency could be 
attained by dismantling the firm (Mueller, 1972). In such a case, if  the firm is to
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remain in one piece, the management would need to have anti-takeover provisions in 
place in order to reduce the risk of a hostile takeover bid. Thus, for the case of firms 
in state 4, the model in this chapter suggests that managerial opportunism will be 
manifested in the fact that firm size (as measured e.g. by the level of firm output) will 
be larger than that of a hypothetical shareholder-welfare-maximizing-firm as is shown 
in Fig 6.2. On the other hand, regarding the case of an ‘unfortunate’ firm, if  the firm 
takes a hit in its income generating capacity (e.g. due to competition), its stock price 
would likely be affected as well, which in turn, would increase the probability of a 
hostile takeover bid. In such a case, the management would prefer to have anti­
takeover defences ready. Therefore, in both cases, it seems reasonable to expect that 
the management o f a mature firm which loses its financial autonomy would be 
interested in keeping anti-takeover provisions in place.
6.2.2. Propositions
The key objective o f the theory in this chapter is to predict in which circumstances 
opportunistic activities will or will not likely surface, and how they will manifest 
themselves. For instance, concerning the circumstances, the level of opportunism is 
expected to be particularly high in system state 3 (see Fig 6.1). On the other hand, in 
relation to the ways in which opportunism will occur, the literature on corporate 
governance and firm performance indicates that opportunism can be of two kinds: ( 1 ) 
hold-up opportunism i.e. instead of paying out dividends managers invest these funds 
below the cost o f capital (“the agency costs of free cash flows”) and (2 ) moral hazard 
opportunism i.e. extraction of shareholder wealth (“stealing”). When institutions are 
strong such as is the case in the U.S., however, managers may overcome institutional 
safeguards against overinvestment (i.e. the takeover threat) by deploying anti­
takeover provisions, but may not be so successful in getting away with stealing 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Hence, this chapter concentrates on the problem of hold­
up opportunism. With these considerations in mind, the key propositions of the theory 
in this chapter are the following:
Proposition 1: The managements of financially dependent firms who are not 
entrenched using anti-takeover provisions will tend to invest in a manner which is 
consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. Note that this situation corresponds 
to the equilibrium labelled “system state 1 ” in the discussion above.
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Proposition 2: The managements o f financially autonomous firms who are not 
entrenched using anti-takeover provisions will tend to over-invest moderately. This 
situation corresponds to the equilibrium labelled “system state 2 ” in this chapter.
Proposition 3: The managements of financially autonomous firms who are also 
entrenched using anti-takeover provisions will tend to over-invest substantially. This 
situation corresponds to the equilibrium labelled “system state 3 ” above.
Proposition 4: The managements o f financially dependent firms who are also 
entrenched using anti-takeover provisions will tend to invest in a manner consistent 
with shareholder wealth maximization. This corresponds to the equilibrium situation 
labelled “system state 4.”
On the other hand, if  the management of a firm is over-investing substantially, as 
the present theory predicts will tend to happen in firms facing the situation labelled 
“system state 3,” then that firm should have a lower valuation when compared to 
other financially autonomous firms with un-entrenched managements (system state 2 ). 
This is because the latter should be constrained to a moderate level o f overinvestment 
by the threat of takeover. Therefore, relative firm valuation can be another way to 
detect the presence o f opportunism. This is the main idea behind the following 
propositions:
Proposition 5: Financially autonomous firms with entrenched managements (i.e. 
firms facing the situation labelled “system state 3”) will have lower valuations when 
compared to other financially autonomous firms with managements not entrenched 
using antitakeover provisions (i.e. firms facing the situation labelled “system state 2 ” 
above).
Proposition 6 : Financially autonomous firms with entrenched managements (i.e. 
firms facing the situation labelled “system state 3”) will have lower valuations when 
compared to financially dependent firms with managements not entrenched using 
antitakeover provisions (i.e. firms facing the situation labelled “system state 1 ” 
above).
Proposition 7: Financially dependent firms with entrenched managements (i.e. 
firms facing the situation labelled “system state 4”) will have lower valuations when 
compared to financially dependent firms with managements not entrenched using 
antitakeover provisions (i.e. firms facing the situation labelled “system state 1 ” 
above).
The last proposition follows from the theoretical prediction that although firms in 
system state 4 will tend to invest in a manner that is consistent with shareholder 
wealth maximization which is analogous to that of firms in state 1 , their size however 
will not be consistent with that of a shareholder-wealth-maximizing firm (see Fig. 
6.2). As mentioned above, the theory in this chapter suggests that firms in state 4 
could improve their efficiency and enhance their market value by selling unrelated 
businesses and paying out the funds to shareholders and/or using the proceeds to 
invest in any net present value projects that may be available. The reason the theory 
predicts that managements of firms in state 4 would not do the latter is the assumption 
of growth maximization. This is also the reason why the management o f firms in state 
4 would keep their antitakeover provisions in place.
6.3. Matching the theory with the empirical world
The purpose o f this section is to bridge the gap between the conceptual world of 
theory and the empirical world. The previous section was exclusively concerned with 
ideas and concepts; in contrast, the objective o f this section is to put us in a suitable 
position to test the propositions of the model for empirical accuracy. This involves 
two steps: (a) the selection or creation of appropriate empirical indicators, and (b) the 
conversion of the prepositional statements into testable hypotheses (Dubin, 1978).
6.3.1. Empirical indicators
Empirical indicators are the result of the operations that researchers perform in 
order to obtain measurements of the values of a theoretical variable (Dubin, 1978, p. 
182). As can be inferred from the propositions, in the case o f the present theory 
measurements for the following theoretical variables are needed: firm financial 
autonomy from shareholders, managerial entrenchment (which acts towards the 
nullification of some of the institutional constraints), and opportunism (in its hold-up 
variety i.e. overinvestment, also manifested in low firm valuation). The purpose of
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this subsection is to describe the empirical indicators to be used in this thesis. Please 
note that a discussion on how the necessary data for the empirical indicators was 
obtained, and an explanation on how the data are organized to provide measurements 
of the values of the theoretical variables, will be provided in the next chapter.
6.3.1.1. Firm financial autonomy from  shareholders and the “A-index”
The empirical indicator proposed in this section in order to measure firm financial 
autonomy is one o f the original contributions of this thesis. In the spirit o f this 
chapter, it is motivated by observations from the lifecycle theory of the firm, and is 
complemented with insights from TCE.
As it can be seen in Fig. 5.1 in Chapter 5, according to Mueller’s lifecycle theory 
the cash flows of young firms are usually smaller than the amounts of funds required 
to invest at their optimal level. Therefore, young firms can be said to be dependent on 
their outside sources of finance to fully exploit their investment opportunities. In 
contrast, according to the figure, the cash flows of mature firms are generally greater 
than the amounts of cash required to achieve optimal investment. Thus, mature firms 
are autonomous in the sense that they can fund all their investments and at the same 
time return part o f that cash to investors in the form o f dividends and/or stock 
repurchases. Consequently, following this line of reasoning, it would seem logical to 
suggest that financially dependent firms are those that on most occasions have smaller 
cash flows than their level of investments, while on the other hand it would seem 
equally reasonable to put forward that financially autonomous firms are those that on 
most occasions have cash flows which are greater than their level of investments.
Nevertheless, empirical indicators of financial autonomy based on this criterion 
would not match the combined TCE-firm lifecycle model’s requirements. As it was 
discussed previously, TCE indicates that firms (i.e. their managements) depend on 
shareholders for the financing of specific assets only. Thus, firms do not depend on 
shareholders for the financing of the whole investment expense since non-specific 
assets can be financed using debt.
Accordingly, it can be concluded that firms are financially dependent on 
shareholders (the type o f dependence about which the model refers) when on most
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occasions their cash flows are smaller than their investments in specific assets.2 
Conversely, it can be concluded that firms are financially autonomous from  
shareholders when on most occasions their cash flows are greater than their levels of 
investments in specific assets.
With these reasons in mind, an “autonomy index” or “A-index” to stand for 
financial autonomy (i.e. an empirical indicator) can be constructed as follows: for a 
given company in a given year, over a number o f past years (immediately preceding 
the year in question), add up the number of times a given company has cash flows 
which are greater than its investments in specific assets. The idea is that financially 
autonomous firms in the sense indicated above will obtain a higher score in this index 
relative to financially dependent firms.
Having established the basic criteria a practical problem arises as to how many 
years to use in order to create the A-index. Graham (2006, p. 319) suggests that in 
analyzing firm financial statements one should use a fairly long period in the past: 7  
to 1 0  years “in order to iron out the frequent ups and downs of the business cycle” ... 
and to get “a better idea of the company’s earning power.” Hence, the “A-index” for a 
given company in a given year will be created by adding one point for each year in 
which a company has greater cash flows than investments in specific assets during the 
previous 7 years.3 Thus, the A-index ranges from 0 to 7.
Note that the A-index is designed to avoid an important problem present in firm 
lifecycle empirical studies that measure firm age in years (e.g. Mueller and Yun, 
1998). Specifically, as discussed in Chapter 5, some firms mature faster than average 
e.g. those producing intermediate goods like transistors, while others mature much 
more slowly e.g. those manufacturing consumer products like Coca Cola (see Mueller 
and Yun, 1998, pp. 360-361). Hence, if  one measures firm age in years there is a 
danger that some young firms will be classified as mature when for all practical 
purposes they are still young, or vice-versa mature firms could be classified as young 
when in fact they present all the characteristics of a mature company. This problem is 
illustrated in Fig. 6.3 below.
2 Investments in specific assets will be measured as that part o f the firms’ investments financed by 
ploughed back cash flows plus net new equity. The details on the calculation o f  the A-index will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
3 Note that specialized publications, such as the “Mergent Industrial Manual” (see e.g. Mergent, 2004), 
also include 7 years o f financial statements for the firms reviewed therein in order to provide a good 
insight into the companies’ earning power. For instance, Mergent’s (2004) “Corporate Visibility -Plus 
Section” presents 7 years o f Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss statements.
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Fig 6.3. Schematic representation of two firms with lifecycles of different length 
Source: author’s considerations
As can be seen, the A-index represents a better empirical indicator for the purpose 
of separating young firms from mature companies than empirical indicators based on 
firm age. This is because young firms with strong growth will tend to have a low A- 
index given their dependence on shareholders to fund investment in specific assets. 
Conversely, mature firms will tend to have a high A-index due to their slow growth 
(which can be negative growth) and financial independence from shareholders. While 
measuring firm age in years can lead to an erroneous classification.
6.3.1.2. Institutional corporate governance and the “E-index”
As it has been previously discussed, managers can insulate themselves to a certain 
extent from the institutional environment by entrenching themselves at the helm of 
their companies. Thus, although the institutional environment is essentially the same 
for all firms in a given country, managements can reduce their exposure to 
institutional forces such as the treat of takeover by having their boards of directors 
deploy anti-takeover provisions. For this reason, what a researcher needs to measure 
in order to asses the effectiveness of institutional corporate governance, i.e. the threat
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of takeover, in constraining opportunism is the level of managerial entrenchment as 
measured by an index of anti-takeover provisions.
At present there are at least 4 indices of corporate governance provisions in the 
literature: (a) the “G-index” developed by Gompers et al. (2003), (b) the “E-index” 
developed by Bebchuk et al. (2004), (c) “Gov-Score” developed by Brown and Caylor 
(2004) and (d) “Gov-7” created by Brown and Caylor (2006b).
O f these, at the time o f data collection for the present work, Brown and Caylor’s 
indices only covered up to 3 years data, while Gompers et al.’s (2003) G-index 
comprised too many corporate provisions (24 in all) so that “innocuous” provisions 
may be included thus underweighting the provisions that really matter (Bebchuk et al., 
2004). This leaves us with Bebchuk et al.’s (2004) E-index as the most promising 
measure of entrenchment.
The E-index (i.e. Entrenchment index) is the outcome of Bebchuk et al. (2004)’s 
effort to identify a group of key governance provisions among the 24 governance 
provisions used by Gompers et al. (2003) to create their G-index. Based on 
discussions with lawyers, their own personal analysis, and examination o f provisions 
which attract opposition from institutional investors, the researchers were able to 
identify a collection of six key governance provisions. The six governance provisions 
thus identified are: staggered boards, limits to amend by-laws, poison pills, golden 
parachutes, supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements 
for charter amendments. The E-index is created for a given firm in a given year by 
assigning a point for each of the six key provisions that the firm has. Thus, the E- 
index ranges from 0 to 6 . In this thesis this empirical indicator will be used to measure 
entrenchment.4
6.3.1.3. The “marginal q ” method and opportunism
To test the propositions in the model, a method to measure deviations from 
shareholder wealth maximization as a consequence of overinvestment is needed. This 
subsection argues that the interesting method first proposed by Mueller and Reardon 
(1993) can be helpful in this regard .5
4 The E-index is available at Bebchuk’s website at http://www.law.harvard.edu/facultv/bebchuk/.
5 This method is also utilized by Gugler et al. (2003, 2004), Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Mueller and 
Yurtoglu (2000), Mueller and Yun (1998) among others. Thus, although in this section Mueller and 
Reardon (1993) are closely followed, comments from discussions in the other papers that use this 
method are also included.
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Mueller and Reardon (1993) (henceforth M&R) start by defining /, as the 
investment o f a firm in period t, CFt+j as the cash flow that the investment generates 
in t+j, and it as the firm’s discount rate in t. Thus, the present value of the investment, 
PVt can be expressed as follows:
* CF
p T ’ = i ^  (6,>
Then, M&R take the PVt from Eq. (6.1) and the investment It, and calculate the ratio 
of “the pseudo permanent return rt to (Gugler et al., 2003, p. F522) a ratio usually 
labelled qmt or “marginal q . ” 6
=  =  (6 .2)
That is, M&R argue that if the company had invested It in a project that generated a 
permanent return rt, this project would have produced the same PVt as in Eq. (6.1). 
The ratio is the key statistic in M&R’s analysis; it can measure hold-up 
opportunism problems of the type where free cash flows are retained and invested in 
negative net present value projects. As M&R argue, no firm  that maximizes 
shareholder wealth would undertake an investment fo r  which the qmt is less than unity 
(Gugler et al. 2004, p. 598). Then, M&R define the market value of the firm Mt as
M t = M m + PVt -  8tM t_x + n t (6 3)
Where, ôt is defined as the depreciation rate that the capital market appraises for 
the firm’s total capital, and is the error of the market in evaluating the market value 
of the firm. M&R then subtract Mt.i from both sides of the last equation, replace PVt 
with qmt Ih and finally divide both sides by Mt.i and obtain:
6 In conformity with the extant literature this thesis also calls this ratio “marginal q” throughout. It 
should be noted that according to Mueller and Yurtoglu (2000, p. 207) estimates oîqmt = rt/it should be 
interpreted as estimates o f average return on investment as opposed to estimates o f marginal return on 
investment. We shall return to this point in more detail in Chapter 8.
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M&R then argue that Eq. (6.4) can be used to estimate ôt and qmt. It is worth noting 
that, according to Gugler et al. (2003, p. F523), although both Mt and It carry the same 
subscript, Eq. (6.4) “does not suffer from a simultaneous equation bias. Mt is a 
company’s market value at the end of year t, while It is the investment flow over year 
t.” Thus, It takes place before Mt and it is exogenous.
To estimate Eq. (6.4) M&R utilize data on the market value o f each firm and its 
investments. They define Mt as the sum of the market value outstanding shares of a 
company plus the market value o f its outstanding debt. And they define investment as
I  = CF -  Dividends + AD + AD + R & D  + A D V  (6.5)
Where CF are the cash flows of the firm defined as the sum of income before 
extraordinary items and depreciation, and AD and AE  are defined as net additions to 
investment funds from changes in outstanding debt and equity respectively. 
Moreover, the researchers argue that although R&D and advertising expenditures 
{ADV) are charged to expenses (as opposed to be treated as investments in the 
company accounts) they are also forms of investment that can produce “intangible 
capital” which contributes to a firm’s market value, and that for this reason they add 
them to their measure o f total investment.
Fig. 6.4 below exemplifies how the M&R method works and how it may be useful 
for measuring hold-up opportunism. As it was mentioned previously, hold-up 
opportunism occurs when the controlling party o f the firm takes advantage of the poor 
safeguard intensity conditions, refuses to pay out at least some of the “free cash 
flows” to shareholders, and uses these funds to invest in negative net present value 
projects, while the shareholders lack the means to have the “control” of the 
corporation disgorge the cash.
A marginal q which is smaller than one indicates that managements are investing 
below the firm’s cost o f capital. In such a case shareholders would clearly prefer to 
receive the cash in the form of dividends or stock repurchases rather than seeing it 
reinvested. If managements are able to repeatedly invest below the firm’s cost of 
capital, this would evidence of investor’s inability to force the managements to pay 
out the free cash flows i.e. a hold-up situation.
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z - l z - l z - l
Fig. 6.4. The M&R model -an example of an overinvestment situation. 
Source: Adapted from Mueller and Reardon (1993, p. 445)
63.1.4. Tobin’s q as a measure o f  firm valuation and opportunism.
As discussed previously, low firm valuation can be an alternative way to detect the 
presence o f opportunism. Following previous work (e.g. Morck et al., 1988; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990), Tobin’s q will be utilized as a measure of firm 
valuation.
Consistent with recent work in the field (see e.g., Bhagat and Black, 2002; 
Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al, 2004), in this thesis Tobin’s q will be 
approximated by computing the ratio of the end o f fiscal year market value o f the firm 
divided by the end of fiscal year book value of the firm’s total assets.
6.3.2. Hypotheses
Since the theoretical variables in the propositions discussed above are of a strictly 
conceptual nature (i.e. they are not material or “empirical”), it is impossible to 
empirically test the theory’s propositions directly. To do this, it is necessary to first 
select suitable empirical indicators which can be employed for the theoretical
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variables in each proposition (Dubin, 1978, p. 206). This was the task performed in 
the previous subsection. Now that we have selected the necessary empirical indicators 
we can plug them in the theory’s propositions and state our testable hypothesis as 
follows:7
HIq: The managements o f financially dependent firms as measured by the A-index 
who are not entrenched using anti-takeover provisions as measured by the E-index 
will tend to invest in a manner which is not consistent with shareholder wealth 
maximization as measured by marginal q.
With the alternative hypothesis:
Hlj: The managements of financially dependent firms as measured by the A-index 
who are not entrenched using anti-takeover provisions as measured by the E-index 
will tend to invest in a manner which is consistent with shareholder wealth 
maximization as measured by marginal q.
H20: The managements of financially autonomous firms as measured by the A- 
index who are not entrenched using anti-takeover provisions as measured by the E- 
index will not tend to over-invest moderately as measured by marginal q.
With the alternative:
H2i: The managements o f financially autonomous firms as measured by the A- 
index who are not entrenched using anti-takeover provisions as measured by the E- 
index will tend to over-invest moderately as measured by marginal q.
H30: The managements o f financially autonomous firms as measured by the A- 
index who are also entrenched using anti-takeover provisions as measured by the E- 
index will not tend to over-invest substantially as measured by marginal q.
With the alternative:
H3i: The managements o f financially autonomous firms as measured by the A- 
index who are also entrenched using anti-takeover provisions as measured by the E- 
index wz7/ tend to over-invest substantially as measured by marginal q.
7 Note that from this argument it follows that from one proposition more than one hypothesis can be 
derived (see Dubin 1978). For instance, in our case if  two empirical indicators for firm financial 
autonomy were developed two different hypotheses could be derived starting from the same 
proposition even though the rest of the empirical indicators were to remain the same. This is an 
important point which is not usually appreciated in the corporate governance and firm performance 
literature.
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H40: The managements o f financially dependent firms as measured by the A-index 
who are also entrenched using anti-takeover provisions as measured by the E-index 
will not tend to invest in a manner consistent with shareholder wealth maximization as 
measured by marginal q.
With the alternative:
H4]: The managements o f financially dependent firms as measured by the A-index 
who are also entrenched using anti-takeover provisions as measured by the E-index 
will tend to invest in a manner consistent with shareholder wealth maximization as 
measured by marginal q.
H5q: Financially autonomous firms as measured by the A-index with entrenched 
managements as measured by the E-index will not have lower valuations as measured 
by Tobin's q when compared to other financially autonomous firms (as measured by 
the A-index) with managements not entrenched using antitakeover provisions (as 
measured by the E-index).
With the alternative:
H5i: Financially autonomous firms as measured by the A-index with entrenched 
managements as measured by the E-index will have lower valuations as measured by 
Tobin's q when compared to other financially autonomous firms (as measured by the 
A-index) with managements not entrenched using antitakeover provisions (as 
measured by the E-index).
H6 0: Financially autonomous firms as measured by the A-index with entrenched 
managements as measured by the E-index will not have lower valuations as measured 
by Tobins q when compared to financially dependent firms (as measured by the A- 
index) with managements not entrenched using antitakeover provisions (as measured 
by the E-index).
With the alternative:
H6 1 : Financially autonomous firms as measured by the A-index with entrenched 
managements as measured by the E-index will have lower valuations as measured by 
Tobins q when compared to financially dependent firms (as measured by the A-index) 
with managements not entrenched using antitakeover provisions (as measured by the 
E-index).
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H7o: Financially dependent firms as measured by the A-index with entrenched 
managements as measured by the E-index will not have lower valuations as measured 
by Tobin's q when compared to financially dependent firms (as measured by the A- 
index) with managements not entrenched using antitakeover provisions (as measured 
by the E-index).
With the alternative:
H7i: Financially dependent firms as measured by the A-index with entrenched 
managements as measured by the E-index will have lower valuations as measured by 
Tobin's q when compared to financially dependent firms (as measured by the A- 
index) with managements not entrenched using antitakeover provisions (as measured 
by the E-index).
6.4. The choice of empirical indicators for the measurement of firm performance
The main purpose of this subsection is to discuss some of the reasons behind the 
choice of empirical indicators for firm performance to be used in this thesis, that is, 
marginal q and Tobin’s q. Moreover, in view of the fact that many papers in the 
corporate governance literature also employ accounting measures o f firm performance 
such as return on equity (ROE, see Chapter 3), this subsection will also discuss some 
of the reasons why these accounting measures may not be the most appropriate for the 
purposes of this thesis. Finally, this subsection will examine the weaknesses 
associated with the measurements of firm performance herein discussed where 
appropriate.
6.4.1. Marginal q
This thesis will employ marginal q as an empirical indicator of firm  investment 
performance in order to detect the presence of managerial opportunism. That is, 
evidence of persistent overinvestment problems over a considerable period of time 
will be interpreted as a reflection of managerial discretion.
The reasons behind the choice of marginal q have to do with its superiority, for the 
purposes of this thesis, over the alternative empirical indicator: Economic Value 
Added (EVA™).
EVA™ is an estimation of economic profit which calls for cumbersome 
calculations of Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC), adjustments to Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) company accounts, and calculations of risk
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across companies. Moreover, in the EVA™ method there is scope for subjective 
decisions on the part o f researcher. For example, the formula for WACC calls for the 
input of required or expected values for the rate of return on equity which can be 
calculated in numerous ways, each of which provides a different answer. 8 Finally, 
since EVA™ is an accounting measure of firm performance it suffers from the biases 
common to such measures of performance (please see Section 6.4.3. below).
In contrast, marginal q is much simpler to compute and there is much less scope 
for subjectivity on the part of the researcher. Marginal q is simply “the change in the 
market value of the firm divided by the change in its capital stock (investment) that 
caused it” where “a sufficient condition for bad managerial decisions is that qmt< l” 
(Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003, pp. 380-381). Indeed, “the procedure for calculating qmt 
allows for different degrees of risk across companies” and “obviates the need to 
calculate company costs of capital” (Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003, p. 381).
Another important feature of marginal q is that, in contrast to Tobin’s q, it avoids 
many of the alleged problems of “reverse causation” or “endogeneity” discussed in 
Chapter 3. Consider the following example put forward by Gugler and Yurtoglu:
...low ... Tobin’s q’s for firms with a diffuse ownership structure might not indicate 
that the shareholders are poor monitors of managers, but rather that original large 
shareholders have diffused their holdings because investment opportunities were 
bound to decline or simply because they wanted to diversify their wealth. An 
estimated qmt of less than one, on the other hand, must be interpreted as a 
management failure. If firm investment opportunities are low, and its managers are 
maximizing shareholder wealth, they will invest little and the returns on this 
investment will (at least) equal the cost of capital.
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003, p. 380, italics in original)
Hence, the observation that marginal q is persistently less than one over a 
considerable period o f time unequivocally indicates managerial opportunism. Given 
that managers choose investment policy, if investment prospects are poor, managers 
can always choose to invest very little so that their marginal q is not less than one. 
More importantly, there is no sense in looking for endogeneity problems when
8 Examples o f different methods to calculate cost o f capital that yield different answers can be found in 
Benninga (2000, Chapter 2). To come up with a definite number for the cost o f capital would require a 
subjective decision on the part o f the researcher.
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marginal q is employed: “[m]anagers decide the nature of and amounts of investment; 
the investments do not determine the identity of owners or managers” (Gugler et ah, 
2004, p. 614).
6.4.2. Tobin’s q
The discussion in Chapter 3 reveals that Tobin’s q is one of the most commonly 
used empirical indicators in the corporate governance literature. This thesis will 
follow the paper that first used this empirical indicator in the corporate governance 
literature, i.e. Morck et al. (1988), and employ Tobin’s q as a measure o f firm 
valuation. As discussed in the previous sections, the purpose o f using Tobin’s q will 
be to employ firm valuation as a complement to marginal q in the detection of 
managerial opportunism.
The present writer is not aware of other measures of firm valuation which may be 
as frequently used as Tobin’s q in the corporate governance literature. An alternative 
would be to use Marris’ (1964) valuation ratio Vt, which equals the market value of 
the firm Mt divided by the book value of the firm’s assets Kt (so that Vu = Mt IKt, see 
Mueller, 2003, p. 164) but this is identical to Tobin’s q as it is currently computed in 
the corporate governance literature (e.g. Gompers et al., 2003). In this connection, it is 
interesting to note that originally (and until the 1980s), the denominator of Tobin’s q 
was usually computed as the replacement cost of the firm’s assets, so that ironically, 
the way in which Tobin’s q is currently computed in the corporate governance 
literature is closer to Marris’ valuation ratio Vt than to the original Tobin’s q.
Early researchers who employed Tobin’s q were well aware of its limitations, for 
example, Morck et al. (1988) comment:
Tobin’s Q is high when the firm has valuable intangible assets in addition to physical 
capital, ... goodwill, a stock of patents or good management...Q is undoubtedly a 
very noisy signal of management performance...
Morck et al. (1988, p. 296)
The upshot is that since there are numerous factors that can affect firm valuation 
other than managerial decisions, econometric equations that employ Tobin’s q as a 
dependent variable must include an appropriate number o f variables to control for all 
those factors. However, since a definitive list o f all the factors that may influence
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valuation is not available in the literature there is always the possibility that the results 
will suffer from omitted variable misspecification. Moreover, as discussed in the 
previous subsection when Tobin’s q equations are employed there is always the pitfall 
of “reverse causation” and “endogeneity” problems.
In view o f these limitations, the role of Tobin’s q in this thesis will be as a 
complement to marginal q to detect managerial opportunism. As it will be evident in 
the empirical chapters, when Tobin’s q is used in combination with marginal q, it is 
possible to tone down the allegation o f “reverse causation.”
6.4.3. Accounting measures o f  firm performance
On the other hand, the discussion in Chapter 3 also reveals that accounting 
measures of performance such as return on equity (ROE) are among the most 
commonly used empirical indicators in the corporate governance literature. 
Nevertheless, in the light of the arguments in Chapter 5 regarding lifecycle theory of 
the firm it is clear these measurements of performance present a bias.
Specifically, young firms with numerous investment opportunities that are also 
growing very fast will likely find their performance understated if estimated using 
such accounting measures. Given that in those firms managers will likely invest 
heavily at some time 7 ' but the returns will only occur at some future time ‘t + n ’, it 
is clear that the accounting results for these firms at time V  will tend to be relatively 
low, since the returns will occur with a lag and in the meantime the denominator of 
the empirical indicator will increase substantially.
Conversely, mature firms with scarce investment opportunities that are barely 
growing or even declining in size will likely see their performance overstated if 
measured by accounting measures of performance. Given that in those firms cash 
flows from past investments are coming in, while the denominators o f the empirical 
indicators are stable or declining since there are no new massive investments being 
undertaken, the results for these firms as measured by accounting ratios will tend to 
be relatively high.
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6.5. Conclusion
This chapter has developed a combined TCE-firm lifecycle theory created for the 
specific purpose of explaining the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance in the context of large U.S. publicly held corporations. This is one 
of the main contributions of this thesis. This work represents an original attempt to fill 
in the gaps and mitigate the weaknesses in corporate governance theory that were 
identified in previous chapters. The approach employed was to combine the 
robustness o f the TCE theory examined in Chapter 4 with some of the key 
perspectives offered by the lifecycle theory of the firm discussed in Chapter 5. Now 
that the relevant hypotheses have been carefully developed, the next chapter will 
discuss the methods that will be employed to make empirical tests o f these 
hypotheses.
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C hapter 7. Notes on the methods used to test the predictions of the combined 
TCE-firm lifecycle theory
7.1. Introduction
After putting forward an internally consistent theory from which key propositions 
on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance were 
logically derived, Chapter 6  identified appropriate empirical counterparts for the 
theoretical variables in the propositions. This has put the present work in position to 
check if the theory’s predictions are consistent with factual evidence. However, before 
the relevant tests are carried out, it is essential to first consider important issues 
regarding the methods that will be employed in this thesis to test the theory’s 
predictions. This is the purpose of the present chapter.
This chapter will proceed as follows. Section 7.2 discusses the choice of methods 
to be employed in the present thesis to test the predictions o f the combined TCE- firm 
lifecycle theory. The fact that the econometric methods in this chapter are selected for 
the purpose o f testing the predictions of the thesis’ theory should be a clear indication 
that in the present work econometrics is not an end in it self, rather it is seen as an 
important tool which is used to check whether the predictions of the theory are 
consistent with the phenomena it intends to explain. Thus, this section discusses the 
reasons behind the choice of econometric methods to be used in the thesis. Section 7.3 
continues with a discussion concerning the specification of the regression equations to 
be estimated in this thesis. The latter discussion is related to the use o f panel data and 
its implications for the specification of the relevant regression equations. Section 7.4 
describes the data sources used in this thesis. Section 7.5 concludes.
7.2. The choice of methods to test the predictions of the combined TCE-firm 
lifecycle theory
When confronted with the problem of selecting a method to test a hypothesis the 
economic researcher faces a philosophical problem much more profound than it is 
usually understood in our field. Indeed, when dealing with this issue the economic 
researcher is working within the vast field of philosophical enquiry which is 
concerned with the study o f the scientific method. Importantly, a key result which has 
emerged in this field of philosophical enquiry is that no absolute justification for the 
choice of methods to test scientific theories can be given. Instead, it has been argued
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that when a researcher faces the problem of selecting the appropriate method to test a 
hypothesis the investigator must rely on his own judgement and consider the 
relevance and convenience o f the different methods vis-à-vis the hypothesis in 
question (Machlup, 1978).
To this argument, an econometrician could respond that several statistical 
techniques have been devised in his field which can be used to objectively determine 
which econometric method is best for a particular case. But the philosopher could 
rejoin by demanding a justification of why econometric methods in general should be 
used in the first place and not, for example, historical methods (such as e.g. the 
method of colligation)? Indeed, econometrics is a relatively new area of economics 
and when it first started its methods were not accepted by all economists. Moreover, 
important difficulties with econometric techniques have been pointed out which have 
not been fully worked out (see e.g. Darnell and Evans, 1990).
Nevertheless, as indicated by Machlup (1978) this does not mean that all attempts 
at providing a justification for the choice of methods should be abandoned, it is just 
the pretence that an absolute justification for the choice o f method can be given that 
must be discarded. Thus, while acknowledging our limitations as regards absolute 
justification, a justification based on our best judgement must be put forward. That is, 
we must exercise our judgement, as far as our prior training and understanding o f the 
issue at hand may permit us, to determine that the method selected to test the theory is 
appropriate for the problem under study. Thus, there is no denying that the main 
reason for the use o f econometric techniques in this thesis is to be found in the 
author's prior training and the judgement of prior generations o f economists who have 
considered econometrics as a suitable tool to test economic theories.
7.2.1. Reasons fo r  not employing certain econometric techniques which are frequently 
used in the fie ld  o f  corporate governance andfirm performance
An examination o f the extant literature reveals that several econometric methods 
have been employed in the empirical literature concerning corporate governance and 
firm performance viz. paired samples, standard event methods, simultaneous 
equations, instrumental variables, regression analysis, the “Fama-MacBeth” 
procedure, and Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) methods.
Among these methods, paired samples and standard event methods do not lend 
themselves well to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 6 . For instance, it is
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difficult to see how to implement tests for overinvestment using any o f these two 
methods. Consequently these methods will not be used in the present thesis.
On the other hand, simultaneous equations and instrumental variables are 
employed in the corporate governance and firm performance literature when 
researchers consider that some of the variables in their models, e.g. ownership 
structure, reflect the “endogenous outcome of competitive selection in which various 
advantages and disadvantages are balanced to arrive at an equilibrium organization of 
the firm” (Demsetz, 1983, p. 384). However, since the right hand side variables in the 
regression equations to be estimated in this thesis are exogenous, as is particularly the 
case o f the Mueller and Reardon (1993) method (see Gugler et al., 2003, p. F523), 
these methods will not be used in the present thesis.
7.2.2. Reasons behind the choice o f  econometric techniques used in the present thesis
In the case o f the present thesis, however, the main econometric method to be 
employed is that o f regression analysis. The main reason is that regression analysis is 
invariably used in the empirical literature to implement the Mueller and Reardon 
(1993) method o f calculating “marginal q,” which is the empirical indicator used in 
the thesis’ hypotheses to measure investment performance. Particularly, it is important 
to note that as stated by Gugler et al. (2003, p. F523) the key right hand side variable 
in the M&R method (i.e. investment) is exogenous, which makes the use o f regression 
analysis appropriate.
Another important method that will be employed in this thesis is the Fama- 
MacBeth procedure (Fama and MacBeth, 1973; Cochrane, 2005, pp. 245-251). This 
method is based on regression analysis but instead of running a single regression for a 
given model as one would in the case when one has a panel dataset, the Fama- 
MacBeth procedure involves first the estimation o f annual cross sections o f the 
econometric model, followed by the estimation of the parameters in the model and 
their statistical significance by calculating (a) the average of the cross sectional 
parameters and (b) the time-series standard errors of the average parameters.
Gompers et al. (2003) have argued that the use of Fama-MacBeth procedure is 
fitting in cases when the right hand side variables o f a regression equation do not vary 
much over time. Specifically, they have argued that for the case of regression 
equations in which variables such as indices o f corporate governance provisions 
which do not change much over time appear on the right hand side, the use of the
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Fama-MacBeth procedure should be appropriate (Gompers et al. 2003, p. 126). This is 
the reason why the Fama-MacBeth technique will be used in the present work. 
Moreover, Gompers et al. (2003) have noted that one obvious alternative method 
would involve the use o f panel data with fixed effects. The problem with this 
alternative, however, is that when there are only a small number of changes over time 
in the right hand side variables of an econometric model, the inclusion o f firm fixed 
effects would force estimation of the coefficients from just a few changes. 
Consequently the use o f fixed effects in such analysis would hardly yield valid results.
Thirdly, the method o f Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) will also be employed in 
this thesis. This method will be applied to estimate regression equations in situations 
in which the databases to be used are expected to contain influential observations. For 
instance, Gompers et al. (2003, p. 129) have argued that the presence of outliers is a 
“common occurrence” when accounting ratios such as return on equity (ROE) are 
included as variables in econometric models. Since the method of least absolute 
deviations is less sensitive to outliers than ordinary least squares, Gompers et al. 
(2003) use LAD to guard against the disproportionate influence that large outliers can 
have on the OLS estimates. This is also the reason why this method will be employed 
in the present work.
Finally please note that, since the three methods selected above and their respective 
hypothesis testing procedures are fairly standard and well know by most researchers 
in the field o f corporate governance and firm performance, a technical description of 
the econometric methods selected is relegated to the Appendix to Chapter 7. Please 
refer to this appendix for a detailed discussion o f the econometric methods to be used. 
In that appendix, after an account of multiple regression analysis is provided, the 
Fama-MacBeth procedure (Fama and MacBeth, 1973) is described. The appendix 
ends with a discussion on the method of Least Absolute Deviations (LAD).
7.3. Notes on the specification of the thesis’ regression equations
The objective o f this section is to discuss the rationale behind the specification of 
the regression equations that will be estimated in the thesis’ empirical chapter (i.e. 
Chapter 8 ). After considering the reasons behind the specification o f the investment 
performance regression equations which are based on the Mueller and Reardon (1993) 
method of estimating marginal q, this section will discuss the arguments behind the 
specification o f the firm valuation regression equations which will be based on
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Gompers et al.’s (2003) application of the Fama-MacBeth procedure. Finally, this 
section will discuss the rationale behind the specification of regression equations that 
include accounting measures of firm performance.
7.3.1. Specification o f  the investment performance regression equation
In considering the specification of regression equations when panel data are 
available, economists usually concentrate in deciding whether they should use fixed 
effects or random effects specifications, while at the same time consideration of time 
fixed  effects is relegated to the background. For most economic applications this is 
good practice, however, when considering some financial applications the analyst 
should pay special attention to the peculiarities of the data at hand since, as it is 
widely known, financial markets can be highly volatile.
In particular, for the case of the investment performance regressions in this thesis 
which are based on the M&R method, a fundamental issue to keep in mind is that 
Mueller and Reardon (1993, p. 442) stress the fact that “[i]n any given year, all firm 
market values may be subject to large exogenous shocks as the stock market rises and 
falls.” With this, the authors clearly suggest that the kind of effects one has to 
primarily take in to account in using their method are those effects which are constant 
across firms but change over time. In other words, they suggest that the use of time 
fixed  effects is indicated for their model.
Consider the Mueller and Reardon (1993) basic model described in the previous 
chapter:
Where, the dependent variable on the right hand side is the yearly percentage 
change in the market value of the firm from t-1 to t, the intercept ôt is the depreciation 
rate that the capital market appraises for the firm’s total capital, the slope qmt is the 
“marginal q” statistic, 7/M-; is the investment of a firm during t divided the by market 
value of the firm at time t-1, and finally, pt/Mt.i is the error of the market in evaluating 
the market value of the firm divided by the market value of the firm at t-1. How can 
the researcher control for time fixed effects in this model?
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As discussed in the appendix to Chapter 7, where a technical description of the 
time fixed effects method is provided, one way in which the econometrician can 
easily control for time fixed effects is by including year dummy variables in the 
regression equation. Indeed, this is the method that researchers using the M&R 
method for estimating marginal q usually employ, see e.g. Mueller and Reardon 
(1993), Mueller and Yun (1998), Mueller and Yurtoglu (2000). Hence, this will also 
be the approach used in this thesis.
Moreover, since depreciation rates should vary across companies depending on the 
type of investments in capital assets they undertake, researchers such as Mueller and 
Yurtoglu (2000) and Gugler et al. (2003, 2004) have also included industry dummy 
variables by assigning each company in their database to a two digit SIC industry 
code. This approach will also be followed in the present work.
Importantly, given that the objective of the present econometric investigation is to 
determine whether overinvestment occurs under particular circumstances, the 
following specification for marginal q will be estimated:
qmt =Po~P\Aindexi t -  p2Eindexi t -  p^firmsizei t_x + PAdelawarel t -  P5firmagei t (7.2)
Where, A-index and E-index -the indices o f firm financial autonomy and 
managerial entrenchment respectively- are the key corporate governance 
determinants of marginal q according to the theory developed in Chapter 6 . As can be 
seen the coefficients have been entered in Eq. (7.2) with their expected a priori signs 
according to theory. The equation states that marginal q declines as firm financial 
autonomy and managerial entrenchment increase. This is because the theory predicts 
that as firms become more financially autonomous and more antitakeover provisions 
are put in place overinvestment will tend to occur and this will be reflected in a low 
marginal q.
Moreover, to control for other potential determinants of qmU additional variables 
are included in Eq. (7.2). The first o f the control variables, firmsize, will be measured 
as the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets at the end of year t-1. This 
variable is expected to have a negative sign. This is because traditionally (i.e. before 
the mid 1980s in the U.S.) large firm size used to be considered enough to allow
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managements to substantially over-invest and yet feel secure to a large extent. 1 
However, -from  the point of view of managements- following the hostile takeover 
wave o f the 1980s large firm size has not been considered sufficient to provide 
security, and therefore it is likely that this variable may be insignificant for samples 
taken from more recent periods. Nevertheless, it is possible that this variable may still 
retain some o f its explanatory power and for this reason it is included in Eq. (7.2) as a 
potential determinant of marginal q.
Secondly, a control variable which takes the value of 1 if  a firm is incorporated in 
delaware and zero otherwise is included in Eq. (7.2). It is expected on a priori 
grounds that this variable will have a positive sign. The reason is that prior work, such 
as that by Daines (2001), suggests that the institutional environment for firms 
incorporated in the state o f Delaware may be more effective in constraining 
managerial opportunism, in which case marginal q should be higher.
Finally, following prior work on rates of return on investment over the lifecycle of 
the firm, firm age is included as a control variable in Eq. (7.2). This variable will be 
measured as the natural logarithm o f the number o f years since the company’s 
incorporation. It is expected on a priori grounds that the variable will have a negative 
sign (see Mueller and Yun, 1998). However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, it 
is also possible that this variable could be insignificant given that different firms may 
have lifecycles of different length, and that consequently, the A-index may be a better 
empirical indicator when it comes to the task of distinguishing young firms from 
mature companies.
Substituting Eq. (7.2) into Eq. (7.1), including the time and industry dummy 
variables mentioned above, and simplifying the following investment performance 
regression equation (which will be estimated in this thesis) is obtained:
 ------------ —  - - a  + pQ —j 1--------- /?,( A i n d e X j  P2  / ? 3 {firmsizeit_x)- I,'t
I L T~l J - 1 n.
+  / ? 4  (delaware it ) — ^ ------------P5 (firmageit ) ^  9tTime, +  A j  Industry t j  +  —
i , / - l  i,t—\ i=i j=i ’ M . / - 1
(7.3)
Where Timet, t = 1,..., T-1 are time dummy variables, and industry^ j  J-l
are industry dummy variables, while a is the intercept for the base or “benchmark” 
category. Note that one of the time dummy variables and one of the industry dummy
1 Mueller and Reardon (1993) present evidence o f substantial overinvestment over the 1970-88 period 
for a sample o f large U.S. corporations.
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variables are dropped to avoid the dummy variable trap. The remaining variables have 
already been defined above.
7.3.2. Specification o f  the firm  valuation regression equation
Researchers studying firm valuation usually employ regression equations in which 
Tobin’s q, a measure o f firm valuation, is to be explained by factors that allegedly 
affect the value o f a firm. Such factors are usually divided into two classes: 
observable factors which can be incorporated in a regression equation by including 
proxy variables and unobserved factors which cannot be included in a regression 
equation because proxy variables are not available (Himmelberg et al., 1999, pp. 357- 
358, argue that examples of unobservable factors include: intangible assets, firm 
market power, and monitoring technology). In order to control for the unobserved 
factors researchers have usually assumed that a good part the effects o f these factors 
on firm valuation are constant over time, and based on this assumption have used a 
fixed firm effects specification similar to the following:
Tobin'sqit = + Sxgovernance,, + S2firmsizeit + S3salesgrowt hit +... + ai +s it (7.4)
Where, the unobservable firm effect a, is supposed to capture the time invariant 
characteristics of firm i which are not picked up by observable variables such as e.g. 
measurements of corporate governance, firm size, sales growth, etc.
As discussed in previous chapters, however, the problem with the use o f a firm 
fixed effects specification is that corporate governance variables usually do not 
change very much over time. For example, Zhou (2001) demonstrates that while 
managerial ownership varies significantly across firms it varies very little form year to 
year within firms. Clearly, in the context of a fixed firm effects model this can have 
important implications: since there is only a small number of changes over time in the 
ownership variable, the inclusion o f firm effects would force estimation of the 
coefficient from only a few changes. Hence, Zhou (2001) concludes that the findings 
of studies using such specifications, especially Himmelberg et al. (1999), are not 
valid.
Similarly, Gompers et al. (2003) have stated that since their measure of corporate 
governance, i.e. the “G-index,” does not vary much over time they do not employ a 
fixed effects specification due to the apparent problems with such a specification.
I l l
Instead, Gompers et al. (2003, p. 126) argue that the use of Fama-MacBeth procedure 
is appropriate in these cases, that is, when the key right hand side corporate 
governance variable does not change very much over time.
These considerations are clearly pertinent for the case of the firm valuation 
regression equation in this section in which variables such as the E-index appear on 
the right hand side. Since this variables do not change very much over time use of the 
Fama-MacBeth procedure should be appropriate. This is the reason why this 
technique will be used in the present work.
Thus, following Gompers et al. (2003), the Fama-MacBeth procedure will be 
employed in the present thesis. In particular, the following cross sectional regression 
equation will be estimated for each year in the panel:
Tobin'sqi =<50 -  8 xAindexl -  S2Eindexj + 83CFj ! totalassetsi + ôAR & D, lîo ta lassetsi
J-i r-j
-  85 firm size t + 8bdela\varel + 81salesgrowthI -  S^firmagef + ^  Xj Indus try t j + e i
M
Where, A-index and E-index -the indices o f firm financial autonomy and 
managerial entrenchment respectively- are the key corporate governance 
determinants o f firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s q according to the theory 
developed in this thesis. Note that the coefficients in Eq. (7.5) have been written with 
their expected a priori signs according to the theory. The equation states that Tobin’s 
q declines as firm financial autonomy and managerial entrenchment increase. This is 
because the theory suggests that as firms become more financially autonomous and 
more antitakeover provisions are put in place overinvestment will become more 
considerable and this will tend to lower firm valuation. This will be reflected in a 
relatively low Tobin’s q.
Moreover, to control for observable determinants of firm valuation, several 
additional control variables are included in Eq. (7.5). The first o f the control variables, 
i.e. CF/totalassets, is the firm cash flow during year t divided by the firm total assets 
at the end o f t. As can be seen in the equation, it is expected on a priori grounds that 
this variable will have a positive sign. Note that the key idea behind this control 
variable is that a large cash flow per se should be a good thing, a firm with a large 
cash flow should be more valuable and have a lower risk o f default; it is only when 
the cash flows are larger than the amounts needed to fund all positive net present 
value projects that conflicts of interest manifested in overinvestment can occur.
112
Hence, the positive effect for a firm 's market value of having a large cash flow is 
controlled using the CF/totalassets variable in Eq. (7.5), while the negative effect of 
having “free cash flows” is captured by the A-index.
The second control variable, i.e. R&D/totalassets, is the firm’s expenditure in 
research and development during year t divided by total assets at the end o f t. Here 
again, the rationale is that a well funded R&D expenditures programme should 
increase the value of the firm hence the positive sign of this variable in Eq. (7.5). It is 
only when R&D programmes are used by managers as a way to overinvest that they 
reduce the market value o f the firm. Hence, the positive effect for a firm of having an 
R& D programme is controlled using the R&D/totalassets variable in Eq. (7.5), while 
the negative effects of overinvestment are captured by the A-index.
The third of the control variables, i.e. firmsize, will be measured as the natural 
logarithm of the book value of total assets at the end of year f. It should be noted that 
firm size is one o f the most often used “controls” in the literature and it has been 
employed in firm valuation regression equations since the times o f Morck et al. 
(1988). The reason for using this control variable has varied over time. Initially this 
variable was included in studies examining the effects of ownership structure on firm 
valuation on the grounds that the larger the firm the more diffuse ownership would be 
(e.g. Morck et al., 1988, p. 299), however, in subsequent years studies investigating 
the effects o f board composition on firm valuation have also included this variable 
often without stating the rationale (e.g. Bhagat and Black, 2002). Similarly, studies 
investigating the relationship between anti-takeover indices and firm valuation usually 
do not explain why this variable is included (e.g. Gompers et al. 2003). One argument 
that researchers often state, however, is that the inclusion of this control variable is 
“based on prior research” (e.g. Brown and Caylor, 2006b).
In the present thesis the rationale behind the inclusion o f firmsize as a control 
variable in Eq. (7.5) is that traditionally (i.e. before the mid 1980s in the U.S.) large 
firm size used to be considered sufficient to allow managements to substantially over­
invest without the fear o f a hostile takeover (Mueller and Reardon, 1993), and this in 
turn tended to reduce firm valuations. Thus, this variable is expected to have a 
negative sign. As mentioned previously, however, following the hostile takeover wave 
of the 1980s large firm size has not been considered sufficient by managers to 
overinvest safely, and therefore it is likely that this variable may be insignificant for 
samples taken from more recent periods.
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Starting with Daines’ (2001) study, in which firms incorporated in Delaware were 
found to have higher valuations than similar firms incorporated elsewhere, inclusion 
of a control dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm is incorporated in 
Delaware and zero otherwise has been a common feature o f several studies in the 
corporate governance literature (e.g. Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al. 2004, 
Brown and Caylor, 2006b). Hence, a dummy variable labelled delaw are is included in 
Eq. (7.19) to control for the potential effect of Delaware incorporation on Tobin’s q. 
Daines’ (2001) work implies that there should be a positive relationship between 
delaw are and Tobin’s q.
In addition, the control variable salesgrowth is included in Eq. (7.5). In an 
influential article, La Porta et al. (2002, p. 1152) argue that firms with better 
investment opportunities should have higher Tobin’s qs. To control for investment 
opportunities these researchers included a sales growth variable in their regression 
equation which was highly significant. Hence, a sales growth variable is also included 
in the firm valuation regression equation above. This variable will be measured as the 
annual percentage change in the firm’s total sales between the end o f year t-1 and the 
end of year t. Based on La Porta et al.’s (2002) arguments it can be expected on a 
priori grounds that there will be a positive relationship between salesgrowth and 
Tobin’s q.
Furthermore, firm age is included as a control variable in Eq. (7.5). It is expected 
on a priori grounds that the variable will have a negative sign given that according to 
Mueller’s lifecycle theory older firms tend to overinvest, which in turn puts 
downward pressure in their market valuation. This variable will be measured as the 
natural logarithm of the number of years since the company’s incorporation.
Finally, Eq. (7.5) includes a set of industry dummy variables. These variables have 
been included in firm valuation regression equations since the times o f Morck et al. 
(1988) to control for possible spurious correlation between corporate governance 
variables and Tobin's q (Morck et al., 1988, p. 299). The rationale for the inclusion of 
these controls in Eq. (7.5) is the following: since Tobin’s q is nowadays invariably 
computed by dividing market value of the firm by the book value o f the firm’s total 
assets, companies in industries with a greater proportion o f intangible assets will have 
a higher Tobin’s q when compared to firms in industries with a greater proportion of 
tangible assets. To control for this difference between industries the inclusion of 
industry dummy variables is required.
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7.3.3. Specification o f  regression equations that include accounting measures o f  firm  
performance
Finally, this thesis will also study the disadvantages of utilizing accounting 
measures in the field of corporate governance and firm performance. The focus will 
be in evaluating the likely bias resulting from the use of Return on Equity (ROE) and 
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) as measures of firm performance. As mentioned in 
Chapter 6 , young firms that are growing very fast and investing heavily will likely 
find their current performance understated if  estimated using accounting measures 
such as ROE and ROIC. Conversely, mature firms which are barely growing or even 
declining in size, which invest comparatively little, will likely see their current 
performance overstated if  measured by these accounting measures.
The reason why this should be the case has to do with the rate of increase o f the 
denominator of the accounting measures of firm performance and the lag with which 
the pay back from investments occurs in the real world. For example, a fast growing 
firm which is undertaking sizeable investment projects will find that the denominator 
of its ROIC (i.e. invested capital) will be growing very fast at a given point in time, 
but the numerator of its ROIC (i.e. the return) will increase with a lag.
Importantly, in estimating regression equations that include accounting measures 
of firm performance in this thesis, not only is there a potential problem with right 
hand side variables which do not vary much over time, but also as Gompers et al. 
(2003, p. 129) have pointed out, there is also a danger that large outliers occur. 
Hence, following Gompers et al. (2003, pp. 129-130), a modified Fama-MacBeth 
procedure will be employed in which each of the cross sectional regressions will be 
estimated using the Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) method. This will allow the 
present work to avoid the disproportionate influence that large outliers can have on 
OLS estimates.
Thus, for example, in the present thesis the regression equation that includes 
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) as a measure o f firm performance will be 
estimated using a modified Fama-MacBeth procedure in which the following cross 
sectional regression equation will be estimated using LAD for each year t in the panel:
ROIC, , = S 0 + SlAindexj t - 8 2Eindexi t + 82fiirmagei t + 8Afirm sizei l_x
J - l  m
+ 86salesgrowthi , + 81It ! totalassets,_x + ^  AjIndustry^ + rju
y=i
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Where, A-index and E-index ore the indices of financial autonomy and managerial 
entrenchment respectively. As can be seen, the A-index is included with a positive 
sign. This is because firms with a high A-index should be mature firms with slow 
growth, which invest comparatively little and are receiving returns from investments 
undertaken several years in the past and will consequently see their current 
performance overstated if  measured by ROIC. On the other hand, the E-index is 
included with a negative sign. It is possible that as managers become more entrenched 
using antitakeover provisions may feel more secure at their post and reduce their 
efforts to produce a strong performance as computed using accounting measures of 
firm performance such as ROIC.
As can be seen, Eq. (7.6) includes additional variables to control for other potential 
determinants o f ROIC .2 The first control variable, yzrwoge, is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the number o f years since the company’s incorporation. According to 
Mueller’s lifecycle theory as firms grow old their cash flows increase substantially 
over time, while their rates o f growth tend to diminish significantly. Hence, it can be 
expected on a priori grounds that firm performance as measured by accounting 
measures will increase as firms mature. Consequently firmage is included in Eq. (7.6) 
with a positive sign.
The second control variable firmsize, has been often included in regression 
equations in the corporate governance and firm performance literature since the times 
of Demsetz and Lehn (1985). The original reason given by Demsetz and Lehn for the 
inclusion of firmsize in their regression equations was that it was needed to control for 
the fact that larger firms have more dispersed ownerships. Later studies have followed 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) in including this control variable when studying (1) the 
relationship between board composition and accounting measures of firm 
performance (and not ownership structure and firm performance as Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985) e.g. Bhagat and Black (2002), and (2) when studying the relationship 
between indices o f anti-takeover provisions and accounting measures of firm 
performance (and not ownership structure and firm performance) e.g. Gompers et al. 
(2003). However, most of the latter work does not explain the rationale for the 
inclusion of this variable in the regression equations. In the present work, this variable
2 The right hand side o f  the regression equation for the case o f ROE is identical to that in Eq. (7.6). 
Moreover, for the ROE regression equation, the reasons behind the inclusion o f  the control variables 
are substantially identical to those in Eq (7.6). Hence, for brevity, discussion on the ROE regression 
equation is not presented in this thesis.
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is included for the reason that some of the largest firms will likely be mature 
corporations with enormous cash flows and relatively scarce profitable investment 
opportunities and slow growth. Since for these firms, the denominator of the 
accounting measure is likely to increase very slowly, while a the same time cash flows 
will be coming in from previous investments, it can be expected on a priori grounds 
that there will be a positive relationship between firmsize and accounting measures of 
firm performance such as ROIC. This variable will be measured as the natural 
logarithm of the book value of total assets at the end of year t-1.
Thirdly, a measure of sales growth is included in the regression equation. This 
variable will be measured as the annual percentage change in the firm’s total sales 
between the end o f year t-1 and the end of year t. The rationale for the inclusion of 
salesgrowth in Eq. (7.6) is the following: if a firm has an excellent sales record during 
year t, the accounting measures o f performance at the end of t will reflect this increase 
in sales with a higher than normal ROE or ROIC. On the other hand, if  a firm has 
poor sales in a given year, this will likely be reflected in its accounting results with a 
lower than normal ROE or ROIC. Hence, it can be expected on a priori grounds that 
salesgrowth and accounting measures of firm performance will be positively related.
In addition, the variable l/totalassetst-i will be included as a proxy for business 
conditions. This variable will be measured as the Mueller and Reardon (1993) 
measure of investment (/,) divided by the book value of the total assets o f the firm at 
the end o f year t-1. In the short run, investment by firms (at any point in their 
lifecycle) should be higher during favourable times such as during a boom than would 
be the case during difficult times such as in a recession. Hence there should be a 
positive relationship between l/totalassetst-i and accounting measures of firm 
performance.
Finally, industry dummy variables are included to control for possible spurious 
correlation between the system state dummy variables and the accounting measures of 
firm performance. The rationale for the inclusion of these controls in Eq. (7.6) is that 
since accounting measures of performance are computed by dividing the firm’s 
current returns by historical book values of invested capital (or equity), companies in 
industries with a greater proportion of intangible assets will have a higher accounting 
performance when compared to firms in industries with a greater proportion of 
tangible assets. To control for this difference between industries the inclusion of 
industry dummy variables is required.
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7.4. Data sources
Table 7.1 below lists the main sources of data to be used in this thesis. The first 
column of the table displays the data items to be used, while the second column 
presents the data sources. As can be seen in the table, the main data source is 
Datastream.
Panel A shows the data needed to compute the market value of a given firm at the 
end of year t (M), which in turn is required to implement the Mueller and Reardon 
(1993) model. Specifically, the table shows that Mt is computed by adding the market 
value of common stock (wc05301 x P) plus the book value of total debt (wc03255) 
and preferred stock (wc03451).3 Where the market value common stock is calculated 
by multiplying the end of fiscal year number of shares (wc0531) times the end of 
fiscal year price per share (P).
On the other hand, Panel B lists the data needed to calculate the investment of a 
firm over year t (/,) which is also necessary to implement the M&R model. In 
particular, /, is calculated by first subtracting dividends (wc04551) from cash flows 
(wc04201) and then adding net new equity (the change in the number of shares 
wc05301 times average share price P over year /), net new debt (the change in total 
debt wc03255 over year /), R&D expenditures (wc01201), and advertising expenses 
(estimated by multiplying total sales (wcOlOOl) and advertising to sales ratios taken 
from 1RS reports on corporation returns, see Mueller and Yurtoglu, 2000, p. 218).
Moreover, Panel C lists the sources of data for important items such as Bebchuk et 
al.’s (2004) E-index, the companies’ dates of incorporation which is used to compute 
firm age, as well as the book value of total assets which is used to calculate Tobin’s q. 
In particular, Tobin’s q is computed by dividing the market value of a given firm at 
the end o f year t (M) taken from Panel A by the book value o f total assets (wc02999).
The financial data utilized to compute the autonomy index (A-index) is also taken 
from Table 7.1. As mentioned in Chapter 6 , the A-index is calculated by adding one 
point for each year in which a company has greater cash flows than investments in 
specific assets during the previous 7 years. Investments in specific assets (7*) are 
measured as follows:
I k = CF -  Dividends + AE1 (7 .7 )
3 Datastream datatypes are presented in parenthesis.
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Table 7.1. Data sources
This table lists the main sources o f data to be used in this thesis. Panel A shows the data items needed to 
compute the market value o f  a given firm at the end o f year t. Panel B lists the data items needed to 
calculate the investment o f a firm over year t. Panel C lists the sources o f data for important items such 
as Bebchuk et al.’s (2004) E-index, as well as other items such as total assets which is used to calculate 
Tobin’s q and date o f  Incorporation which is used to compute firm age.______________________
Panel A. Firm market value (MJ 
Data item Datastream datatype
Market value o f  common stock (wc05301 xP )
End o f fiscal year number o f shares wc05301
End o f fiscal year price per share P
Book value o f  total debt wc03255
Preferred stock wc03451
Panel B. Investment (/<)
Data item Datastream datatype/ other
Cash flow wc04201
Dividends wc04551
Net new debt = change in total debt during year change in wc03255
Net new equity = change in number o f common 
shares outstanding x average share price over year t
change in wc05301 x average P
R&D expenditures 
Advertising expenses
wc01201
Approximated by multiplying company sales by 1RS reports on corporation
advertising to sales ratios from the 1RS reports returns. Table 6: Balance
on corporation returns for 1995 available at: sheets, income statements, tax
htto:// www .irs.gov /taxstats/bustaxstats/article and selected other items. See
/0„id=l 12834.00.html Mueller and Yurtoglu (2000,
pp 216-218)
Total sales wcOlOOl
Panel C. Other
Data item Datastream datatype/ other
Total assets wc02999
Date o f fiscal period end wc05350
Accounting performance ROIC & ROE wc08376 & wc08301 
respectively
Consumer price index (CPI) World bank - world 
development indicators
Entrenchment index (E-index) Available from Bebchuk’s
webpage at http://www. 
law.harvard.edu /facultv/ 
bebchuk/
Date o f Incorporation (to compute firm age) Mergent Industrial Manual
(Mergent, 2004)
Industry SIC codes ‘Eqy Sic Code’ 
(Bloomberg table wizzard)
State o f incorporation ‘State O f Incorporation’ 
(Bloomberg table wizzard)
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Where CF is the cash flow of the firm (wc04201), Dividends are taken from 
Datastream (wc04551) and AE stands for net new equity. Two observations on the 
calculation of Ik are in order. First, since both advertising and R&D expenditures are 
charged to expenses, these are not included in Eq. (7.7) for this would involve double 
counting (see Eq. 7.8 below). Second, net new debt is not included because the A- 
index is concerned with the measurement of financing available for (non- 
redeployable) specific assets only and according to TCE debt is better suited to 
finance investment in redeployable assets. Therefore, when calculating the A-index 
for a given firm in year t, 1 point is added for every year (from t- 7  to t-1 ) in which:
CF + AD V + R & D >  I , +  A D V  + R & D
C F > I k (7-8)
Finally it should be noted that prior to the calculation o f the M&R and Tobin's q 
variables all items were deflated by using the CPI (2000=1). The CPI data for the U.S. 
were obtained from the World Bank, World Development Indicators, ESDS 
International, University of Manchester.
7.5. Conclusion
This chapter has considered the methods necessary to test the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 6 . In particular, this chapter has concentrated in discussing the 
choice of appropriate econometric methods for the task at hand. It has been 
emphasized that the role of the econometric methods employed in this thesis will be to 
test if the predictions of the combined TCE-lifecycle theory o f corporate governance 
and firm performance are consistent with the class of phenomena it intends to explain.
Moreover, this chapter has discussed the specification of the regression equations 
to be estimated in this thesis. This discussion is related to the use of panel data and its 
implications for the specification of the relevant regression equations. The next 
chapter will perform tests of the predictions of the combined TCE-lifecycle theory. 
Particularly, the emphasis will be in testing whether firms with high A-index and E- 
index values tend to overinvest using the M&R method, and if  these firms also have 
lower valuations when compared to other firms using the Fama-MacBeth procedure.
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C hapter 8. C orporate governance and firm perform ance in the U.S.: Empirical
evidence
8.1. Introduction
The objective of the present chapter is to test the predictions of the combined TCE- 
firm lifecycle theory for empirical accuracy. For this purpose, the econometric 
methods discussed in the previous chapter will be employed to determine whether the 
empirical evidence statistically rejects, or not, the testable hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 6 . The role o f the econometric methods will be to determine if  there is 
significant statistical evidence against the null hypotheses. If  there is, then it will be 
concluded that the evidence supports the predictions of the theory in Chapter 6  (the 
alternative hypotheses). Needless to say, the finding o f evidence supporting the 
alternative hypotheses should not be regarded as proof o f the veracity of the 
hypotheses; it only means that they withstand the empirical tests for now, and that 
there is an acceptable statistical level of confidence for believing in their reliability.
In addition, this chapter will examine the pitfalls associated with the use of 
accounting measures o f firm performance. The focus will be in appraising Return on 
Equity (ROE) and Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) in their role as performance 
measures.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 describes the empirical data to be 
employed. Section 8.3 then discusses key econometric results concerning the 
predictions of the theory in Chapter 6 . Section 8.4 evaluates the disadvantages of 
using accounting measures of firm performance. Section 8.5 concludes.
8.2. Data
This section is explains how the U.S. database used in this thesis was collected and 
describes its main characteristics. A key aim o f the discussion is to show that the 
sample contains firms with sufficient variation in their age, sizes and other variables 
for the purposes o f testing the hypotheses developed in Chapter 6 .
8.2.1. Sample selection
The starting point o f the data collection procedure in this chapter is Bebchuk et 
al.’s (2004) E-index database. As discussed in Chapter 6 , the E-index is a measure of 
managerial entrenchment built from data contained in the publications of the Investor
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Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC). This index is updated every two or three 
years. At the time of the data collection for this thesis, the database contained 
information for the years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004.
In order to obtain a sample of firms with reasonably long time series of data with 
which to build empirical indicators, the database was initially inspected for companies 
with non-missing values for the years 1990 and 2004/ In this way 586 such 
companies with reasonably long time series of data were identified. Given that some 
of the companies changed names and ticker symbols, the information in the two years 
was matched using 8  digit CUSIPs2 provided in Bebchuk et al.’s database in order to 
make sure that the data referred to the same company.
Then a search for these 586 firms was performed using the Datastream database 
and 556 firms were found. Next, following Gugler et al. (2003, F524), banks, 
financial companies and certain service industries (SICs 6000 to 6999 and above 
8100) were excluded “because the nature of capital and investment in these industries 
is not comparable to those of non-financial firms.” This reduced the sample by 81 
companies from 556 to 475. For this final sample o f 475 firms the usual practice of 
researchers who utilize corporate governance provision indices (e.g. Gompers et al., 
2003; Bebchuk et al., 2004) was followed and the observations for the years in which 
IRRC does not publish governance provisions data were filled in by assuming that the 
provisions remain unchanged in the period between IRRC publications. Given the 
information contained in Bebchuk’s database at the time o f the data collection for this 
thesis it was possible to initially assign values for the 475 firm’s E-indices for a 
period of 16 years, comprising the years from 1990 to 2005.
An update of the E-index database by Bebchuk in late 2009, however, by which E- 
indices for the years 2006 and 2007 were made publicly available, allowed for an 
increase in the size o f the thesis’ database. Specifically, this update made it possible to 
assign values for the surviving firm’s E-indices for a period o f 19 years, comprising 
the years from 1990 to 2008. Market prices and accounting data for these companies 
was obtained from the Datastream database.
1 Note that Bebchuk et al.’s database contains two sub-samples, a “no dual class” stock sub-sample and 
a “dual class” stock sub-sample. Since “dual class” stocks are usually excluded from samples in the 
literature for the reason that in those companies “the superior voting rights may be sufficient to provide 
incumbents with a powerful entrenchment mechanism that renders the other entrenchment provisions 
relatively unimportant” (Bebchuk et al., 2004, p. 16), the present work also excludes dual class stocks.
2 CUSIP is an acronym that refers to the 8 character alphanumeric security identifier distributed by the 
Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures.
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Table 8.1. Summary Statistics
This table provides summary statistics for the variables to be employed in the regression equations in 
this chapter. A-index is a firm-level index of financial autonomy computed by adding one point for 
eveiy year, in the previous 7 years, in which a given firm’s cash flows are greater than its investment in 
specific assets. E-index is the entrenchment index created by Bebchuk et al. (2004). is the
percentage change in the market value o f the firm between the end o f year t-1 and the end o f year t. 
7/M-; is the investment undertaken by a given firm during year t divided by the market value o f  the 
firm at the end o f  year t-1. Tobin’s q equals the market value o f the firm at the end o f year t divided by 
the book value o f  total assets at the end o f year t. ROIC measures a firm's Return on Invested Capital 
during year t and ROE is the Return on Assets during year t, both variables are taken from Datastream. 
logtotalassets is the natural logarithm of the book value o f total assets measured at the end o f year t 
(year t-1) in US$. delaware is a dummy variable that takes the value o f 1 if  a firm is incorporated in 
Delaware and zero otherwise, salesgrowth is the annual percentage change in the firm’s total sales 
between the end o f year t-1 and the end o f year t. logfirmage is the natural logarithm o f firm age 
measured in years since the company’s incorporation. CF/totalassets equals the firm cash flows during 
year t divided by total assets at the end o f year t. R&D/totalassets equals firm R&D expenditures 
during year t divided by total assets at the end o f  year t. I/totalassetst.j equals the M&R measure of
Variable N M ean M edian Std. D ev. M in M ax
A-index 8687 5.0199 6 2.1651 0 7
E-index 8687 2.6594 3 1.3638 0 6
8620 0.0807 0.0309 0.3454 -0.8363 4.5065
8639 0.1262 0.0942 0.1607 -0.7120 2.2021
Tobin's q 8646 1.5137 1.1258 1.2258 0.0360 15.8453
ROIC 8647 9.9952 9.4400 11.1170 -104.2200 117.1800
ROE 8563 13.2044 13.2000 39.8119 -1,263.0200 1,262.1000
logtotalassets, 8687 21.6734 21.5809 1.4737 17.2768 27.2513
logtotalassets,.] 8686 21.6287 21.5468 1.4726 17.2768 27.2513
delaware 8687 0.4649 0 0.4988 0 1
salesgrowth 8686 0.0584 0.0365 0.2263 -0.9984 6.8451
logfirmage 8687 4.0373 4.2195 0.6085 0.0000 5.0752
CF/totalassets 8685 0.1116 0.1043 0.0651 -0.3643 0.6186
R&D/totalassets 8650 0.0263 0.0057 0.0428 0.0000 0.5426
I/totalassets,.] 8645 0.1764 0.1262 0.2637 -3.1263 5.0814
8.2.2. Sample description
Table 8.1 above provides summary statistics for the key empirical variables to be 
employed in the regression equations in this chapter. Note that for the key variables in 
the M&R investment performance regression equations i.e. (Mr Mt.i)/Mt.i and //M -/ 
reported in the table, the procedure in Mueller and Yurtoglu (2000) was followed and 
leverage versus-residual squared plots’ (i.e. graphs of leverage vs. normalized 
residuals squared) were utilized to identify influential observations. Observations with 
substantial leverage were checked for consistency in data collection by looking at the 
percentage change in the variables between years. Observations which are 
considerably inconsistent with the data on each firm were excluded. With this 
procedure 6  observations were excluded in total.
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Fig. 8.1. Firm size at the end o f year / (log scale) 
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It has been pointed out in the literature that samples constructed using as a starting 
point the Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) information are likely to 
contain a substantial amount of large companies. This is because firms that are 
relevant from the IRRC perspective are traditionally those in the Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P) 500 as well as the annual lists o f large corporations in the publications of 
Fortune, Forbes, and Businessweek (Gompers et al., 2003). Since the database in this 
chapter is indirectly based on the publications of the IRRC there is a danger that it 
contains large firms only. However, inspection of the sample reveals that it contains a 
number o f small firms as well.
As shown in Fig. 8.1 above, although the sample does contain a number of very 
large firms e.g. there are more than 500 firm-year observations in which company 
total assets are beyond the USS 25 billion mark, the figure also indicates that the 
sample contains a number of small firms as evidenced by the fact that there are over 
1000 firm-year observations in the sample where firm total assets are less than US$ 
500 million.3 Overall, inspection of Fig. 8.1 reveals that the sample is not restricted to 
the very largest firms; instead the figure shows that the sample contains a reasonably 
varied range of company sizes.
3 As discussed in Chapter 7 all items in the database are deflated using the CPI (2000=1).
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Fig. 8.2. Firm age at the end o f year t
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Similarly there is a danger that databases constructed using the information on 
corporate governance provisions published by the IRRC may only contain older 
companies as measured by firm age. This is because older firms are usually also very 
large. Thus, a sample composed of large firms may also contain a substantial number 
o f older firms. However, inspection of the sample employed in this chapter reveals 
that it contains a reasonably varied range o f company ages. As shown in Fig. 8.2 
above, although the database does contain a number o f old companies, the figure also 
indicates that the sample contains a number of small firms as evidenced by the fact 
that there are over 1000 firm-year observations in the sample where firm age 
(measured in years since company incorporation) is lower than 30 years.
To further describe the sample used in this chapter Table 8.2 below presents the 
values o f the A-index, E-index and firm size variables sorted by firm age. This is 
interesting because it helps elucidate important issues such as whether mature firms 
have more free cash flows than younger companies and if  the management of older 
firms are more entrenched. The information in the table suggests that both 
propositions are correct. As can be seen, the information in the table suggests that 
older firms have higher A-indices on average than younger companies. Moreover, the 
information in the table indicates that the E-index tends to increase with firm age.
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Table 8.2. Financial autonomy, entrenchment and firm size over the lifecycle of the firm
This table presents values o f the A-index, E-index and firm size variables sorted by firm  age. The A- 
index is a firm-level index o f financial autonomy computed by adding one point for every year, in the 
previous 7 years, in which a given firm’s cash flows are greater than its investment in specific assets. 
The E-index is the entrenchment index created by Bebchuk et al. (2004). Firm size is the book value of 
total assets o f the firm measured at the end o f year t in millions o f US$. Firm age is the company’s age
Firm age N
A-index E-index Firm size
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
0 to 15 years 358 2.5419 2.3933 2.0196 1.4151 3,243 6,865
16 to 30 years 997 3.5757 2.3800 2.3019 1.3942 6,683 17,300
31 to 45 years 1235 4.4121 2.3583 2.5870 1.3933 4,456 11,100
46 to 60 years 1114 4.7271 2.1890 2.7136 1.3682 5,362 9,040
61 to 75 years 1471 5.4317 1.9390 2.6139 1.3574 6,946 10,100
76 to 90 years 1560 5.9314 1.4570 2.7423 1.3393 8,311 14,600
91 to 105 years 1198 5.7362 1.5470 2.9332 1.2421 11,800 25,000
106 to 120 years 445 5.7371 1.5218 3.0090 1.3237 25,000 87,800
121 to 135 years 154 5.4545 1.9607 2.9935 1.1289 13,600 34,900
136 to 150 years 122 5.9508 0.9435 2.7377 1.2779 4,250 5,996
151 to 165 years 33 5.5758 1.1997 2.8788 1.1390 3,587 2,930
On the other hand, Table 8.2 gives a less monotonous picture of the relationship 
between the firm size variable and firm age. As can be seen, the general pattern in the 
table is that average firm size increases up to a certain age and then declines again. 
While the smallest firms are concentrated in the first and the last time bins where 
firms have an average size of US$ 3.2 and US$3.6 billion respectively, the largest 
average firm sizes are registered for companies with ages in the region of 100 years 
after firm incorporation. The table shows that for the case o f the thesis’ database the 
largest average firm size (US$ 25 billion) is that of firms in the 106 to 120 years time 
bucket. It is also worth noting that the time bins showing the highest average firm 
sizes also present the highest standard deviations. The latter reflects the fact that many 
small firms were placed in the same time bins as the largest corporations.
It is important to highlight once again at this point that one of the problems of 
measuring firm age in years is that some firms mature faster than others. Hence, if  one 
measures firm age in years there is a danger that some young firms will be classified 
as mature when in fact they present all the characteristics of a young company, or 
vice-versa, mature firms could be classified as young companies when in fact they 
present none of the features of young firms such as rapid growth and good investment 
prospects. As it was mentioned in Chapter 6, this problem of the classification of 
young and mature firms is one o f the key issues the A-index was designed to address.
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Table 8.3. Industry dummy variables
This table presents information on the 25 industrial sectors from which the industry dummy variables 
to be employed in the regression equations in this chapter are created. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the industry dummy variables are constructed by assigning each firm-year observation in the
Industry SIC N
1 Agriculture, Forestry, Com . Fishing 100 19
2 M etal M ining, Oil and Gas Extraction 10-14 404
3 Construction 15-17 114
4 Food, Kindred Products & Tobacco 20-21 324
5 T extiles & Apparel 22-23 109
6 Lumber, W ood & Furniture and Fixtures 24-25 171
7 Paper, A llied  Products & Printing, Publishing 26-27 394
8 Chem icals (W ithout Pharmaceuticals: 283) 28 513
9 Pharm aceuticals 283 235
10 Petroleum  R efin ing and Related Ind. 29 170
11 Rubber and M isc. P lastics Products 30 57
12 Leather and Leather Products 31 38
13 Stone, Clay, G lass, Concrete Products 32 16
14 Primary M etal Industries 33 199
15 Fabricated M etals 34 163
16 Industrial & Com . M achinery, Com. Eq. 35 751
17 El. M achinery, Other E lectrical Eq. 36 584
18 Transportation Equipm ent 37 443
19 M easurem ent Instruments 38 458
20 M isc. M anufacturing 39 74
21 Transportation 40-47 318
22 Com m unications 48 71
23 Electric, Gas, Sanitary Services 49 1244
24 Durable G oods-W holesale 50-59 1199
25 Services 70-79 619
As discussed in Chapter 7, industry dummy variables will be included in the 
regression equations estimated in this chapter. Consequently, Table 8.3 describes the 
industry classifications which were employed to construct the dummy variables 
together with their two digit industry SIC codes and the number o f firm-year 
observations available for each industry class. Clearly, the table illustrates that the 
thesis’ database contains information on firms belonging to a wide variety of 
industrial sectors o f the U.S. economy.
Finally, correlations between the empirical variables are presented in Table 8.4. It 
is interesting to note that the A-index presents significantly negative correlations with 
salesgrowth, I/totalassetst.i and fM-M./VM-/. This suggests that, consistent
with firm lifecycle arguments, companies with a low A-index (financially dependent 
firms) present a higher rate o f sales growth, invest more, and have a higher rate of 
increase in their market values when compared to firms with a higher vf-Wex.
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In addition, the table shows that the A-index has positive and significant 
correlations with logtotalassets, logfirmage, CF/totalassets, ROIC and ROE. This 
implies that, consistent with firm lifecycle theory, companies with a high A-index are 
on average relatively larger and older with larger cash flows and consequently higher 
accounting returns.
Interestingly, while Tobin’s q presents a significantly negative correlation with the 
A-index it also displays a very strong and significant positive correlation with 
CF/totalassets. This suggests that very large cash flows are not necessarily negative 
for firm valuation; rather it is only when the cash flows are larger than the amounts 
needed to fund al positive net present value projects that conflicts of interest known in 
the literature as the “agency costs of free cash flow” occur.
On the other hand, Table 8.4 shows that the E-index presents positive and 
significant correlations with the A-index and logfirmage. This implies that as firms 
mature, and on average become more financially autonomous, their managements 
tend to deploy a larger number of consequential anti-takeover provisions.
Importantly, the table indicates that both the A-index and the E-index have 
significantly negative correlations with Tobin’s q. This suggests that, consistent with 
the hypotheses developed in Chapter 6, as firms become more financially autonomous 
and deploy more antitakeover provisions their valuations tend to decline.
Moreover, Table 8.4 indicates that both the E-index and logfirmage have negative 
and significant correlations with salesgrowth. This suggests that it is not in the fast 
growing young firms that managements deploy the most antitakeover provisions; on 
the contrary, it is in the slow growing mature firms where managements are the most 
entrenched.
Finally, note the significantly negative correlation between the E-index and ROIC 
and ROE. One possible explanation of this result is that since entrenched 
managements may feel more secure in their jobs at the helm o f their companies they 
may be less concerned about reporting an outstanding firm performance as reflected 
in their financial statements.
In conclusion, the sample description above demonstrates that the database to be 
employed in this chapter contains firms with sufficient variation in their age, sizes and 
other variables for the purposes of testing the hypotheses developed in Chapter 6. 
Having elucidated this point, the next section employs the econometric methods 
discussed Chapter 7 to test the predictions of the combined TCE-firm lifecycle theory.
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8.3. Results
This section discusses the main empirical results of the present study. For clarity, 
the exposition is organized in two parts: the first subsection below considers the 
results pertaining to firm investment performance, and then the second subsection 
discusses the results concerning firm valuation.
8.3.1. Investment performance
Mueller and Yun’s (1998) investigation is replicated in Table 8.5 column 1 below. 
This column shows results obtained by (a) specifying marginal q as equal to an 
intercept plus a coefficient times the natural logarithm of firm age, (b) substituting for 
marginal q in the basic M&R investment performance regression equation (Eq. 7.1) 
and finally (c) estimating the parameters by OLS. Similar to Mueller and Yun’s 
findings, the results in the table show a significantly positive intercept o f 1.8002 and 
negative and significant coefficient for logfirmage of -0.1810. These estimates for our 
sample, pertaining to the time period 1990-2008, imply that for the average firm 
marginal q falls below 1 (indicative of a higher cost o f capital than return on 
investment) around 80 years after its incorporation (qmt = 1.8-0.18 (ln(80)) = 1).
However, as discussed in Chapter 6, the use o f Mueller and Yun’s specification, in 
which firm age is measured in years since firm incorporation, has some important 
drawbacks. The most important is that, logically, different firms will have lifecycles 
of different lengths when measured in years. This is the reason why the A-index was 
developed in this thesis. Moreover, as has been argued previously, while the presence 
large free cash flows is a necessary condition for overinvestment, it is not sufficient. 
The reason is that if  management overinvests the market value of the firm may plunge 
and a hostile takeover may ensue (Mueller, 1969). This is why it is important to 
include an index o f antitakeover provisions such as the E-index to determine how 
insulated firm management is from the takeover threat. As explained in Chapter 6, 
one of the key predictions of the thesis’ theory is that overinvestment (as measured by 
marginal q) will become increasingly significant as firm financial autonomy (as 
measured by the A-index) and managerial entrenchment (as measured by the E-index) 
both increase. Thus, Table 8.5 column 2, below, specifies marginal q as equal to an 
intercept plus a coefficient times the A-index plus another coefficient times the E- 
index. This specification is then substituted in M&R investment performance 
regression equation (Eq. 7.1) and finally the parameters are estimated by OLS.
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Table 8.5. Regression estimates -  M&R investment performance regression equations
This table presents estimates o f ‘marginal q’ for firms in the thesis’ database over the time period from 
1990 to 2008. The technique employed was originally developed by Mueller and Reardon (1993). The 
estimation method is OLS. The dependent variable is (Mr Mt_])/Mt.h which is the percentage change in 
the market value o f  the firm between the end o f year t-1 and the end o f year t. I/M,.] is the investment 
undertaken by a given firm during year t divided by the market value o f the firm at the end o f year t-1. 
A-index is a firm-level index o f financial autonomy computed by adding one point for every year, in 
the previous 7 years, in which a given firm’s cash flows are greater than its investment in specific 
assets. E-index is the entrenchment index created by Bebchuk et al. (2004). ïogîotalassetsx.\ is the 
natural logarithm o f the book value o f  total assets measured at the end o f year t-1 in USS. delaware is a 
dummy variable that takes the value o f 1 if  a firm is incorporated in Delaware and zero otherwise. 
logfirmage is the natural logarithm o f firm age measured in years since the company’s incorporation. 
The regressions include year dummy variables to pick up movements in stock market values which are 
common to all firms. Moreover, each company is assigned to a two digit SIC industry code and 
industry dummy variables are also included. * and ** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 
1% and 5% level respectively (one tailed t-test). Following Petersen (2009) standard errors clustered by
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
I/M,.] 1.8002* 1.5942* 1.7184* 2.5330* 2.4793*
(0.2679) (0.1146) (0.2409) (0.4451) (0.4514)
(logfirmage, -0.1810*
(0.0640)
-0.0392
(0.0566)
-0.0352
(0.0608)
(A-index, )I/M,_, -0.0740*
(0.0146)
-0.0694*
(0.0144)
-0.0664*
(0.0144)
-0.0690*
(0.0149)
(E-index,)I/M,_] -0.0616*
(0.0202)
-0.0586*
(0.0198)
-0.0636*
(0.0206)
-0.0630*
(0.0211)
(logtotalassets^I/M ,.] -0.0374**
(0.0218)
-0.0424*
(0.0201)
(delaware, )1/M ul -0.0559
(0.0583)
Industry dummy variables? yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummy variables? yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2
Number o f observations
0.3523
8618
0.3616
8618
0.3616
8618
0.3628
8618
0.3626
8618
As can be seen in Table 8.5 column 2, there are significantly negative coefficients 
for both the A-index and the E-index at the 1 percent level. Importantly, this result is 
consistent with the predictions of the theory in Chapter 6 as it signifies that marginal q 
will tend to decrease as both the A-index and the E-index raise.
Next, Table 8.5 column 3 presents the results o f running a regression equation 
which includes the preceding two kinds of measures (i.e. years since firm
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incorporation and firm characteristics as captured by the A-index and E-index) as a 
means to detect overinvestment problems. As can be seen, while both Xht A-index and 
the E-index coefficients remain negative and significant at the 1% level, the 
coefficient for the natural logarithm of firm age becomes insignificant at any 
conventional level. The reason for this result is that, as mentioned earlier, although it 
is logically to expect that firms will go through a lifecycle there is no reason to expect 
that the lengths of company lifecycles measured in years will be similar for the 
diversity of firms. Different companies produce different types of products and 
operate under different business conditions (Mueller and Yun, 1998). For this reason 
this thesis argues that is more effective to measure firm characteristics such as 
financial autonomy and managerial entrenchment as a means to assess firm age, than 
to try to determine if  a firm is young or mature by using firm age measured in years.
Further, Table 8.5 column 4 presents the results of running a regression equation 
with additional control variables. Specifically, column 4 presents the results of 
estimating Eq. (7.3) which was discussed in Chapter 7 where specific predictions for 
its coefficients were formulated. As can be seen, in this specification both the A-index 
and the E-index coefficients are negative as predicted and are significant at the 1% 
level. However, the coefficient for logfirmage although negative as expected on a 
priori grounds is insignificant at any conventional level. Interestingly, the coefficient 
for logtotalassetst.\ is negative as predicted, and it is significant at the 5% level (one 
tailed t-test). This provides evidence in favour of the proposition that large firm size 
gives managements protection from the takeover threat, and that consequently, the 
managements of larger firms have more leeway to overinvest than those of smaller 
companies. On the other hand, contrary to the predictions in Chapter 7 the coefficient 
for delaware is negative, nevertheless, it is insignificant at any conventional level of 
significance. Thus, at least for our sample we find no evidence that the institutional 
environment for firms incorporated in the state of Delaware may be more effective in 
constraining managerial opportunism as manifested in overinvestment problems.
Finally, Table 8.5 column 5 presents the results of running a more parsimonious 
regression equation in which marginal q is specified as equal to an intercept plus a 
coefficient times the A-index, plus another coefficient times the E-index, and finally 
an additional coefficient times logtotalasse1Si.\. As shown in the table, for this 
specification the intercept is significantly positive at the 1% level and the coefficients 
for the A-index, E-index and logtotalassetst.\ are significantly negative at the 1% level.
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Table 8.6. Calculated qmts for different combinations of the A-index and the E-index
This table presents values for marginal q implied by the estimates in column 5 Table 8.5 for different 
combinations o f the A-index and the E-index. A-index is a firm-level index o f financial autonomy 
computed by adding one point for every year, in the previous 7 years, in which a given firm’s cash 
flows are greater than its investment in specific assets. E-index is the entrenchment index created by 
Bebchuk et al. (2004). Note that in the calculations logtotalassets^, the natural logarithm o f the book 
value o f total assets measured at the end o f year t-1 in US$, is held at its mean value o f 21.6287.______
A-index
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 1.5622 1.4932 1.4242 1.3552 1.2862 1.2172 1.1482 1.0792
1 1.4992 1.4302 1.3612 1.2922 1.2232 1.1542 1.0852 1.0162
2 1.4362 1.3672 1.2982 1.2292 1.1602 1.0912 1.0222 0.9532
3 1.3732 1.3042 1.2352 1.1662 1.0972 1.0282 0.9592 0.8902
4 1.3102 1.2412 1.1722 1.1032 1.0342 0.9652 0.8962 0.8272
5 1.2472 1.1782 1.1092 1.0402 0.9712 0.9022 0.8332 0.7642
6 1.1842 1.1152 1.0462 0.9772 0.9082 0.8392 0.7702 0.7012
The meaning of our investment performance results is further illustrated with the 
aid of Table 8.6. This table presents values for marginal q implied by the estimates in 
column 5 Table 8.5 for different combinations of the A-index and the E-index (similar 
results are obtained if  the estimates in Table 8.5 column 4 are used instead). Note that 
in the calculations logtotalassetst.i is held at its mean value o f 21.6287. Hence, for 
example, the estimates imply that the value of marginal q for the average firm when 
A-index = 1 and the E-index = 1 equals 1.4302 (qmt= 2.4793 -0.069(1) -0.063(1) -  
0.0424 (21.6287) = 1.4302).
Importantly, the results in Table 8.6 show that the values o f marginal q for the 
average firm are substantially higher than 1 when firm financial autonomy as 
measured by the A-index is low and managerial entrenchment as measured by the E- 
index is also low. Specially, the table shows the highest value o f marginal q of 1.5622 
when the A-index and the E-index are both equal to zero. More generally, the table 
shows that the values o f marginal q decline progressively as financial autonomy and 
entrenchment become more important.
The results in Table 8.6 can be best interpreted with the aid o f Fig. 8.3 below. 
Mueller and Yurtoglu (2000) argue that marginal q equals the area under the marginal 
rate of return schedule (mrr) between 0 and the level of investments divided by the 
area under the cost o f capital (i) between 0 and the level o f investments.
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Fig. 8.3. Interpretation of marginal q results. 
Source: Adapted from Mueller (2003, p. 80)
Thus, an estimated marginal q that is greater than one is consistent with the 
interpretation that firms are maximizing shareholder value by equalizing their 
marginal rates of returns to their marginal cost o f capital. For example, as shown in 
Fig. 8.3, if a firm invested 1% it would equalize its marginal rate of return ‘mrr’ to its 
marginal cost of capital T ,  and its marginal q would equal the area under mrr from 0 
to Ii, that is ‘a + b ,’ divided by the area under the marginal cost of capital curve, 
namely ‘b ’, which is clearly greater than one.
Therefore, since the data indicates that marginal qs are substantially greater than 
one for low values of the A-index and the E-index, this section concludes that there is 
significant evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the managements o f financially 
dependent firms as measured by the A-index who are not entrenched using anti­
takeover provisions as measured by the E-index will tend to invest in a manner which 
is consistent with shareholder wealth maximization as measured by marginal q. That 
is, the results are consistent with the alternative hypothesis H lj as predicted by the 
combined TCE-firm lifecycle theory, and not with the null hypothesis H l0.
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In addition, the results in Table 8.6 show that the values of marginal q for the 
average firm are close to 1 when firm financial autonomy as measured by the A-index 
is high and managerial entrenchment as measured by the E-index is low. For instance, 
the table shows a value of marginal q o f 1.0162 when the A-index is equal to 7 and the 
E-index is equal to 1. In general, the table shows values for marginal q which are 
close to 1 in the upper-right hand region of Table 8.6.
According to Mueller and Yurtoglu’s (2000) interpretation o f marginal q, an 
estimated qm1 which is close to 1 can be interpreted as an indication o f moderate 
overinvestment taking place. To see this suppose that a firm invests I2 as shown in 
Fig. 8.3, and moreover assume that the areas labelled ‘a’ and ‘e’ in the figure are 
approximately equal. In this case, marginal q would equal the area under mrr, that is 
‘a + b + c + d’, divided by the area under the cost of capital curve, i.e. ‘b + c + d + e \  
Given that ‘a’ and ‘e’ have approximately equal areas, marginal q approximately 
equals 1 and, as the figure shows, there is overinvestment taking place as the marginal 
investment project has a rate of return that is below its cost o f capital.
Therefore, the estimates o f marginal q presented in Table 8.6 are consistent with 
the hypothesis that the managements o f financially autonomous firms as measured by 
the A-index who are not entrenched using anti-takeover provisions as measured by the 
E-index will tend to over-invest moderately as measured by marginal q. Note that it 
had been expected on a priori grounds that overinvestment would be moderate in this 
situation because of the threat of takeover (which is represented in Fig. 8.3 with curve 
mcM). Hence, this result is consistent with the alternative hypothesis H2i as predicted 
by our theory, and not with the null hypothesis H20.
Furthermore, the results shown in Table 8.6 indicate that there is strong evidence 
of overinvestment as measured by marginal q when both the A-index and the E-index 
have high values. From the discussion in the previous paragraphs it is clear that no 
firm that maximizes shareholder wealth would undertake investment for which qmt = 
r /it < 1, for this unequivocally implies overinvestment. Now, when the A-index = 7 
and the E-index = 6 the marginal q implied by the estimates o f Table 8.5 column 5 
equals 0.7012. This suggests that on average for every dollar that firms with these 
high levels of financial autonomy and entrenchment invested during the period 1990- 
2008, the market value o f these firms increased by about $0.70 only.
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Consequently, the estimates of marginal q presented in Table 8.6 are consistent 
with the hypothesis that the managements of financially autonomous firms as 
measured by the A-index who are also entrenched using anti-takeover provisions as 
measured by the E-index will tend to over-invest substantially as measured by 
marginal q. Thus, the results are consistent with the alternative hypothesis H3i as 
predicted by our theory, and not with the null hypothesis H3q.
Finally, the results in Table 8.6 show that the values of marginal q for the average 
firm are substantially greater than 1 when firm financial autonomy as measured by the 
A-index is low and managerial entrenchment as measured by the E-index is high. For 
instance, the table shows a value of marginal q of 1.2472 when the A-index is equal to 
0 and the E-index is equal to 5. This suggests that on average for every dollar that 
firms with these levels of low financial autonomy and high entrenchment invested 
during the period 1990-2008, the market value of these firms increased by about 
$1.25. In general, the table shows values for marginal q which are greater than 1 in 
the lower-left hand side region o f Table 8.6.
Hence, the estimates o f marginal q presented in Table 8.6 are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the managements of financially dependent firms as measured by the 
A-index who are also entrenched using anti-takeover provisions as measured by the E- 
index will tend to invest in a manner consistent with shareholder wealth maximization 
as measured by marginal q. Thus, the results are consistent with the alternative 
hypothesis H4i as predicted by our theory, and not with the null hypothesis H40. In 
sum, we can conclude that all the results in this section are consistent with the 
predictions of the model in Chapter 6.
8.3.2. Firm valuation
Table 8.7 below presents the results for the firm valuation regression equations. As 
discussed in Chapter 7, these equations are estimated using the Fama-MacBeth 
procedure. The reason why this method is employed is that indices o f corporate 
governance provisions do not change very much over time (Gompers et al., 2003).
Column 1 in Table 8.7 presents a specification in which the Tobin's q is regressed 
on the A-index, the E-index, and several control variables except CF/totalassets (a 
measure of the relative magnitude of firm cash flows). As can be seen in column 1 
while the E-index is negative and significant at the 1% level as predicted, the A-index 
on the other hand is positive and insignificant at any conventional level.
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Table 8.7. Regression estimates -  firm valuation regression equations
This table presents the results o f regressing Tobin’s q on corporate governance and control variables. 
The method employed was originally developed by Fama and MacBeth (1973). Tobin's q equals the 
market value o f the firm at the end o f year t divided by the book value o f total assets at the end of 
year t. A-index is a firm-level index o f financial autonomy computed by adding one point for every 
year, in the previous 7 years, in which a given firm’s cash flows are greater than its investment in 
specific assets. E-index is the entrenchment index created by Bebchuk et al. (2004). CF/totalassets 
equals the firm cash flows during year t divided by total assets at the end o f year t. R&D/totalassets 
equals firm R&D expenditures during year t divided by total assets at the end o f  year t. logtotalassets 
is the natural logarithm o f the book value o f total assets measured at the end o f year t (year t-1) in 
USS. delaware is a dummy variable that takes the value o f 1 if  a firm is incorporated in Delaware and 
zero otherwise, salesgrowth is the annual percentage change in the firm’s total sales between the end 
o f  year t-1 and the end o f year t. logfirmage is the natural logarithm o f firm age measured in years 
since the company’s incorporation. Finally, companies are assigned to two digit SIC industry codes 
and industry dummy variables are also included. * and ** indicate that the coefficient is significant at 
the 1% and 5% level respectively (one tailed t-test). The time series standard errors in parentheses are 
adjusted for serial correlation using the Newey-West (1987) procedure with two lags. Adjusted R2 is 
the average o f the year by year R2 adjusted for degrees o f freedom.________________________________
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
A-index 0.0096 -0.0337* -0.0339* -0.0298**
(0.0138) (0.0133) (0.0135) (0.0126)
E-index -0.0649* -0.0411* -0.0424* -0.0413*
(0.0079) (0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0081)
CF/totalassets 9.4563* 9.4498* 9.3940*
(0.4885) (0.4866) (0.4955)
R&D/totalassets 5.1090* 3.0652** 3.0447** 3.2426**
(1.2810) (1.3926) (1.3781) (1.4398)
logtotalassetst 0.0006 0.0104 0.5796*
(0.0327) (0.0306) (0.1417)
logtotalassets t.] 0.0038 -0.5743*
(0.0288) (0.1290)
delaware -0.0039 -0.0194 -0.0171 -0.0175
(0.0193) (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0181)
salesgrowth 0.8989* 0.4525* 0.4549* 0.2109**
(0.2052) (0.1685) (0.1662) (0.1257)
logfirmage -0.1657* -0.0807** -0.0774** -0.0737**
(0.0455) (0.0363) (0.0356) (0.0359)
Industry dummy variables? yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.2678 0.5066 0.5063 0.5129
Number o f observations 8626 8626 8626 8626
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The reason for the insignificance of the A-index in column 1 should be very clear. 
Financially autonomous firms as measured by the A-index are usually also mature 
firms with large cash flows. Thus, it is essential to separate the positive effect o f large 
cash flows on firm valuation from the negative effect o f a high A-index on firm 
valuation. This is accomplished in column 2 Table 8.7 with the inclusion o f the 
CF/totalassets variable. As can be seen in the second column o f the table where these 
two effects are separated, while CF/totalassets is positive and significant at the 1% 
level the A-index becomes significantly negative at the 1% level. This result is 
interesting because it emphasizes an important point which is often overlooked in the 
literature viz. that large firm cash flows per se should bring about higher firm 
valuations, it is only when the cash flows are larger than the amounts needed to fund 
all positive net present value projects that conflicts o f interest manifested in 
overinvestment occur.
Turning to the control variables, Table 8.7 shows that the coefficient of the 
variable R&D/totalassets, which is presently used as a measure o f R&D expenditures, 
is positive and significant as predicted in Chapter 7. This indicates that a well funded 
R&D expenditures programme does tend to increase firm value as measured by 
Tobin’s q. Next, in contrast to Daines’ (2001) findings, the table shows that the 
coefficient of the delaware dummy variable has a negative sign, but that nevertheless 
it is insignificant at any conventional level. This result suggests that there is no 
statistically significant difference in firm valuation when firms incorporated in 
Delaware are compared to similar firms incorporated in other U.S. states. Further, in 
agreement with the arguments in La Porta et al. (2002) the coefficient of the variable 
salesgrowthpa, which is used here to control for investment opportunities, has a 
positive sign and it is statistically significant at conventional levels. This indicates that 
there is evidence in favour of the argument that firms with better investment 
opportunities tend to have higher Tobin’s qs. Finally, the significantly negative 
coefficient for logfirmage suggests that older firms have on average lower valuations.
On the other hand, columns 1 and 2 in Table 8.7 show that, contrary to the 
predictions in Chapter 7, the coefficient of the variable logtotalassetst (a measure of 
firm size at the end of year t) has a positive sign and that it is insignificant at any 
conventional level. To further examine the effects of firm size on valuation, column 3 
includes logtotalassetst-i (which measures firm size at the end o f year t-1) instead, but 
the result is also a positive and insignificant coefficient.
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Table 8.8. Calculated Tobin's qs for different A-index and E-index combinations
This table presents values for Tobin’s q implied by the estimates in column 4 Table 8.7 for different 
combinations o f the A-index and the E-index. A-index is a firm-level index o f financial autonomy 
computed by adding one point for every year, in the previous 7 years, in which a given firm’s cash 
flows are greater than its investment in specific assets. E-index is the entrenchment index created by 
Bebchuk et al. (2004). Note that in the calculations all other variables are held at their mean values.
A-index
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 1.7717 1.7420 1.7122 1.6824 1.6526 1.6229 1.5931 1.5633
1 1.7305 1.7007 1.6709 1.6411 1.6114 1.5816 1.5518 1.5220
2 1.6892 1.6594 1.6296 1.5998 1.5701 1.5403 1.5105 1.4807
3 1.6479 1.6181 1.5883 1.5586 1.5288 1.4990 1.4692 1.4395
4 1.6066 1.5768 1.5470 1.5173 1.4875 1.4577 1.4279 1.3982
5 1.5653 1.5355 1.5058 1.4760 1.4462 1.4164 1.3867 1.3569
6 1.5240 1.4943 1.4645 1.4347 1.4049 1.3752 1.3454 1.3156
However, column 4 Table 8.7 shows that when both logtotalassetst and 
logtotalassetst-i are included in the same regression equation both coefficients become 
significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, column 4 shows that while the coefficient of 
logtotalassetst is significantly positive, the coefficient o f logtotalassetst.i is 
significantly negative. One possible interpretation of this result is that, the coefficient 
of logtotalassetst-i is significantly negative because large firm size at time t-1 (when 
investment decisions are taken) gives managements protection from the takeover 
threat and allows them to overinvest thus reducing firm value at time t. On the other 
hand, the significantly positive coefficient of logtotalassetst may reflect competitive 
advantages derived from a large firm size at time t, such as market power, which may 
tend to enhance the value of the firm.
Table 8.8 above further illustrates our key firm valuation results. This table 
presents values for Tobin’s q implied by the estimates in column 4 Table 8.7 for 
different combinations o f the A-index and the E-index. Note that in the calculations all 
other variables are held at their mean values.
Clearly, from the values presented in Table 8.8 it can be seen that for high values 
of the A-index firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s q becomes lower as the E-index 
increases. For instance, when the A-index = 7 and the E-index = 1 the Tobin’s q value 
implied by the estimates of Table 8.7 column 4 equals 1.5220. However, when the 
values of the A-index and E-index are 7 and 6 respectively, the implied value for
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Tobin’s q is only 1.3156. Thus, as predicted by the theory in Chapter 6, this result 
rejects the null hypothesis H5o and is consistent with alternative hypothesis H5i 
according to which financially autonomous firms as measured by the A-index with 
entrenched managements as measured by the E-index will have lower valuations as 
measured by Tobin’s q when compared to other financially autonomous firms with 
managements not entrenched using antitakeover provisions.
Moreover, since the evidence in the previous section is consistent with the 
statement that firms with simultaneously high A-index and high E-index tend to over­
invest, there is reason to believe that the disparity in the valuation of the two groups 
of financially autonomous firms above is related to hold-up opportunism: since the 
shareholders o f firms with high values of the A-index and the E-index cannot force 
the managements to disgorge all the free cash flows, the latter can retain part o f the 
funds and invest them at rates below the cost of capital for the firm, thus bringing 
about the low firm valuations.
Similarly, Table 8.8 shows that financially autonomous firms as measured by a 
high A-index with entrenched managements as measured by a high E-index will have 
lower valuations as measured by Tobin’s q when compared to financially dependent 
firms with a low A-index with managements not entrenched as measured by a low E- 
index. For example, when the A-index and the E-index are both equal to zero the 
implied value for Tobin’s q is of 1.7717, however, when the A-index and the E-index 
reach their maximum value the implied value for Tobin’s q is only 1.3156. Therefore, 
this result is consistent with the alternative hypothesis H6i and not with the null 
hypothesis H6o as predicted by the theory in Chapter 6.
Another interesting result suggested by the estimates is that financially dependent 
firms as measured by a low A-index with entrenched managements as measured by a 
high E-index will have lower valuations as measured by Tobin's q when compared to 
financially dependent firms as measured by a low A-index with managements not 
entrenched using antitakeover provisions as measured by a low E-index. For instance, 
when the A-index = 0 and the E-index = 6 the implied value for Tobin’s q is 1.524, on 
the other hand, when A-index and the E-index are both equal to zero the implied value 
for Tobin’s q is of 1.7717. This is consistent with the alternative hypothesis H7j and 
not with the null hypothesis H7o, as predicted by the combined TCE-firm lifecycle 
theory.
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One explanation for the relative low valuation of firms with low A-index but high 
E-index could be that it reflects agency problems. It is difficult, however, to discern 
the nature of the agency problems involved. As discussed in Chapter 6, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) have argued that substantial shareholder expropriation is not feasible in 
the U.S. due to effective institutional shareholder protection. Furthermore, regarding 
the ‘agency costs o f free cash flows,’ it is important to point out that firms in state 4 
are financially dependent (as measured by the A-index) and hence do not have an 
abundance of free cash flows. Also, as indicated in the previous section there is no 
evidence suggesting that these firms over-invest.
On the other hand, it is possible that the low relative valuations for firms with low 
A-index and high E-index are related to the fact that they do not have credible 
corporate governance systems due to the presence of anti-takeover provisions. In 
theory, this should put downward pressure on the market’s valuation of the equity of 
the firm. But then, why don’t these firms remove their anti-takeover provisions in 
order to reduce their costs of external equity? According to the combined TCE-firm 
lifecycle theoretical framework in this thesis, one reason could be that firms in this 
situation are mainly mature companies which have lost their financial autonomy (see 
Chapter 6). As discussed Chapter 6, if prior to the loss o f financial autonomy the 
management o f such mature firms had been over-investing by diversifying into 
unrelated businesses (as suggested by the lifecycle theory, see Chapter 5), added value 
could be realized via improved efficiency by divesting nearly autonomous divisions 
(Mueller, 1972). The low observed valuations would then be the result of the efforts 
of the managements of these companies to keep their corporations in one piece -  
thereby avoiding reductions in the size of their firms.
Finally, please note that the robustness of the results in this section is examined 
further in the Appendix to Chapter 8. In this appendix the observations in the thesis’s 
database are divided into subgroups according to (a) firm size, (b) firm age (measured 
in years) and (c) two broad types of industry classifications, and then subgroup 
investment performance and firm valuation regression equations are run in each case. 
The appendix is designed to demonstrate that by and large our theory’s predictions 
can be expected to hold even if  the samples used had been non-randomly selected 
either by firm size, by firm age, or by industry classification.
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8.4. Accounting measures of firm performance
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the pitfalls associated with the use of 
accounting measures o f firm performance in the context of the lifecycle o f the firm, 
and hence provide justification why these are not being used in the present thesis. 
Particularly, this section will argue that accounting measures o f performance 
constitute biased measures of firm performance. The reason is that, in the calculation 
of such measures of performance, the fact that firms exhibit different rates of 
investment and growth as they go through their lifecycles is ignored, as well as the 
fact that returns from new investments come with a lag.
Table 8.9 in the next page presents the results for the accounting measures of firm 
performance regression equations. As can be seen, the accounting measures examined 
in this section are ROE and ROIC since these are some of the most important in the 
corporate finance and accounting literatures. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 7, a 
modified Fama-MacBeth procedure is used to estimate the regression equations in the 
table. Specifically, the modification in the Fama-MacBeth procedure consists in that 
the yearly cross-sectional regressions are estimated using Least Absolute Deviation 
(LAD) regressions instead o f Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). This econometric 
technique is robust to influential observations (outliers) and it was proposed by 
Gompers et al. (2003, pp. 129-130). Column 1 in the table presents the results of 
regressing ROE on the natural logarithm of firm age and control variables. As can be 
seen, the coefficient of logfirmage is positive and significant at the 5% level as 
predicted in Chapter 7. The results indicate that when firm age increases by 1% ROE 
increases by 0.00769 on average. Clearly, this is consistent with Mueller’s theory in 
Chapter 5 since that theory suggests that firm revenue will increase as firms mature.
Nevertheless, the preceding result ignores the possibility that different firms may 
have lifecycles of different lengths, and that consequently, some firms will see their 
ROE increasing at different rates as they mature. To address this issue, column 2 in 
Table 8.9 presents the results o f regressing ROE on the A-index, the E-index, as well 
as the natural logarithm of firm age and other control variables. As can be seen, while 
the coefficient for the A-index is significantly positive and that for E-index is 
significantly negative (both at the 1% level of significance) as predicted in the 
previous chapter, the coefficient for logfirmage remains positive but becomes 
statistically insignificant. This suggests that the A-index performs a better job when it 
comes to separating young firms from mature ones than firm age measured in years.
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Table 8.9. Regression estimates -  accounting measures of performance equations
This table presents the results o f regressing accounting measures o f firm performance, i.e. Return on 
Equity (ROE) and Return on Invested Capital (ROIC), on corporate governance variables and control 
variables. The estimation method is a modified version o f  the Fama-MacBeth procedure in which the 
yearly cross-sectional regressions are estimated using Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) regressions 
instead o f OLS (see Gompers et al., 2003, pp. 129-130). ROE and ROIC are both taken from 
Datastream. A-index is a firm-level index o f financial autonomy computed by adding one point for 
every year, in the previous 7 years, in which a given firm’s cash flows are greater than its investment 
in specific assets. E-index is the entrenchment index created by Bebchuk et al. (2004). logfirmage is 
the natural logarithm o f firm age measured in years since the company’s incorporation. 
logtotalassets,.] is the natural logarithm o f the book value o f total assets measured at the end o f year t- 
1 in US$. salesgrowth is the annual percentage change in the firm’s total sales between the end o f year 
t-1 and the end o f year t. I/tolalassets,.] equals the M&R measure o f investment during year t divided 
by total assets at the end o f year t-1. Finally, companies are assigned to two digit SIC industry codes 
and industry dummy variables are also included. * and ** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 
the 1% and 5% level respectively (one tailed t-test). The time series standard errors in parentheses are 
adjusted for serial correlation using the Newey-West (1987) procedure with two lags. Average Pseudo 
R2 is the average o f the year by year Pseudo R2._______________________________________
Variable ROE ROIC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A-index 0.7656* 0.4950*
(0.1870) (0.1103)
E-index -0.1579* -0.2046*
(0.0608) (0.0460)
logfirmage 0.7687** 0.2221 -0.0360 -0.2770
(0.3353) (0.3115) (0.1731) (0.1911)
logtotalassets,.] 1.0300* 1.0267* 0.2469** 0.2162
(0.2304) (0.2403) (0.1317) (0.1578)
salesgrowth 11.5569* 12.0957* 6.8402* 7.2207*
(2.0788) (2.0132) (1.3338) (1.4940)
I/totalassets,.] 3.3484* 3.3296* 3.0122* 3.2724*
(1.3430) (1.2624) (1.0101) (1.0663)
Industry dummy variables? yes yes yes yes
A verage Pseudo R 2 0.1034 0.1128 0.1356 0.1484
Num ber o f  observations 8524 8524 8609 8609
As discussed in Chapter 7, the positive sign for the A-index is consistent with the 
hypothesis that firms with a high A-index are mature firms with slow growth, which 
invest comparatively little and are receiving returns from investments undertaken 
several years in the past and will consequently see their current performance 
overstated if measured by ROE. On the other hand, the negative sign for the E-index 
is consistent with the hypothesis that as managers become more entrenched using
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antitakeover provisions they may feel more secure at their post and reduce their 
efforts to produce a strong performance as computed using accounting measures of 
firm performance such as ROE.
Concerning the control variables, columns 1 and 2 of Table 8.9 show that the 
coefficient for logtotalassets, which is used as a measure o f firm size, has a positive 
sign as predicted in Chapter 7, and in addition it is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. This positive relationship between logtotalassets and ROE was expected given 
that for the largest firms the denominator of the accounting measure is likely to 
increase very slowly while at the same time returns should be coming in from 
previous investments. On the other hand, as expected on a priori grounds, the 
coefficient of the salesgrowth variable has a positive sign and it is significant at the 
1% level. This indicates that firms with an excellent sales record in a given year will 
also tend to have higher ROEs. Finally, the coefficient for It/totalassetst.] is also 
positive and significant at the 1% level. As discussed in Chapter 7, this variable is 
included as a proxy for business conditions and it suggests that during favourable 
times when firms invest more heavily accounting measures of firm performance such 
as ROE are also higher.
The results o f regressing ROIC on corporate governance variables and control 
variables are presented in columns 3 and 4 in Table 8.9. Here again we start by 
regressing the accounting measure of firm performance on the natural logarithm of 
firm age and control variables (column 3). Nevertheless, on this occasion the 
coefficient for logfirmage is insignificant at any conventional level. On the other 
hand, when the A-index and the E-index variables are included as shown in column 4 
the results are consistent with the a priori expectations stated in the previous chapter. 
The significantly positive sign for the A-index is consistent with the hypothesis that 
firms with a high A-index are mature firms with slow growth which invest little, are 
receiving returns from investments undertaken in the past and will consequently see 
their current performance overstated if measured by ROIC. On the other hand, the 
significantly negative sign for the E-index is consistent with the hypothesis that as 
managers become more entrenched they may feel more secure and may consequently 
reduce their efforts to produce a strong performance as computed using accounting 
measures o f firm performance such as ROIC.
Turning to the control variables, Table 8.9 shows that the coefficient of the 
variable logtotalassets, which is used as a measure of firm size, has a positive sign as
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predicted in Chapter 7. However, while it is significant at the 5% level in column 3 it 
becomes statistically insignificant when both the A-index and E-index are included as 
shown in column 4. Overall, the fragile positive relationship between logtotalassets 
and ROIC provides some weak support for the view that the largest firms will tend to 
have a higher return on investment given that the denominator of the accounting 
measure is likely to increase more slowly while returns from old investments will still 
be coming in. On the other hand, the coefficient of the salesgrowth variable has a 
positive sign and it is significant at the 1% level as expected. This suggests that firms 
with an excellent sales record in a given year will also tend to have higher ROICs. 
Finally, the coefficient for I/totalassetst.i is also positive and significant at the 1% 
level. As discussed in Chapter 7, this variable is included as a proxy for business 
conditions and it suggests that during favourable times when firms invest more 
heavily accounting measures o f firm performance such as ROIC are also higher.
In sum, the results in this section suggest that accounting measures of firm 
performance such as ROE and ROIC are biased. Since the returns that a company 
may expect from new investments will usually come with a lag, it is logical to infer 
that firms that are undertaking substantial investments (young firms with a low A- 
index) will see their performance understated if assessed using accounting measures 
by a double effect. First, the denominator of the accounting measures o f performance 
for firms that are investing heavily will tend to increase rapidly, and second, the return 
in the numerator of the accounting measures will only increase after an interval of 
time has elapsed so that the investment starts generating income. Hence, it can be 
expected that firms that undertake considerable investment will find their performance 
biased downward by measures such as ROE and ROIC. By the same token, firms that 
are undertaking very little investment or that are retrenching (mature firms with a high 
A-index) may find their performance overstated by accounting measures of 
performance. Since, for these firms, the denominators o f the accounting measures of 
performance will not increase noticeably, while at the same time, the firm will be 
receiving the returns from previous investments, an upward bias in firm accounting 
performance is likely to occur. The significantly positive coefficients o f the A-index 
shown in Table 8.9 provide evidence in support of this conclusion.
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8.5. Conclusion
This chapter has performed statistical tests to determine if  the predictions derived 
from the combined TCE-firm lifecycle model constructed in Chapter 6 are consistent 
with the factual evidence. Using a sample of 475 firms over the period from 1990 to 
2008, and the econometric methods reviewed in Chapter 7, this chapter finds that 
there is significant statistical evidence against the null hypotheses enunciated in 
Chapter 6. Therefore, this chapter concludes that there is substantial evidence in 
favour of the predictions of the model in Chapter 6 (the alternative hypotheses).
In addition, this chapter has examined whether accounting measures such as ROE 
and ROIC are biased measures of firm performance. The evidence suggests that 
accounting measures of performance can be misleading particularly when firms are 
investing heavily since the investments are registered in the firm’s balance sheets as 
the investments take place, but the returns from those investments occur with a lag. 
Moreover, this chapter also suggests that accounting measures can also be misleading 
for slow growth firms because these firms may be benefiting from returns on 
investments that were undertaken in the past, while at the same time, the denominator 
of their accounting measures will not increase very much since there are not many 
new investments being undertaken.
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C hapter 9. Conclusions
9.1. Introduction
The field o f corporate governance and firm performance has witnessed enormous 
progress since its beginnings in the 1970s. Thanks to the effort and resources poured 
in by many researchers, mainly from the AT camp, our knowledge o f the topic has 
increased substantially and countless original contributions have been made. 
However, as in any relatively young area of scientific inquiry there is fundamental 
controversy in need of clarification and theories that need to be refined. In particular, 
the key debate the present work has aimed to contribute to is that which is concerned 
with discerning whether or not there actually exists a relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance.
Given that AT is by far the most popular theory in the field of corporate 
governance and firm performance, this thesis started with a critical review (i.e. 
summary and evaluation) of this paradigm. Importantly, this thesis has criticized this 
literature by (a) arguing that the conflicting results are the consequence of not 
applying the different AT theories to the class o f phenomena they were designed to 
explain1 (b) by illustrating that part of the extant research is in a pre-theoretical stage, 
and (c) by mustering the arguments of AT theorists who have stated that some of their 
own work is flawed (see Chapters 2 and 3). The criticism of the literature is made in a 
constructive spirit. It is hoped that researchers who rely on the AT paradigm will 
carefully consider the present criticism of ideas and either prove it false using sound 
scientific arguments or adopt corrective measures in their future work. Thus, the aim 
of this thesis is not to downplay or in any way diminish the importance of AT, 
instead, as a first contribution, this thesis has carried out a constructive criticism of the 
ideas involved.
Given that no solutions for the gaps in the AT paradigm were apparent, the 
decision was made in this thesis to rely on Nobel laureate O. E. Williamson’s TCE 
approach to guide the enquiry instead.2 One important difficulty with undertaking the 
work from the TCE perspective, however, is that Williamson’s terminology is often
1 Cf. Friedman (1953).
2 In addition, to the criticisms mentioned above there are additional criticisms o f AT that have been 
pointed out in the TCE literature which appear difficult to overcome, e.g. Williamson (2002) argues 
that AT suffers from an exclusive reliance on an ex-ante incentive alignment approach which 
disregards the mechanisms of ex-post governance.
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disconcerting for financial economists steeped in the AT paradigm, and consequently 
there is a danger that some of the key contributions of the thesis may not be fully 
appreciated. A case in point is that for AT scholars the term “transaction costs” refers 
to the costs of carrying out a trade i.e. commissions and the difference between the 
price obtained and the midpoint of the bid-offer spread. However, this is definitely not 
the central meaning attached to the term in TCE. Thus, the proper understanding of 
the meaning o f TCE requires the study o f new terminology and patient consideration 
of how all the TCE concepts fit together.
However, in considering its application to the field of corporate governance and 
firm performance this thesis found that the TCE paradigm required further 
elaboration. Specifically, so far Williamson’s TCE has only considered transactions 
for which the condition o f bilateral dependency between the parties is assumed to 
hold. This has allowed him to conclude that inefficient modes of organization cannot 
persist in the long run. Thus, this thesis contributes to TCE by showing for the first 
time that for the case of corporate governance and firm performance there are 
occasions in which bilateral dependency does not hold and inefficient organizational 
forms can persist for many years, viz. the equity organizational mode when firms are 
financially autonomous and their managers are entrenched. Thus, this thesis presents 
an exception that TCE scholars need to incorporate in their paradigm.
To make TCE applicable to the study o f corporate governance and firm 
performance, and to include situations in which bilateral dependency does not hold, 
this thesis found it necessary to utilize insights taken from a lifecycle theory o f the 
firm. Specifically, D. C. Mueller’s (Mueller, 1969; 1972; 2003) firm lifecycle theory 
was adopted and combined with the TCE paradigm. The key idea behind this 
combination was that the characteristics of the transaction between the shareholders 
and the “control” of the corporation change in predictable ways as the firm matures, 
and that the effects of such changes on firm performance can be unambiguously 
predicted.
Since up to this point the related TCE literature on financing choices has only 
considered situations when bilateral dependency is assumed to hold, this literature has 
only dealt with the traditional TCE problem of the optimal choice between 
governance structures (in this case the debt vs. equity problem, see the references in 
Chapter 4). In contrast, the combined TCE-firm approach in this thesis concentrates 
on the economics of the hybrid form. Therefore, our theory is pioneering in the sense
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that it constitutes the first attempt to expand the new TCE literature on the hybrid 
form to the study of financing problems.
Overall, this thesis contends that the new combined theory developed in the present 
thesis represents an important contribution to the positive economics and finance 
literature since it states clear, testable, predictions which were found to be supported 
by the empirical data.
In the following subsections, the main results and findings and the theoretical and 
practical implications of this doctoral thesis are discussed. Afterwards, the limitations 
of the present work are stated together with the possibilities for future research.
9.2. Main results and findings
The main contribution o f this thesis to its field of study is that it creates a new 
combined TCE-firm lifecycle theory which explains how the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance develops through various stages of the 
lifecycle o f the firm, and that yields unambiguous predictions which are consistent 
with the empirical evidence.
In this regard it is important to note that the thesis does not aim to become a 
contribution to the Agency Theory literature. As discussed previously, the thesis 
argues that for the problem under study the use o f the AT perspective presents serious 
drawbacks. Thus, constructive criticism of AT is provided in the thesis in the hope 
that researchers will adopt corrective measures in their future work. For example, the 
thesis argues that AT is malleable in the sense that starting from its premises 
diametrically opposed conclusions as to the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance can been reached. Hence, it is important to 
emphasize that this thesis aims to contribute to the Transaction Cost Economics 
literature by examining the problem of corporate governance and firm performance 
mainly from a mainly TCE perspective. The contribution o f the theory is primarily to 
TCE and to firm lifecycle theory as well, but not to AT.
On the other hand, the thesis makes an important contribution at the empirical 
level. Specifically, an empirical counterpart for the key TCE concept of bilateral 
dependency/autonomy labelled the “A-index” is developed. As discussed in this 
thesis, this index was constructed as a proxy for the theoretical concept of firm 
financial autonomy. The basic concept that the A-index intends to capture is the 
phenomenon illustrated in Mueller's (1969; 1972; 2003) firm lifecycle theory viz. that
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mature firms will usually have cash flows which are larger than the amounts needed 
to fund all positive net present value projects on a continuing basis, while on the other 
hand, young firms will usually have cash flows which are usually smaller than the 
amount needed for the regular funding of all positive net present value projects.
In addition, this thesis contributes to the lifecycle theory o f the firm by employing 
TCE to mitigate some its weaknesses. For instance, in the lifecycle theory o f the firm 
as proposed by Mueller (1969; 1972; 2003) there is no mention o f the board of 
directors or o f its potential function. This gap is filled in this thesis by making 
reference to the TCE insight that the board constitutes a contractual safeguard which 
is assigned to the shareholders.
Turning to the thesis’ findings, recall that research question that present work has 
aimed to answer is the following: concerning the large publicly held corporation, is 
there a relationship between corporate governance and firm performance?
The results o f the present work indicate that there is substantial evidence in favour 
of the proposition that there actually is a significant relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. Particularly, for the case of the U.S. (Chapter 8) 
the results suggest that when “institutional corporate governance” in the form of a 
takeover threat is neutralized through the issuance of anti-takeover provisions (as 
measured by the E-index), then if the firms in question also receive abundant cash 
flows from their operations on a continuing basis, i.e. in excess of the amounts needed 
to fund all positive net present value projects (as measured by the A-index), the 
managements of those corporations will tend to over-invest substantially. The latter is 
reflected in poor firm investment performance (as measured by marginal q) and 
comparatively low firm valuation (as measured by Tobin’s q). It should be noted that 
in this case, the failure of “institutional corporate governance” (i.e. the takeover 
threat) in constraining over-investment requires as a pre-requisite the failure of “firm- 
level corporate governance” (i.e. the board of directors) in constraining managerial 
opportunism, since it is the board of directors that approves the anti-takeover 
provisions.
In addition, the present doctoral thesis presents a new type o f corporate governance 
problem in which there are no abundant free cash flows (as measured by the A-index) 
and consequently no overinvestment (as measured by marginal q), but firm valuation 
is low (as measured by Tobin’s q). Specifically, the equilibrium situation labelled 
“system state 4” refers to mature firms in old industries that after a period of
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overinvestment become financially dependent on shareholders once again. According 
to the theory these companies will have relatively low valuation because of their 
previous wasteful expansion into unrelated business, but will show no current 
overinvestment given that they do not have free cash flows at the time. In this case, 
shareholders would be better off if the company were dismantled, but this does not 
occur because o f managerial entrenchment.
9.3. Theoretical and practical implications
The theoretical and policy implications of the present work can be best appreciated 
by considering the two fundamental lessons which can be leant from  the mainly TCE 
theory developed in this thesis that we do not learn from  AT.
The first lesson we can learn from our theory that we do not learn from AT is that 
the key to the corporate governance and firm performance question resides in the 
examination of the level of bilateral dependency between the “control” of the 
corporation and its shareholders. This constitutes a sharp departure from the two main 
AT paradigms according to which the emphasis of the analysis should be either on 
firm ownership structure or on the characteristics of the board o f directors.
These differences in emphasis between our theory and AT lead to important 
divergences when considering economic policy recommendations. Specifically, our 
theory leads us to conclude that, assuming that the objective o f a policy maker is to 
improve corporate governance in the sense that managers remain responsive to the 
wishes of the shareholders, there is only one effective policy to be implemented: to 
prohibit the deployment of anti-takeover provisions by the boards o f directors. The 
theory developed in this thesis predicts that if this policy were implemented over­
investment on the part of financially autonomous corporations would be mitigated to a 
moderate level and also conglomerate mergers composed o f unrelated businesses 
would likely be dismantled under the influence of market forces.
This contrasts with the two main AT approaches discussed in this thesis which 
have led many an analyst to conclude that improved corporate governance can also be 
attained by changing (a) ownership structure e.g. through the issuance of stock 
options to managers and/or (b) the composition of the board o f directors e.g. by 
reducing the size of the board, requiring a majority o f outside directors, or any other 
modification in the composition of the board.
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The theory developed in this thesis suggests that neither o f these two AT policy 
recommendations would work. The reason for this conclusion can be found in the 
second lesson that our mainly TCE approach teaches us that we do not learn from  
AT. Namely, that the assumption of opportunistic behaviour in the TCE framework 
implies that a contractual safeguard such as the board o f directors will only work 
properly if  it is in the best interests of both parties that a competent safeguard is put in 
place and maintained.
For example, assume that an AT analyst suggests that the change in board 
composition needed to improve corporate governance could be achieved by issuing 
regulations to the effect that all boards of directors must have a majority of outside 
directors (similar to what the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission implemented 
in late 2003). Even if  we assume -for the sake of argument- that it is the case that the 
vast majority o f outside directors do have strong incentives to protect shareholder 
interests, seen from the perspective our mainly TCE theory it would be naive to think 
that a determined, financially independent and entrenched “control” of the corporation 
would not have the ability to find and successfully elect to the board a sufficient 
number of biased outside directors who would continue to favour its interests. 
Similarly, TCE’s emphasis on opportunism would suggest that a mandated change in 
ownership structure through the issuance of stock options would not work either. If 
the “control” of the corporation is financially independent from shareholders and it is 
sufficiently entrenched it would just use the stock option program to increase its 
wealth at the expense o f the shareholders.
Thus, at the theoretical level a key implication of the present work is that the 
managerial version o f AT proposed by Fama and Jensen (1983), where it is 
hypothesized that the board of directors is an effective mechanism that can control 
agency costs at all times, is incorrect. Indeed, since the board of directors plays a key 
role in the deployment of anti-takeover provisions (which are devices that limit 
shareholder rights), the sole existence of such provisions could be interpreted as 
evidence against Fama and Jensen’s (1983) hypothesis. More importantly, Fama and 
Jensen’s (1983) theory is contradicted by the empirical evidence presented in this 
thesis (see Chapter 8) given that the board of directors seems unable to rein in over­
investment for the case of mature financially autonomous corporations. The key 
contribution of this thesis in this respect is that it provides an explanation on how the 
board of directors becomes unable to rein in managerial opportunism overtime. The
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theory in this thesis explicitly describes how, when firms are young, the board of 
directors is an effective means to contain opportunism, and that eventually, as firms 
mature and become financially independent the problems start to appear. On this issue 
AT is largely silent and no satisfactory explanation is given on how board of directors 
may become ineffective as firms mature.
In addition, when it comes to the correct application and testing of theories a key 
implication of the present thesis is that it is essential to differentiate between theories 
designed to explain entrepreneurial and managerial corporations. Since 
entrepreneurial AT (i.e. Jensen and Meckling, 1976) “fails to explain the large 
modem corporation” (Fama, 1980, p. 289), it should be clear that correct assessment 
of this theory requires that the data used to test the theory excludes large modem 
corporations from the sample. On the other hand, since managerial AT (i.e. Fama and 
Jensen, 1983) was built for the specific case of firms where there is a “separation of 
ownership and control” (among which is the large modem corporation), correct 
evaluation of the theory requires that, in studying corporate governance and firm 
performance, the data used to test the theory are taken exclusively from large modem 
corporations. Based on the finding that these theories are not always applied to the 
type of firms they were designed to explain (see Chapter 3), the conclusion in this 
thesis concerning the mixed results in the AT literature is that the disagreements, 
evidenced by the continuing debate on whether there actually is a relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance, are likely due to the incorrect 
application of the AT models in question.
Finally, this thesis has documented a bias inherent in accounting measures such as 
Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Invested Capital (ROIC). The evidence 
suggests that accounting measures of firm performance can be biased particularly for 
the case o f fast growing firms which invest heavily (e.g. young firms). The reason is 
that, for fast growing firms the investments will be registered in the balance sheets 
contemporaneously, as the projects are put in place, nevertheless the returns from 
those investments will occur with a lag. Moreover, the results in this thesis also 
suggest that accounting measures can also present a bias when measuring the 
performance of slow growing firms (e.g. some mature firms) because these firms may 
be benefiting from returns on investments that were undertaken in the past, while at 
the same time, the denominator of their accounting measures will not increase very 
much given that these companies tend to invest comparatively less.
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9.4. Answers to potential objections and discussion on the limitations of the 
present work
The purpose o f this section is to provide answers to some potential objections to 
the overall approach o f the present doctoral thesis as well as to acknowledge some of 
its limitations. The following discussion examines some key issues on a point by 
point basis.
Objection No. 1: “M ueller’s argument that mature firm s have no profitable 
investment opportunities because they belong to an old industry is not realistic. ”
In fairness to Mueller’s work is it important to point out that his lifecycle theory 
does not assert that mature firms will have no profitable investment opportunities 
because they belong to an old industry. What his theory really asserts is that mature 
firms will have limited investment opportunities in an old industry, that the amounts 
needed to exploit them will be less than the cash flows generated by the firm, and that 
consequently overinvestment will tend to occur. Thus the correct criticism of Mueller 
would be to point out that it is not realistic to assert that mature firms in mature 
industries will always have limited investment opportunities.
The combined TCE-firm lifecycle theory in this thesis attempts to rectify this 
shortcoming by incorporating the possibility that mature firms could become 
financially autonomous once again in a mature industry. This is done in Chapter 6 by 
including a new equilibrium situation which is labelled “system state 4,” which takes 
into account the possibility that mature firms will have abundant profitable investment 
opportunities in a mature industry.
Objection No. 2: “The theoretical framing o f  the work is dated since it relies on 
Mueller’s theory and Williamson’s TCE. Both theories started in the 1970s. In 
addition, the theoretical framing is not particularly convincing. ”
Concerning the first point, it is correct to state that both Mueller’s lifecycle theory 
and Williamson’s TCE started in the 1970s. However, it should be noted that the 
versions of the theories that were employed to construct the combined firm lifecycle 
theory in this thesis rely in both authors ’ latest renditions of their work. Specifically, 
special attention is paid to Williamson (2002) and Mueller (2003).
Williamson’s 2002 paper incorporates all the innovations that TCE has adopted 
over its highly successful development since the 1970s. For example, when TCE
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started Williamson only considered two governance structures: markets and 
hierarchies. In contrast, Williamson (2002) presents an updated version that also pays 
special attention to the hybrid form. On the other hand, Mueller’s (2003) book 
presents a refined version of his 1970s lifecycle theory where important industry 
lifecycle work undertaken since the 1970s is fully acknowledged and compared to his 
own work. Specifically, Mueller (2003, pp. 29-62) discusses extensively the excellent 
work on industry and product lifecycle by Klepper and Grady (1990), Klepper (1996); 
Klepper and Simons (1999) and Klepper and Simons (2000).
But more significant is the fact that the theory in this thesis is primarily a 
contribution to the new TCE literature on the economics of the hybrid form. While it 
is true that the traditional TCE literature on the optimal choice of governance 
structures started in the 1970s, the new literature on the economics o f the hybrid form 
only started in the 1990s (Menard, 2004). Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
theoretical framing o f the present work is not dated.
On the other hand, regarding the objection that the theory is not particularly 
convincing, it is important to point out that such a criterion to decide whether a theory 
should be accepted as part of science has been sharply criticized by philosophers of 
science and it is not endorsed in their field. Just consider the difficulties that Galileo 
had to endure in order to convince his contemporaries that the earth moves, or 
Einstein to convince his peers that time and space are relative, their theories must 
have seemed not only unconvincing but counter-intuitive as well. This is why modem 
science relies on other criteria to decide whether a theory should be accepted such as 
logical consistency, understandability, and testability (Machlup, 1978; Blaug, 1992).
Objection No. 3: “It is hard to see what the additional contribution beyond the work 
o f Mueller is. It is not sufficiently novel to conclude that firm s with large amounts o f  
spare cash and managers who have the ability to spend it without considering 
shareholders to do so at the expense o f  those shareholders. ”
Please note that the theoiy developed in Chapter 6 not only states that if  a firm has 
large amounts of spare cash at a given point in time and the managers are entrenched 
so that they have the ability to waste the cash in unproductive investments then 
overinvestment will occur. According to the theory the crucial point for 
overinvestment to occur is that the managers must also expect that they will continue 
to have free cash flows in an ongoing basis. This is why the A-index is constructed
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using several years in the past: it is important that the managers o f the firm are used to 
have free cash flows most of the time so that they have sufficient confidence to expect 
that shareholder’s equity will not be needed in the foreseeable future. This contrasts 
sharply with work that would only consider contemporary cash flows when measuring 
free cash flow.
But a more original aspect of the theory in Chapter 6 is that it puts forward a new 
type of corporate governance problem in which there are no free cash flows and 
consequently no overinvestment, but firm valuation is low. Specifically, the 
equilibrium situation labelled “system state 4” refers to mature firms in old industries 
that after a period o f overinvestment become financially dependent on shareholders 
once again. According to the theory these companies will have relatively low 
valuation as measured by Tobin’s q because of their previous wasteful expansion into 
unrelated businesses, but will show no current overinvestment as measured by 
marginal q given that they do not have free cash flows anymore as measured by the 
A-index. In this case, shareholders would be better off if  the company were 
dismantled, but this does not occur because of managerial entrenchment.
In addition, note that the theory is pioneering in the sense that it stresses that the 
key to the corporate governance and firm performance question should reside in the 
examination of the level of bilateral dependency between the “control” of the 
corporation and its shareholders. This constitutes a sharp departure from the two 
traditional AT paradigms according to which the emphasis of the analysis should be 
either on firm ownership structure or on the characteristics o f the board o f directors.
Moreover, the emphasis on bilateral dependency and opportunism leads us to the 
important conclusion that a contractual safeguard such as the board o f directors will 
only work well if  it is in the best interests of both parties that a competent safeguard is 
put in place and maintained. The policy implication is that mandatory changes on 
ownership structure and/or board characteristics will not work since the “control” of 
the corporation will tend to adjust to the changes in an opportunistic way, as discussed 
previously. The theory in this doctoral thesis also provides other important 
contributions. As mentioned previously, it provides an explanation on how the board 
of directors becomes unable to rein in managerial opportunism overtime. The theory 
in this thesis explicitly describes how, when firms are young, the board of directors is 
an effective means to contain opportunism, and that eventually, as firms mature and 
become financially independent the problems start to appear.
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But perhaps the clearest way to show that there actually is an additional 
contribution beyond the work of Mueller would be to consult him on his opinion on 
the thesis’ theory. The present author sent D.C. Mueller an early draft of a paper 
containing the combined TCE-firm lifecycle theory in this thesis which the thesis’ 
supervisor, Dr. Chen, kindly agreed to co-author. On an email dated January 5th 2009 
Mueller sent us the following message:
Gentlemen,
Burcin Yurtoglu gave me your article to read. You have done a very nice job combining 
transaction cost economics and the life cycle theory. I have no real substantive 
criticisms. At its present length, it will be hard to sell to a journal. Discussion of 
methodology for developing economic theories could be cut [...]
Good luck with your research. DCM
If Mueller has no substantive criticisms and considers that the work could be sent 
to a journal it is clear that he sees that there is a substantial contribution in the 
combined theory.
Objection No. 4: “Filatotchev and Wright have recently written on corporate 
governance over the lifecycle, this literature is overlooked. ”
During the literature review phase of this thesis the present author did examine the 
recent work on corporate governance over the lifecycle o f the firm by Filatotchev and 
Wright (2005). These researchers develop a very interesting theory of the lifecycle of 
corporate governance by combining AT with the resource base perspective, where the 
two key theoretical variables of the combined model are (i) the firm’s “organizational 
resource base”, and (ii) “transparency/accountability.” Unfortunately, however, the 
authors do not develop empirical indicators for these two variables and consequently 
are not yet able to present statistical tests of their theory.
Instead, in the different parts of Filatotchev and Wright’s book, we are presented 
with measurements o f ownership structure, measurements of characteristics of the 
boards of directors, and statistical tests using these variables. It is important to note 
that, in so far as it relates to corporate governance and firm performance, this type of 
empirical work is already covered in Chapters 2 and 3 of the present thesis.
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Now, absent direct empirical tests of their theory it is very easy to criticize 
Filatotchev and Wright’s work by arguing, for example, that given the vagueness of 
the concepts employed (i.e. the theoretical variables in their new model) it will prove 
impossible to create the necessary empirical indicators to test the theory, and that for 
this reason the theory is not really scientific {Cf. Friedman, 1953; Dubin, 1978; Blaug, 
1992). However, it was in my opinion counterproductive to provide such strong 
criticism of their theory without first giving the authors the opportunity to show that 
they can actually develop empirical measures of their theoretical variables and test 
their theory. It is important for the progress o f science that new and innovative 
approaches such as that o f Filatotchev and Wright are not shut down in their very 
beginnings, but be given a fair chance to demonstrate their worth.
Objection No. 5: “Literature other than that concerning corporate governance and 
firm  performance is overlooked. ”
The topic o f the present thesis is that of corporate governance and firm 
performance and for this reason the main focus of the critical review of the literature 
is on this subject matter. Clearly, no doctoral thesis can provide a critical review of all 
the possible contiguous fields to its subject matter because of limitations of time, 
resources and writing space. Nevertheless, to address this issue the present thesis has 
provided references to papers that offer reviews o f other literatures different than that 
of corporate governance and firm performance. For example, in Chapter 4 reference is 
made to papers that provide summaries on the literature on the choice of debt vs. 
equity and the new literature on the hybrid form, in Chapter 5 reference is made to 
papers which offer reviews of the literature on rates o f return over the lifecycle of the 
firm, conglomerate mergers, etc.
It is important to stress that the present work constitutes the first attempt to expand 
the new TCE literature on the hybrid form to the study of financing problems. That is, 
this is the first work to provide an in depth treatment on how the important TCE 
concepts o f bilateral dependency, opportunism, contractual safeguards and institutions 
apply to the equity governance structure (one of the hybrid forms). As discussed in 
Chapter 4, TCE scholars have not yet examined in any detail whether bilateral 
dependency holds for the case of mature firms with large free cash flows. Instead, the 
entire TCE field has thus far assumed that bilateral dependency will always hold and 
that, for this reason, waste will always be minimized. This thesis represents an
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exception to this view. Clearly -and this is the important point I wish to make here- 
since this is the first contribution to this area there can be no literature review: the 
present work encompasses it in its entirety.
In addition, the assumption that bilateral dependency will always hold also helps to 
explain why TCE has had no impact in the field o f corporate governance and firm 
performance and why, when TCE is mentioned at all, it only appears as a footnote in 
an otherwise managerial AT presentation. Since TCE theorists always assume that 
bilateral dependency holds they tend to see the boards of directors as permanently 
effective constraints on managerial opportunism. Clearly, this is just too similar a 
point to that which Fama and Jensen made in their famous managerial AT paper 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983) to draw any special attention to TCE from empirical 
researchers in the field. In view of this similarity, in this thesis any managerial AT 
paper in which TCE appears in the manner indicated above is considered part of the 
managerial AT literature and is classified as such in Chapter 3.
Objection No. 6: “Since the database is indirectly based on the publications o f  the 
Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) there is a danger that it contains 
large/mature firm s only. Thus the sample would not allow us to say anything about 
small/young companies. ”
Despite the fact that the database is indirectly based on the publications o f IRRC, 
the sample description in Chapter 8 shows that the thesis’s sample contains firms with 
considerable variation in their age, sizes and other characteristics, and is adequate for 
the purposes of testing the relevant hypotheses.
Certainly, Chapter 8 demonstrates that the thesis’s sample does contain a 
considerable number o f small firms. For instance, it is shown that there are over 1000 
firm-year observations in the database where firm total assets are less than US$ 500 
million (in 200 observations total assets are less than $180 million).3 On the other 
hand, the chapter shows that there are also very large firms in the database, e.g., there 
are more than 500 firm-year observations in which company total assets are greater 
than US$ 25,000 million. Therefore, it can be concluded that the sample contains a 
reasonably varied range o f company sizes, including a large number of small 
companies.
3 Total assets are deflated using CPI (2000 = 1).
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Additionally, Chapter 8 reveals that the sample contains a substantial number of 
young firms as evidenced by the fact that there are over 1000 firm-year observations 
in the database where firm age measured in years since company incorporation is 
lower than 30 years (in 358 observations firm age is 15 years or less since 
incorporation). On the other hand, Chapter 8 also shows that there are over 700 firm- 
year observations in the sample where firm age measured in years since company 
incorporation is greater than 105 years. Consequently, it can be concluded that the 
sample contains a reasonably varied range of company ages, including a large number 
of young companies.
Please also note that the theory in the present thesis (see Chapter 6) is intended to 
apply to the kinds o f firms in the thesis sample (see the sample description in Chapter 
8). Application o f the theory to phenomena to other than that it is designed to explain 
would result in a procedural error (Friedman, 1953; Dubin, 1978, Whetten, 1989).
Limitations o f  the present work
One limitation o f the present study is that it is an information intensive approach. 
In order to be applied, the theory in this thesis requires detailed information on the 
corporate governance o f a given country both at the firm and institutional levels. For 
example, at the firm-level this thesis relies on information gathered in previous 
studies regarding the evolution of firm ownership, the characteristics o f boards of 
directors, and firm cash flows. On the other hand, at the institutional level this thesis 
takes into account factors such as law enforcement, the historical evolution o f the 
takeover constraint, and the possibility that anti-takeover provisions may be deployed.
Thus in this sense, the main strength of this thesis, i.e. its careful attention to detail, 
it is also a limitation. It is possible that future researchers may find it difficult to apply 
the theory in countries where this information is not available. Indeed, it would 
certainly be a mistake to attempt to apply the theoretical framework o f this thesis 
without first gathering information about all the relevant details. This is one of the 
main reasons why this thesis’s empirical research concentrates on the United States. 
Since the U.S. has received a good deal of attention on the part of corporate scholars, 
it is feasible to gather the necessary information about the relevant facts.
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9.5. Possibilities for future research
The theories studied in this doctoral research point to possibilities for future 
research in the fields o f (a) corporate finance and (b) development economics.
First, concerning corporate finance, it is interesting to note that some of the 
seminal theories in this branch o f economics and finance hold that the payment of 
dividends on the part of firms and their choices of capital structures are either 
irrelevant (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Miller and Modigliani, 1961) or puzzles (e.g. 
Black, 1976). In contrast, however, according to both TCE (Williamson, 1988) and 
the lifecycle theory o f the firm (Mueller, 1969; 1972), these two phenomena are 
neither irrelevant, nor puzzles.
For example, according to the lifecycle of the firm, the payment of dividends 
phenomenon occurs when the level of a firm’s cash flows exceeds the level of 
profitable investment opportunities on an ongoing basis (i.e. when firms reach 
financial autonomy). To investigate this possibility logit regressions could be 
implemented in which the dependent dummy variable takes the value o f 1 if a firm is 
a dividend payer, and zero otherwise, and is regressed on the A-index and control 
variables. According to the lifecycle theory of the firm, the results should show that 
firms with higher A-indices are significantly more likely to be dividend payers. Thus, 
the theories studied in this thesis open possibilities to study dividend payments over 
the lifecycle o f the firm.
As another example, consider firm capital structure. According to TCE firms 
which have an abundance of redeployable assets, such as is the case of over­
diversified conglomerate empires, should have on average higher levels o f leverage 
when compared to other firms. As it may be recalled, the reason is that according to 
TCE redeployable assets are more efficiently financed with debt. Moreover, as 
discussed in Chapter 6, and according to the results in Chapter 8, there is reason to 
believe that such over-diversified firms should be firms with high A-index and E- 
index values. Thus, in order to investigate this possibility measures o f firm leverage 
(i.e. both book and market leverage) could be regressed on the A-index, the E-index 
and control variables. According to TCE and the combined TCE-firm lifecycle 
framework, the results should show that firms with high A-index and E-index values 
should have, on average, significantly higher levels of leverage. Therefore, the 
combined framework in this thesis opens possibilities for future research in the field
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of corporate finance that have the potential o f answering some o f the most interesting 
phenomena in this branch of economics and finance.
Finally, the combined TCE-firm lifecycle theory opens possibilities for future 
research in the area of development economics, an area with a primary interest in 
economic growth. For example, since the combined TCE-lifecycle theory in this 
thesis suggests that young firms grow very fast while on the other hand, mature firms 
grow very slowly (see Chapter 6), it follows that in order to have a rapidly growing 
economy is essential that a country has the mechanisms necessary for young firms to 
raise the necessary amounts of debt and equity. In this respect the existence o f a well- 
functioning capital market coupled with strong corporate governance mechanisms is 
essential. While firms in countries with deficient capital markets may possibly raise 
sufficient debt from banks to finance investment in redeployable projects, it is 
conceivable that they will not always be able to raise sufficient equity to finance 
investment in non-redeployable projects. Therefore, it is possible that young firms in 
countries with deficient capital markets are constrained in their investments due to 
lack of access to equity finance, and consequently are inhibited in their rate of growth. 
Could the availability o f equity finance to young firms affect a country’s rate of 
economic growth?
9.6. Conclusion
This chapter has concluded the present doctoral research by presenting the main 
results and findings of the thesis. The chief contribution of the present work to 
economics and finance as positive sciences is the construction of a combined TCE- 
firm lifecycle theoretical framework which explains and predicts the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance in the context o f American 
institutions and thereby fills important gaps in the extant literature. Moreover, this 
chapter has stated the thesis’ theoretical and practical implications. Finally, chapter 
has stated the limitations o f the present work and some possibilities for a future 
programme of research which could be based on the combined TCE-firm lifecycle 
theory developed in this thesis.
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Appendices
Appendix to Chapter 3
This appendix presents a series o f tables pertaining to the review o f the empirical 
literature on corporate governance and firm performance discussed in Chapter 3. The 
purpose o f the tables is to complement the discussion in that chapter and also to sum 
up the main characteristics and conclusions of some o f the most important empirical 
papers in this branch o f economics and finance.
The first table in this appendix, Table A.3.1, summarizes the empirical literature 
inspired by the entrepreneurial model by Jensen and Meckling (1976), in which the 
key variables are ownership structure and firm performance. The next two tables, 
Tables A.3.2.1 and Table A.3.2.2, summarize the empirical work inspired by the 
managerial model in Fama and Jensen (1983), where the key variables are board 
composition and firm performance. Finally, Table A.3.3 reviews a more recent 
literature, also based on agency theory, which studies the relationship between 
corporate governance as reflected in indices of anti-takeover provisions, and firm 
performance.
The tables in this appendix describe the relevant papers in detail. For instance 
consider Table A.3.1 -the opening table in the appendix. The first two columns in 
Table A.3.1 show the name of the author, information about the publication o f the 
article and the country in which the study was performed. The third and fourth 
columns describe the data from which the results were estimated. Finally, the last two 
columns summarize the research approach, that is, how the data was gathered and 
analyzed, and the results and conclusions reached on each of the scientific papers 
summarized in the tables.
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Appendix to C hapter 7
A.7. Technical description of selected econometric methods
The objective o f this appendix is to provide a technical description of the 
econometric methods to be used in the present thesis. After discussing topics related 
to regression analysis, the Fama-MacBeth technique will be discussed followed by the 
method o f Least Absolute Deviations (LAD).
A. 7.1. The Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM)
In econometrics, the statistical method of regression analysis is the most important 
tool used to test the empirical validity of economic theories (Gujarati, 2003, p. 7). 
Among the regression analysis techniques, one of the most commonly used is the 
Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM).
In the simplest (two-variable) case the CLRM “is used for testing hypotheses about 
the relationship between a dependent variable Y  and an independent or explanatory 
variable A” (Salvatore and Reagle, 2002, p. 128). In such cases the Population 
Regression Function (PRF) can be written as follows:
Yi = b0 + b1X i + Ui (A.7.1)
The CLRM procedure involves estimating the values of the two population 
parameters bo and bj, and the statistical significance of their estimates, where the 
reliability of the statistical procedure depends critically on the validity of the 
assumptions about the error term For small samples, the assumptions underpinning 
CLRM are the following:
The error term is assumed to be (1) normally distributed, with (2) zero expected value 
or mean, (3) constant variance, and it is further assumed (4) that the error terms are 
uncorrelated or unrelated to each other, and (5) that the explanatory variable assumes 
fixed values in repeated sampling (so that and w, are also uncorrelated).
(Salvatore and Reagle, 2002, p. 128)
As the number of independent variables in an econometric model increases the 
derivation of formulas for the calculations of the parameters and standard error
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estimators increase in difficulty. Moreover, the tediousness o f the calculations needed 
to compute the estimates increases considerably. In order to address these difficulties, 
when econometricians work with multi-variable models they generally resort to the 
use of matrix algebra. Matrix notation offers substantial advantages in conciseness of 
notation and calculation. Moreover, the matrix algebra approach is very flexible since 
the formulas derived using it work for any number of independent variables 
(Salvatore and Reagle, 2002, p. 159). Accordingly, this subsection shows how the 
CLRM can be written using matrix notation.
Given that the M&R “marginal q” method generally involves the use o f panel data 
with time fixed  effects, this section also presents a discussion of such techniques. 
Finally, please note that the discussion is based on lecture notes prepared by R.G. 
Pierse, professor o f econometrics at The University o f  Surrey. The notes correspond to 
the econometrics course for the 2005-2006 academic year.
A.7.1.1. The CLRM in matrix notation
The PRF of the CLRM can be re-expressed in a more convenient format in matrix 
notation as
Y = Xb + u (A.7.2)
Where Y and u are n x 1 column vectors, b is a Æ x 1 column vector and X is an « x 
k  matrix where each column corresponds to a different explanatory variable plus the 
intercept term. For example, for an equation with three parameters {k = 3) and n 
observations:
Y =
Y,
y 2 u =
Ui
U2 b =
b0
b, X =
1
1
X„
X ,2
X21
x 22
Yn
V J Un L J
b2
1 Xin Xzn^
As it can be seen, “[b]y convention, when the regression contains an intercept, this 
[is] the first column of the matrix X [and consists] of a vector of ones, corresponding 
to the intercept in the model” (Pierse, 2006).
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A.7.1.2. The OLSestimator
Since it is usually not possible to obtain all the observations in a population to 
estimate the PRF in Eq. (A.7.2), a Sample Regression Function (SRF) is estimated 
instead using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. The OLS method is a 
procedure for minimizing the sum of squared residuals, where the residuals are 
defined as the vertical distances between the actual observations o f the dependent
variable T) and the fitted values o f this variable 7 , , and are denoted by e which is a 
column vector o f dimension % x 1 . The formula of the OLS estimators for an equation 
with k  parameters (the derivation of which can be found in any econometrics 
textbook) expressed using matrix algebra is the following:
= (X'X ) " 1 X 'Y (A.7.3)
Where, bQ, bx,.. .b k are estimators of the unknown population parameters bo, b],...
b/c respectively, and the particular values obtained from the formula above are known 
as parameter estimates.
The purpose of most econometric studies is to find estimates o f the population 
parameters using the formula above. However, since all that the researcher usually has 
is a sample, once the estimates are calculated the question then arises o f how accurate 
these estimates are. The solution to this problem resides in the use o f probabilities: 
what is the probability that the value of an estimate is not due to chance?
A. 7.1.3. The variance o f  the OLS estimates
To test for the statistical significance of the parameter estimates, a formula to
compute unbiased standard errors of bQ, 6 , . . . bk is required. Such formula can be
conveniently derived using matrix algebra and is presented below (the derivation of 
this formula can be found in any econometrics textbook). As in the previous case, the 
formula works for any number of parameters, e.g. for an equation with 3  parameters:
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Sa c o v % ,6 J  cov(b0,b2)
bo
c o v % ,6 J  s* cov(Z>!, b2 )
b\
cov(Z>0 , b2 ) co\{bx,b2) si
bi
= (e'e)/(n-k) (X'X)"' (A.7.4)
Where, the residuals can be computed using e = Y-X b
Note that the standard errors of the OLS parameter estimates are simply the square 
roots of the variances, = b l  , s A = [si , and sA = [si .
bo \  bo bi V b\ b2 \  62
A.7.1.4. Hypothesis testing procedure
Since by assumption the error term is normally distributed, econometricians have
argued that 7, and b0 , b{ ...b k are also normally distributed (Salvatore and Reagle, 
2002, p. 131). Based on this argument, a common procedure in econometrics is to use
the t distribution with n-k degrees o f freedom to test hypotheses about bQ, bx ...b k .
Where k is the number o f parameters in the regression (e.g. for the three variable case 
k = 3), and n is the number of observations in the sample. This means that using a 
table of the t distribution (available in all econometric textbooks) a researcher can 
determine the level o f statistical significance of the parameter estimates. More
precisely, to test hypotheses about bQ, bx ...b k the following t-tests can be employed:
tls= h ^ >t^ h z K t _ h = h z h .  (A.7.5)
Si Si s~Do bl by
Where, according to the econometricians’ arguments, these t-statistics follow the t 
distribution with n-k degrees of freedom.
Usually, in econometrics the objective of these /-tests is to find out whether the 
parameter estimates are significantly different from zero. In these cases, the typical 
null hypothesis is stated as H0: bk = 0, with the alternative hypothesis Hi: bk 4- 0. If, 
after performing the tests, a researcher finds that some o f the parameter estimates are 
statistically different from zero at some level o f confidence (usually at the 5% level), 
then he will have some evidence that the parameter estimates obtained by OLS are not
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due to pure chance, and can therefore expect to find similar results if  a new sample is 
obtained and the OLS procedure is repeated. Conversely, if  after performing the tests, 
the researcher finds that some of the parameters are not statistically different from 
zero at some level of confidence (e.g. 5%), then he can conclude that there exists no 
strong relationship between the dependent variable and the respective independent 
variables.
When researchers do not have theoretical a priori guidance as to what the expected 
sign of the population parameters should be, the usual procedure is to perform two- 
tailed t-tests as the one just described. On the other hand, when there are good a 
priori theoretical reasons to expect particular signs for the parameters, one-tailed t- 
tests can be employed. For instance, for the case of the Mueller and Reardon (1993) 
model, there are good a priori reasons for expecting that the sign o f the depreciation 
rate estimate {5t) should be negative, while on the other hand, there is reason to 
believe that the marginal q {qmt) estimate should have a positive sign. Thus in this 
case one-tailed t-tests could be employed. The key point to keep in mind is that the 
use of a priori theoretical information can help the researcher make better use of the 
statistical power o f the f-tests through the use of one-tailed critical values.
On another vein, as discussed in chapter 6 , the M&R model suggests that firms 
with estimated “marginal qs” which are smaller than one are over-investing. This 
means that it is important to be able to determine statistically whether a particular 
marginal q estimate is significantly smaller than one. In this case, t-tests can also be 
employed to test the relevant hypothesis. This can be done by stating relevant null 
hypothesis as follows Ho: > 1 (that the parameter estimate is equal or greater than
one), with the alternative hypothesis Hi: bk< 1 (that the parameter estimate is smaller 
than one), where a one-tailed /-test is indicated. If  f* is smaller than the critical value 
with n-k degrees of freedom at a certain level of significance (e.g. 5 %), the null 
hypothesis that the parameter estimate is equal or greater than one can be rejected, 
and therefore the researcher can conclude that the parameter estimate is significantly 
smaller than one at the relevant level of significance. Otherwise, the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected.
In addition, it is important to stress that when a sample size is “small” the validity 
of the t-tests depends strongly on the assumption that the error term is normally 
distributed. Clearly, the problem is that this assumption may not hold in practice.
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Fortunately, however, as Wooldridge (2009, p. 174) argues, if  the error term is not 
normally distributed, econometricians can use the central limit theorem to conclude 
that “the OLS estimators satisfy asymptotic normality, which means that they are 
approximately normally distributed in large enough sample sizes.” Since the size of 
the sample to be employed in the empirical chapter of this thesis (i.e. chapter 8 ) is 
considerably large, the assumption concerning the relevant distributions in this 
chapter will be that they are asymptotically normal and that, consequently, the t 
statistics have approximately t distributions.
Finally, it should be noted that in most econometric studies it is typical to report 
the coefficient o f determination R2, which is a measure o f the degree to which the
A
variation in the actual observations 7, is explained by the fitted values 7 , .  R ranges 
from 0 to 1, where 1 corresponds to the case when all the actual observations 7, fall in 
the estimated SRF, while on the other hand, 0 refers to the case when none of the 
variation in 7, is explained by the estimated SRF. Moreover, a modified version of 
this coefficient called “adjusted R2” is also typically reported in econometric work. To 
save space these coefficients will not be discussed here, but please note that an 
examination of this topic is available from Gujarati (2003, pp. 217-223).
A.7.2. Panel data analysis
Panel data refers to the pooling of observations on a cross-section o f clusters (i.e. 
individuals, firms, countries, etc.) over several time periods. Given that panel data, 
which are preferable to strictly cross-sectional or time series data (Hsiao, 2003, pp. 1- 
8 ), are available to test the hypotheses in the present thesis (as it will be shown in 
chapter 8 ) this subsection will discuss some of the basics of panel data analysis. The 
panel data model can be written as (Pierse, 2006):
Yu = x„b + uit, (A.7.6)
where i= \ , . . .  ,n  and t=  1,..., T
Where, Yit is the observation on the dependent variable 7  for the zth cross-sectional 
unit in the fth period, \ it is a 7 x k-1 vector of observations on k-1 explanatory 
variables for the /th individual in the tth period, b is a k-1 x 1 vector of parameters, and 
uu is the error term associated with the observation o f the z'th cross-sectional unit in the
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/th period. Note that to facilitate the discussion in this subsection the regression 
equation does not contain an intercept term (it includes k-1 explanatory variables).
A. 7.2.1. The time fixed  effects model
In panel data analysis assumptions about the error term in Eq. (A.7.6) play a 
crucial role. The most common assumption is that the error contains an unobservable 
individual effect at and a disturbance v,, as follows (Pierse, 2006):
uu = Qi + vu (A.7.7)
Where, the unobservable individual effect at is supposed to capture time invariant 
characteristics o f individual i which are not picked up by the variables in xz>.
Two different models can be derived from the above according to the assumptions 
about the individual specific effects a,: the “individual fixed effects” model and the 
“random effects” model (Pierse, 2006). Where, the individual fixed effects model has 
the purpose o f controlling for effects that are constant over time but differ across 
clusters (i.e. individuals, firms, countries, etc.).
On the other hand, however, it could be the case that there are effects that are 
constant across clusters but change over time. This is the rationale behind the time
fixed  effects model. For brevity, this section discusses the time fixed effects model
only since it is the most relevant for this thesis. The time fixed effects model assumes 
that the error contains a time effect 6t and a disturbance Wu as follows (adapted from 
Pierse, 2006):
Uit=0t + Wit (A.7.8)
Where the time effect is supposed to capture the effects that have the same value 
for all clusters (individuals, firms, countries, etc) but that change over time, and that 
are not picked up by the x,-, variables in Eq. (A.7.6).
The model in Eq. (A.7.6) can be rewritten as (Pierse, 2006):
Y = Xb + u (A.7.9)
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Where Y is a «7  x 1 vector, X is an nT  x k-1 matrix, b is a k-1 x 1 vector of 
parameters, and u is an «7  x i  vector of error terms defined by
u = (ir  0  l/z)e + w (A.7.10)
Where, I 7  is an identity matrix o f order 7, i„ is a 77 x 1 vector of ones, 0 is an 7  x 1
vector of time specific disturbances and w is an nT  x 1 vector o f remainder 
disturbances.
The time fixed effects model assumes that the time specific effects 0 are 
parameters to be estimated, and moreover, that the disturbance component w is 
consistent with the assumptions of the CLRM enumerated in Section A.7.1. Based on 
these assumptions, the model in Eq. (A.7.9) and Eq. (A.7.10) can be rewritten as:
Y = Xb + D0 + w (A.7.11)
Where, D = (I7  0 i„ )  is an nT  x 7  matrix of dummy variables (adapted from 
Pierse, 2006). Mueller and Reardon (1993) estimate this model by OLS.
Finally, note that if  the regression equation contains an intercept one o f the 
columns of the matrix o f dummy variables D must be dropped in order to avoid 
falling in the dummy variable trap.
A. 7.3. The Fama-MacBeth procedure
The purpose o f this subsection is to describe the Fama-MacBeth procedure (Fama 
and MacBeth, 1973) and to show how it can be utilized to test hypotheses concerning 
parameter estimates. The importance of the Fama-MacBeth procedure for the 
purposes of the present thesis resides in that it is the main procedure applied by 
researchers who have studied empirically the relationship between corporate 
governance indices (which do not vary very much over time) and firm valuation (see 
e.g., (Tempers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al. 2004).
The main feature of the Fama-MacBeth procedure is that instead o f running a 
single pooled regression, as is usually the case with panel data models, one cross- 
sectional regression is run for each year in the panel. Consider the case o f a panel data 
model with two parameters (k=2). The first step in the Fama-MacBeth procedure in
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this case is to run the following cross-sectional regression equation for each year in 
the panel (from / = 1 to / = 7):
Yj — bot  + bu  X i  + Cj (A.7.12)
The second step in the Fama-MacBeth procedure is to compute the parameter 
estimates as the average o f the cross-sectional regression estimates:
A 1 r  A A 1 T  A
bo = —^ b o ,  and bi = —^^bu  (A.7.13)
T  z=i T  /=1
Thirdly and finally, to estimate the standard errors, the standard deviations of the 
cross-sectional regression estimates are used:
' i .  l ¥ ( F = l ) t ( L ' 4 o ) 2  and st. 4 l ) 2  ( A - 7 ' 1 4 )
Under the assumption that the parameter estimates are normally distributed, t- 
statistics will follow the t distribution with n-k degrees o f freedom. Hence, to test the 
hypothesis that the parameter estimates are significantly different from zero t-tests can 
be employed.
A. 7.4. The Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) method
Finally, this appendix is concerned with the method of Least Absolute Deviations 
(LAD). As mentioned previously, this method will be applied to estimate regression 
equations in situations in which the presence of outliers is expected to be a common 
occurrence, e.g. when accounting ratios such as Return on Equity (ROE) are included 
as variables in econometric models (Gompers et al., 2003, p. 129).
A A A
The LAD estimators o f the unknown population parameters bQ, bx,.. .b k minimize 
the sum of the absolute values of the residuals as follows (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 330):
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min V
6o,6i,...6t 1
^  — b o  —  b i  J C n  —  . . .  —  b k  X t] (A.7.15)
Since the LAD estimates are not available in closed form, however, no formulas 
for these estimates can be provided.
As mentioned by Wooldridge (2009, p. 330) the advantage o f LAD with respect to 
OLS in dealing with outliers is that “LAD does not give increasing weight to larger 
residuals,” and therefore, “it is much less sensitive to changes in the extreme values of 
the data than OLS.” Since LAD is less sensitive to outliers than OLS, the LAD 
method will be used in this thesis in order to guard against the influence that outliers 
can have on OLS estimates.
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Appendix to C hapter 8
A.8. Robustness of the results
The purpose of this appendix is to provide further evidence in favour o f the 
predictions of the combined TCE-firm lifecycle theory developed in Chapter 6. This 
is accomplished by running a series o f investment performance and firm valuation 
subgroup regression equations. Specifically, in this appendix the observations in the 
thesis's database are divided into subgroups according to (a) firm size, (b) firm age 
and (c) two broad types of industry classifications (“manufacturing” which includes 
firms with SIC codes 20-39, and “other” which comprises non-manufacturing firms 
i.e. all other SIC codes in the database), and then subgroup investment performance 
and firm valuation regression equations are run in each case. The key aim of this 
appendix is to illustrate that by and large the thesis' results can be expected to hold 
even if the samples used had been non-randomly selected either by firm size, by firm 
age (measured in years), or by industry classification.1
A.8.1. Investment performance: subgroup regressions
Lets us discuss, firstly, the investment performance subgroup regression results. 
Table A.8.1 in the next page presents the results of dividing the observations in 
thesis's database in three firm size subgroups with a comparable number of 
observations each and then running M&R investment performance regression 
equations (specifically Eq. (7.3) in Chapter 7). The first subgroup contains firms with 
assets o f 1.25 billion or less, the second firms with assets between 1.25 and 5 billion, 
and the third firms with assets greater than 5 billion.
As can be seen in the table, the investment performance results obtained in Chapter 
8 hold. In particular, note that the key A-index and E-index coefficients for the three 
firm size subgroup regression equations have the negative signs expected on a priori 
grounds and are statistically significant at conventional levels. Also note that the 
coefficient of the natural logarithm of total assets has a negative sign, as predicted by 
theory, in the three equations but it is significant in the second and third subgroup 
regressions only.
1 In fact, this ought to be the case provided there is sufficient variation in the subgroup samples. 
According to econometric theory non-random sampling based on the independent variables o f a 
regression equation should not cause any statistical problems (e.g. bias or inconsistency) for the types 
of techniques employed to obtain the key results in this thesis (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2009, p. 323).
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Table A.8.1. M&R investment performance equations and firm size
This table presents estimates o f ‘marginal q’ for firms in the thesis’ database grouped by firm size over 
the time period from 1990 to 2008. The technique employed was originally developed by Mueller and 
Reardon (1993). The estimation method is OLS. The dependent variable is (MrMt.J/M,.,, which is the 
percentage change in the market value o f the firm between the end o f year t-1 and the end o f year t. 
I/M,.] is the investment undertaken by a given firm during year t divided by the market value o f the 
firm at the end o f year \- \ .  A-index is a firm-level index o f financial autonomy computed by adding one 
point for every year, in the previous 7 years, in which a given firm’s cash flows are greater than its 
investment in specific assets. E-index is the entrenchment index created by Bebchuk et al. (2004). 
logtotalassets^x is the natural logarithm o f the book value o f total assets measured at the end o f year t-1 
in US$. delaware is a dummy variable that takes the value o f 1 if  a firm is incorporated in Delaware 
and zero otherwise, logfirmage is the natural logarithm o f  firm age measured in years since the 
company’s incorporation. The regressions include year dummy variables to pick up movements in 
stock market values which are common to all firms. Moreover, each company is assigned to a two digit 
SIC industry code and industry dummy variables are also included. *, ** and *** indicate that the 
coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively (one tailed t-test). Following 
Petersen (2009) standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses.________________________
Variable < USD 1.25 billion
USD 1.25 billion < 
x <  USD 5 billion
> USD 5 
billion
(1) (2) (3)
W - y 2.3901*** 6.6823* 2.5562*
(1.5831) (1.4319) (0.8724)
(logfirmage, )I/M ,.1 0.0061 -0.0661 -0.0382
(0.0898) (0.1043) (0.0772)
(A-index, )I/M ,.l -0.0909* -0.0557* -0.0599*
(0.0271) (0.0185) (0.0219)
(E-index, -0.0510*** -0.0821* -0.0682*
(0.0392) (0.0338) (0.0266)
(logtotalassets^I/M ,., -0.0325 -0.2277* -0.0410***
(0.0815) (0.0727) (0.0318)
(delaware, )I/M,.i -0.0687 -0.1492*** 0.0535
(0.1123) (0.0955) (0.0604)
Industry dummy variables? yes yes yes
Time dummy variables? yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.3421 0.3345 0.4524
Number o f observations 2867 2922 2829
In contrast, the coefficient of the natural logarithm of firm age changes signs from the 
first to the second columns and it is insignificant at conventional levels in all three 
subgroups. Similarly, the coefficient of the delaware dummy variable changes signs 
from the second to the third columns and it is only significant in the second regression 
equation.
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On the other hand, Table A.8.2 in the next page shows the results of dividing the 
observations in the thesis's database in three firm age subgroups with a similar 
number o f observations each, and then running M&R investment performance 
regression equations (specifically Eq. (7.3), Chapter 7). The first subgroup contains 
firms aged 48 years or less, the second firms with ages between 48 and 80 years, and 
the third firms with ages greater than 80 years.
As can be seen, for the three subgroups the key A-index and E-index coefficients 
have the negative signs expected on a priori grounds. However, in this case they are 
statistically significant at conventional levels only in the first two columns in the 
table. Clearly, one likely explanation for this result is that there is not sufficient 
variation in the third subgroup (firms with ages greater than 80 years) for the OLS 
formulas to estimate the coefficients properly. Thus, for example, if  we introduce 
additional variation to the third subgroup by adding to it all firms with less than 20 
years of age in the sample (561 observations) and then rerun the regression, the values 
o f the A-index and E-index coefficients become -0.079 and -0.077 respectively, both 
significant at the 1% level (in this last regression n = 3491 and adjusted R2 = 0.3715).
Moreover, note that the coefficient of the natural logarithm of total assets changes 
signs in the third subgroup regression and it is statistically significant only the second 
subgroup regression. Similarly, the coefficient of the natural logarithm of firm age 
changes signs twice from one subgroup equation to the next and it only has the 
predicted sign and is statistically significant in the second column in Table A.8.2. 
Conversely, the coefficient of the delaware dummy variable is insignificant in all 
three regression equations.
Finally, Table A.8.3 below presents the results of dividing the observations in the 
thesis's database in two broad types of industry classifications (“manufacturing” 
which includes firms with SIC codes 20-39, and “other” which comprises non­
manufacturing firms i.e. all other SIC codes in the database) and then running M&R 
investment performance regression equations. Importantly, the results in the table 
show that the A-index and E-index coefficients for the two industry subgroup 
regression equations have the negative signs expected on theoretical grounds and in 
both columns are statistically significant at conventional levels. Also the coefficient of 
the natural logarithm of total assets has the negative sign predicted by theory in the 
two equations but it is significant in the “manufacturing” subgroup regression only.
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Table A.8.2. M&R investment performance equations and firm age
This table presents estimates o f ‘marginal q’ for firms in the thesis’ database grouped by firm age over 
the time period from 1990 to 2008. The technique employed was originally developed by Mueller and 
Reardon (1993). The estimation method is OLS. The dependent variable is which is the
percentage change in the market value o f the firm between the end o f year t-1 and the end o f year t. 
I/M/.j is the investment undertaken by a given firm during year t divided by the market value o f the 
firm at the end o f  year t-1. A-index is a firm-level index o f financial autonomy computed by adding one 
point for every year, in the previous 7 years, in which a given firm’s cash flows are greater than its 
investment in specific assets. E-index is the entrenchment index created by Bebchuk et al. (2004). 
logtotalassets^.x is the natural logarithm o f the book value o f total assets measured at the end o f year t-1 
in US$. delaware is a dummy variable that takes the value o f 1 if  a firm is incorporated in Delaware 
and zero otherwise, logfirmage is the natural logarithm o f  firm age measured in years since the 
company’s incorporation. The regressions include year dummy variables to pick up movements in 
stock market values which are common to all firms. Moreover, each company is assigned to a two digit 
SIC industry code and industry dummy variables are also included. *, ** and *** indicate that the 
coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively (one tailed t-test). Following
Variable < 48 years 48 yrs < x < 80 yrs > 80 years
(1) (2) (3)
1.6314** 5.9874* 0.4564
(0.8363) (1.0623) (1.0881)
(logfirmage, 0.0931 -0.4979** 0.0061
(0.1034) (0.2154) (0.2049)
(A-index, )I/M ,.I -0.0861* -0.0492** -0.0078
(0.0237) (0.0211) (0.0215)
(E-index,)I/M,.j -0.0980* -0.0635* -0.0232
(0.0371) (0.0258) (0.0225)
(logtotalassetSifil/M,.! -0.0055 -0.1120* 0.0265
(0.0397) (0.0281) (0.0299)
(delaware, -0.0731 -0.0979 0.0677
(0.1165) (0.0789) (0.0706)
Industry dummy variables? yes yes yes
Time dummy variables? yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.3160 0.4114 0.4546
Number o f observations 2823 2865 2930
In addition, Table A.8.3 in the next page shows that the coefficient of the natural 
logarithm of firm age changes signs from the first to the second column and it is 
marginally significant in the second subgroup regression only where it has the 
negative sign predicted by theory. Finally, the coefficient for the delaware dummy 
variable is insignificant in both subgroup regression equations.
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Table A.8.3. M&R investment performance equations and industry classification
This table presents estimates o f ‘marginal q’ for firms in the thesis’ database. The observations are 
grouped in two broad types o f industries: “manufacturing” includes firms with SIC codes 20-39, while 
non-manufacturing firms grouped under “other”. M&R regression equations are estimated separately for 
the two industry classifications. The time period under study is 1990 to 2008. The technique employed 
was originally developed by Mueller and Reardon (1993). The estimation method is OLS. The dependent 
variable is (Mr Mt.1)/M l.i, which is the percentage change in the market value o f the firm between the end 
of year t-1 and the end o f year t. I/M,., is the investment undertaken by a given firm during year t divided 
by the market value o f the firm at the end o f  year t- \. A-index is a firm-level index o f  financial autonomy 
computed by adding one point for every year, in the previous 7 years, in which a given firm’s cash flows 
are greater than its investment in specific assets. E-index is the entrenchment index created by Bebchuk et 
al. (2004). logtotalassetsx.x is the natural logarithm o f the book value o f total assets measured at the end of 
year t-1 in US$. delaware is a dummy variable that takes the value o f 1 if  a firm is incorporated in 
Delaware and zero otherwise, logfirmage is the natural logarithm o f firm age measured in years since the 
company’s incorporation. The regressions include year dummy variables to pick up movements in stock 
market values which are common to all firms. Moreover, each company is assigned to a two digit SIC 
industry code and industry dummy variables are also included. *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient 
is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively (one tailed t-test). Following Petersen (2009) 
standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses._________________________________________
Variable Manufacturing Other
(1) (2)
W - / 2.6535* 2.3402*
(0.5921) (0.6695)
(logfirmage, )I/M t_, 0.0262 -0.0847***
(0.1024) (0.0620)
(A-index, )I/M ,.} -0.0870* -0.0462*
(0.0230) (0.0152)
(E-index, -0.0692** -0.0555**
(0.0309) (0.0252)
(logtoialassetst.x)I/M,., -0.0483*** -0.0263
(0.0344) (0.0286)
(delaware, )I/M ,., -0.0972 -0.0052
(0.0938) (0.0692)
Industry dummy variables? yes yes
Time dummy variables? yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.3640 0.3721
Number o f observations 4663 3955
In sum, from the evidence shown in this subsection we conclude that by and large 
the key results o f the M&R investment performance regression equations presented in 
Chapter 8 should hold even if the sample had been non-randomly selected either by 
firm size, by firm age (measured in years), or industry classification.
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A.8.2. Firm valuation: subgroup regressions
Let us now turn to examine the firm valuation subgroup regression results. Table 
A.8.4 in the next page presents the results of dividing the observations in thesis's 
database in three firm size subgroups with a comparable number o f observations each, 
and then running firm valuation regression equations (i.e. regressions o f Tobin’s q on 
corporate governance and control variables). The first subgroup contains firms with 
assets of 1.25 billion or less, the second firms with assets between 1.25 and 5 billion, 
and the third firms with assets greater than 5 billion.
As can be seen, the key A-index and E-index coefficients have the negative signs 
expected on a priori grounds in all three subgroup regressions and are statistically 
significant in the two larger firm subgroups but not in the smaller firm subgroup. One 
explanation for the insignificant A-index and E-index coefficients in the first column 
is that there is not sufficient variation in the first subgroup (firms with assets of 1.25 
billion or less) for the proper estimation of these coefficients. Thus, for example, if  we 
introduce additional variation to the first subgroup by adding to it all firms with assets 
greater than 25 billion in the sample (592 observations) and run the regression anew, 
the values of the A-index and E-index coefficients become -0.0283 and -0.0234 
respectively both statistically significant at the 5% level (in this regression n = 3464 
and adjusted R2 = 0.4884).
Turning to the control variables, Table A.8.4 shows that the coefficient of the 
variables CF/totalassets and R&D/totalassets are positive and significant for all three 
subgroups, consistent with the results in Chapter 8 and as expected on a priori 
grounds. In addition, the coefficients for logtotalassetst and logtotalassetst-i are 
statistically significant in the three firm size subgroups and their signs are also those 
expected on a priori grounds. Furthermore, consistent with the results presented in 
Chapter 8, the coefficient of the delaware dummy variable is insignificant in all three 
subgroup regression equations.
Conversely, the coefficient of salesgrowth is statistically significant in the second 
and third columns where it has the positive sign predicted by theory, while it is 
insignificant and of the "wrong" sign in the first column. Finally, the coefficient of 
logfirmage is only statistically significant in the third column where it has a negative 
sign as expected on a priori grounds, while it is insignificant in the first and second 
columns where its sign switches from negative to positive.
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Table A.8.4. Tobin's q regression equations and firm size
This table presents the results o f regressing Tobin’s q on corporate governance and control variables for 
firms in the thesis’ database grouped by firm size over the time period from 1990 to 2008. The method 
employed was originally developed by Fama and MacBeth (1973). Tobin’s q equals the market value 
o f the firm at the end o f year t divided by the book value o f total assets at the end o f year t. A-index is a 
firm-level index o f financial autonomy computed by adding one point for every year, in the previous 7 
years, in which a given firm’s cash flows are greater than its investment in specific assets. E-index is 
the entrenchment index created by Bebchuk et al. (2004). CF/totalassets equals the firm cash flows 
during year t divided by total assets at the end o f year t. R&D/totalassets equals firm R&D 
expenditures during year t divided by total assets at the end o f year t. logtotalassets is the natural 
logarithm of the book value o f total assets measured at the end o f year t (year t-1) in US$. delaware is a 
dummy variable that takes the value o f 1 if  a firm is incorporated in Delaware and zero otherwise. 
salesgrowth is the annual percentage change in the firm’s total sales between the end o f year t-1 and 
the end o f year t. logfirmage is the natural logarithm o f firm age measured in years since the company’s 
incorporation. Finally, companies are assigned to two digit SIC industry codes and industry dummy 
variables are also included. *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively (one tailed t-test). The time series standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for 
serial correlation using the Newey-West (1987) procedure with two lags. Adjusted R2 is the average o f  
the year by year R2 adjusted for degrees o f freedom.___________________ ___________________________
Variable < USD 1.25 billion
USD 1.25 billion < 
x < USD 5 billion
▻ USD 5 
billion
(1) (2) (3)
A-index -0.0151 -0.0322** -0.0244***
(0.0188) (0.0151) (0.0163)
E-index -0.0048 -0.0669* -0.0421*
(0.0162) (0.0180) (0.0068)
CF/totalassets 8.5997* 10.0985* 10.4847*
(0.7053) (0.5269) (1.0140)
R&D/totalassets 3.0014** 1.5067*** 6.0048***
(1.3746) (1.0800) (3.5364)
logtotalassets, 0.7090* 0.5362* 0.4053**
(0.2008) (0.1174) (0.1675)
logtotalassets,.. -0.7295* -0.5494* -0.3828*
(0.2015) (0.1271) (0.1480)
delaware 0.0338 -0.0230 -0.0126
(0.0521) (0.0302) (0.0290)
salesgrowth -0.0191 0.3279*** 0.3963***
(0.1931) (0.2127) (0.2558)
logfirmage -0.0995 0.0111 -0.2114*
(0.0764) (0.0267) (0.0704)
Industry dummy variables? yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.4496 0.5071 0.6153
Number o f observations 2872 2925 2829
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On the other hand, Table A.8.5 in the next page shows the results of dividing the 
observations in the thesis's database in three firm age subgroups and then running 
firm valuation regression equations (i.e. regressions o f Tobin’s q on corporate 
governance and control variables). The first subgroup contains firms aged 48 or less, 
the second firms with ages between 48 and 80, and the third firms with ages greater 
than 80.
As can be seen, the key A-index and E-index coefficients have the negative signs 
expected on a priori grounds in all three subgroup regressions. In addition, while the 
coefficient of the E-index is statistically significant in all three columns, the 
coefficient o f the A-index is highly significant in columns 2 and 3 but not in the first 
column (here again it can be shown that the reason for the insignificant A-index 
coefficient in the first column is that there is not sufficient variation in the youngest 
firm subgroup for the proper estimation of this coefficient).
Switching our attention to the control variables, Table A.8.5 shows that the 
coefficient of the variables CF/totalassets and R&D/totalassets are positive and 
significant for all three subgroups, consistent with the results in Chapter 8 and as 
expected on a priori grounds. In addition, the coefficients for logtotalassetst and 
logtotalassetst.] are statistically significant in the three firm size subgroups and their 
signs are also those expected on a priori grounds. Furthermore, the coefficient of the 
delaware dummy variable is negative and statistically significant in the first column 
and positive and significant in the third column, while it is negative and insignificant 
in the second column.
Moreover, the coefficient of salesgrowth is statistically significant in the first and 
second columns while it is insignificant in the third column, in all three columns 
however, it presents the positive sign expected on theoretical grounds. Additionally, 
the coefficient o f logfirmage is negative and statistically significant in the first column 
and positive and significant in the third column, while it is negative and insignificant 
in the second column.
Finally, Table A.8.6 below presents the results of dividing the observations in the 
thesis's database in two broad types of industry classifications (“manufacturing” 
which includes firms with SIC codes 20-39, and “other” which comprises non­
manufacturing firms i.e. all other SIC codes in the database) and then running firm 
valuation regression equations.
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Table A.8.5. Tobin's q regression equations and firm age
This table presents the results o f regressing Tobin’s q on corporate governance and control variables for 
firms in the thesis’ database grouped by firm age over the time period from 1990 to 2008. The method 
employed was originally developed by Fama and MacBeth (1973). Tobin’s q equals the market value 
o f the firm at the end o f year t divided by the book value o f total assets at the end o f year t. A-index is a 
firm-level index o f financial autonomy computed by adding one point for every year, in the previous 7 
years, in which a given firm’s cash flows are greater than its investment in specific assets. E-index is 
the entrenchment index created by Bebchuk et al. (2004). CF/toîalassets equals the firm cash flows 
during year t divided by total assets at the end o f year t. R&D/totalassets equals firm R&D 
expenditures during year t divided by total assets at the end o f year t. logtotalassets is the natural 
logarithm o f the book value o f total assets measured at the end o f year t (year t-1) in US$. delaware is a 
dummy variable that takes the value o f 1 if  a firm is incorporated in Delaware and zero otherwise. 
salesgrowth is the annual percentage change in the firm’s total sales between the end o f year t-1 and 
the end o f year t. logfirmage is the natural logarithm o f firm age measured in years since the company’s 
incorporation. Finally, companies are assigned to two digit SIC industry codes and industry dummy 
variables are also included. *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively (one tailed t-test). The time series standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for 
serial correlation using the Newey-West (1987) procedure with two lags. Adjusted R2 is the average of 
the year by year R2 adjusted for degrees o f freedom.______________________________________________
Variable < 48 years 48 yrs < x < 80 yrs > 80 years
(1) (2) (3)
A-index -0.0018 -0.0343* -0.0705*
(0.0166) (0.0085) (0.0228)
E-index -0.0594* -0.0585* -0.0218***
(0.0149) (0.0130) (0.0135)
CF/totalassets 10.6157* 7.3395* 8.9964*
(0.6883) (0.6307) (0.4027)
R&D/totalassets 2.4740*** 4.7520* 8.0468*
(1.5380) (1.2582) (2.3888)
logtotalassetst 0.8327* 0.3170* 0.2152**
(0.2460) (0.0873) (0.1019)
logtotalassets,.] -0.7686* -0.3394* -0.2371*
(0.2257) (0.0797) (0.0906)
delaware -0.2232* -0.0004 0.2185*
(0.0620) (0.0265) (0.0439)
salesgrowth 0.4053* 0.1337*** 0.2550
(0.1175) (0.0990) (0.2379)
logfirmage -0.2857* -0.0023 0.1400***
(0.0683) (0.1421) (0.0829)
Industry dummy variables? yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.5033 0.4797 0.5850
Number o f observations 2828 2866 2932
2 0 0
Importantly, the results in Table A.8.6 in the next page show that, in both industry 
subgroup regression equations, the A-index and E-index coefficients have the negative 
signs expected on theoretical grounds and are statistically significant at conventional 
levels.
On the other hand, consistent with the results in Chapter 8 and as expected on a 
priori grounds, Table A.8.6 shows that the coefficient o f CF/totalassets and 
R&D/totalassets are positive and significant in the two industry subgroup regressions. 
In addition, the coefficients for logtotalassetst and logtotalassetst.i are statistically 
significant in both industry subgroup regressions and their signs are also those 
expected on a priori grounds. Moreover, the coefficient o f the delaware dummy 
variable is positive and statistically significant in the first column, while it is negative 
and significant in the second column.
Furthermore, the coefficient of salesgrowth is statistically insignificant in the first 
column while it is significant in the second column, in both instances however, it 
presents the positive sign expected on theoretical grounds. In addition, the coefficient 
o f logfirmage is statistically insignificant in the first column but it is significant in the 
second column, in both cases sign of the coefficient is negative as expected on a priori 
grounds.
Overall, from the evidence shown in this subsection we conclude that the key 
results o f the firm valuation regression equations presented in Chapter 8 should hold 
most of the time, even when the sample is not non-randomly selected either by firm 
size, by firm age, or industry classification.
201
Table A.8.6. Tobin's q regression equations and industry classification
This table presents the results o f regressing Tobin’s q on corporate governance and control variables. The 
observations are grouped in two broad types o f industries: “manufacturing” includes firms with SIC 
codes 20-39, while non-manufacturing firms are grouped under “other”. The regression equations are 
estimated separately for the two industry classifications. The time period under study is 1990 to 2008. 
The method employed was originally developed by Fama and MacBeth (1973). Tobin's q equals the 
market value o f the firm at the end o f year t divided by the book value o f total assets at the end o f year t. 
A-index is a firm-level index o f financial autonomy computed by adding one point for every year, in the 
previous 7 years, in which a given firm’s cash flows are greater than its investment in specific assets. E- 
index is the entrenchment index created by Bebchuk et al. (2004). CF/totalassets equals the firm cash 
flows during year t divided by total assets at the end o f year t. R&D/totalassets equals firm R&D 
expenditures during year t divided by total assets at the end o f year t. logtotalassets is the natural 
logarithm o f the book value o f total assets measured at the end o f year t (year t-1) in US $. delaware is a 
dummy variable that takes the value o f 1 if  a firm is incorporated in Delaware and zero otherwise. 
salesgrowth is the annual percentage change in the firm’s total sales between the end o f year t-1 and the 
end o f year t. logfirmage is the natural logarithm o f firm age measured in years since the company’s 
incorporation. Finally, companies are assigned to two digit SIC industry codes and industry dummy 
variables are also included. *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively (one tailed t-test). The time series standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for 
serial correlation using the Newey-West (1987) procedure with two lags. Adjusted R2 is the average o f  
the year by year R2 adjusted for degrees o f freedom.__________
Variable Manufacturing Other
(1) (2)
A-index -0.0280** -0.0311**
(0.0144) (0.0136)
E-index -0.0413* -0.0395*
(0.0070) (0.0089)
CF/totalassets 9.9412* 8.8262*
(0.4096) (0.7526)
R&D/totalassets 2.0071*** 4.9138*
(1.4450) (1.3759)
logtotalassetst 0.5079* 0.8151*
(0.1727) (0.1538)
logtotalassetst.] -0.5237* -0.7763*
(0.1552) (0.1556)
delaware 0.0531** -0.1069**
(0.0214) (0.0487)
salesgrowth 0.2290 0.2233***
(0.1935) (0.1454)
logfirmage -0.0421 -0.1038*
(0.0749) (0.0263)
Industry dummy variables? yes yes
Adjusted R2
Number o f observations
0.5108
4670
0.5023
3956
2 0 2
